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Strategic behaviour, barriers to entry and barriers to mobility: 
An investigation into the European airline industry from 1993 to 1997 
 
by Hans J. Huber 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates entry barriers and the way they impact on strategic behavior 
and pricing in the context of deregulation within the European airline industry. By 
using contestability theory to approximate a theoretical optimum, identified entry 
barriers and their impact on prices can be measured. 35 densely traveled city pairs 
are examined and clusters are formed that define strategic groups according to 
operational characteristics. Two clusters that were particularly relevant in the context 
of liberalization are selected: incumbent routes and routes where new service was 
started. Price changes in these groups were regressed against suspected entry 
barriers. Hub dominance and excess capacity in flight frequency on such hubs, along 
with intercontinental flights and, to a lesser extent, control of computer reservation 
systems were found to explain significant deviations from market contestability within 
the most competitive price segments. Successful incumbents are able to replace 
regulatory barriers by economic barriers to entry.  
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I Introduction 
 
Under the influence of deregulation of domestic air transport in the US in 1978 and 
the signing of the Single European Act in 1986, the European Council aimed to 
achieve an internal market in the air transport sector. The Council passed legislation 
under Article 84(2) to abolish the many existing bilateral restrictions on competition 
and to move from a bilateral to a multilateral system. 
 
I.1 From the first to the third package of airline deregulation 
 
The Single European Act came into effect on 1 July 1987. The liberalization of air 
transport envisaged in the Act was begun, though it was done stage by stage 
because of the different positions which the member states took towards 
liberalization. Among these, the UK, the Netherlands and Eire were the foremost 
advocates of liberalization; Germany, France, Spain and Italy on the other hand, with 
their state owned and heavily subsidized national flag carriers, were at the rear. The 
process of liberalization was carried out in three stages; each stage usually termed 
the first, second and third packages, respectively. The first package was adopted by 
the Council in 1987, the second in 1990 and the third in June 1992. 
 
The first package contained regulations laying down the procedure for the application 
of competition rules to the air transport sector, as a result of which Articles 85 and 86 
may be fully applied to all air transport within the Community.1 The Commission was 
given powers to grant block exemptions for certain agreements between airlines on 
capacity and revenue sharing, non-binding tariff consultations and access to airport 
facilities.2 A system was also introduced for the approval of air fares by member 
states which allowed for flexible pricing together with a relaxation of capacity controls 
between member states and freer market entry.3
 
The second package included provisions for further relaxation of the requirement for 
fare approvals by national governments, allowing the designation of several carriers  
                                                          
1 Council regulation No.EEC/3975/87 (O.J.1987 L 374/1). 
2 Council regulation No.EEC/3976/87 (O.J.1987 L 374/9). 
3 Council Directive No.87/601/EEC (O.J:1987 L374/12). 
on certain routes and providing access to third, fourth and fifth freedom traffic rights 
on scheduled flights within the Community. In addition, quota sharing of passengers 
was progressively abolished.4
 
The great leap forward took place on 23 June 1992 when the Council adopted three 
regulations which together form the third package.5 The completion of the internal 
market was due to be completed at the same time as the third phase of the 
Commission’s programme to liberalize air transport in the EC came into operation, 
with the result that airlines could no longer rely on government protection and had to 
adapt to the more competitive environment in which the rules of the market determine 
success or failure. 
 
The provisions of the third package meant first of all that free tariff-fixing was allowed 
from 1 January 1993 subject to certain safeguards to prevent excessively high or low 
fares.6 Secondly, a Community-wide procedure for licensing carriers was introduced, 
which meant that any airline which met the specified requirements must be granted 
an operating license:7 “The regulation on licensing is at first sight a regulatory 
measure … However, its main importance is as a liberatory measure, because any 
airline which meets the specified requirements as to financial fitness, technical fitness 
and nationality of ownership and control, must be granted an operating license. In 
other words, member states are no longer allowed to continue the monopoly policies 
which they often previously operated in respect of national carriers: if an airline 
satisfies the basic requirements it must be granted a license by its home member 
state and then be allowed to operate to almost any destination within the 
Community”(Balfour 1994, p.1028). This regulation on access requires member 
states to allow any licensed Community carrier to operate between any two points 
within the Community.8
 
                                                          
4 Council regulations No.EEC/2342/90 and No.EEC/2343/90 (O.J.1990 L 217/1 and 8). 
5 Council regulations No.EEC/2407/92 and No.EEC/2409/92 (O.J.1992 L 240/1 and 15). 
6 In such cases, the member state may ask the Commission to examine the fare and decide whether 
or not the Commission can approve it (Council Regulation No.EEC/2409/92). 
7 In Council Regulation No.EEC/2407/92 (O.J.No.1992 L 240/1). 
8 Council Regulation No.EEC/2408/92. 
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As a third point, the remaining restrictions on cabotage, which applied during the 
transitional period starting on 1 January 1993, were removed from 1 April 1997.9 With 
that measure, the Commission hopes that the many routes within the Community 
which are still served inefficiently or not at all will provide opportunities for new 
entrant airlines, as the prognosis for success is good because of the absence of 
competition on such routes. As this part of the third package would only take full 
effect in 1997, liberalization effects due to the lifting of cabotage restrictions are 
considered beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Although the third package may be considered successful in the sense that the 
number of airlines in the EC has increased between 1993 and 1997, this did not 
necessarily reflect in increased competitiveness on routes dominated by the big, 
established airlines: 94% of the routes within the Community were still mono- or 
duopolized in 1996 (Storm 1995, p.35). New entrant airlines have been forced to use 
a lot of resources just to stay in the market and the established airlines have not 
experienced the increase in competition they were expected to.  
 
I.2 Three different schools of entry barriers 
 
This research intends to empirically show the linkage between the observed absence 
of competitiveness on European routes and barriers to entry, as they are specific to 
this industry. Barriers to entry and mobility explain important aspects of the strategic 
behaviour of industry incumbents. Any dynamic interpretation of incumbents’ 
behaviour needs to take into account the underlying barriers in the specific industry.  
 
Barriers to entry and barriers to mobility have a long tradition in the domain of 
industrial organization. Bain (1956) defines as a barrier to entry anything that allows 
incumbent firms to earn surpranormal profits without the threat of entry. Stigler (1968) 
defines an entry barrier to be present when the potential entrants face costs greater 
than those incurred by a firm now incumbent in the industry. In contrast, Von 
Weizsäcker (1980) defines an entry barrier as an impediment to the flow of resources 
                                                          
9 See Council Regulation No.EEC/2408/92. The reason why cabotage was not liberalized completely 
until 1 April 1997 was strong resistance from the larger EC countries, which at the time when the third 
package came into operation were not ready to open their domestic markets and to allow competition 
on busy routes. 
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into the industry, arising as a result of socially excessive protection of incumbent 
firms. According to him, a barrier is an undefined object whose presence is to be 
judged only in terms of its undesirable consequences for social welfare. These three 
definitions of entry barriers can be characterized as three schools: the structuralist 
school (Bain), the Chicago school of efficiency (Stigler) and the normative school 
(Von Weizsäcker).10
 
The structuralist school 
Bain argues that the “condition of entry is determined…by the advantages of 
established sellers in an industry over potential sellers”, with the comparison made 
between the pre-entry profits of established firms and the post-entry profits of 
entrants. Thus, a barrier to entry exists if an entrant cannot achieve the profit levels 
post-entry that the incumbent enjoyed prior to its arrival. Further, he argues that  
“…the condition of entry is…primarily a structural situation…[which] describes…the 
circumstances in which the potentiality of competition will or will not become actual” 
(Bain 1956, p. 3). He suggests three kinds of behaviour by incumbents in the face of 
an entry threat: blockaded entry, deterred entry and accommodated entry. He 
distinguishes between the fundamental structural conditions which create 
asymmetries between firms and the strategic behaviour of incumbents which exploit 
them. He argues that asymmetries in outcome ultimately (i.e. in the long run) rest on 
structural factors. 
 
The Chicago school of efficiency 
Stigler’s view of barriers contrasts with Bain’s. He proposes that: “…a barrier to entry 
may be defined as a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) which must 
be borne by firms which seek to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in 
the industry” (Stigler 1968, p. 67). The primary conceptual difference between Stigler 
and Bain is that, in the former case, the entrant and incumbent are compared post-
entry: a barrier exists if the two are not equally efficient after the costs of entering the 
industry are taken into account. Bain’s emphasis on the conditions of entry assigns 
an entry barrier to any industry in which structural conditions exist that permit an 
established firm to elevate prices above the minimum average cost of potential  
                                                          
10 The following characterizations of each school are to a great extent shortened reviews from Gilbert’s 
introduction in Geroski, Gilbert and Jacquemin (1990) 
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entrants. Stigler considers an entry barrier to exist only if the conditions of entry are 
less difficult for established firms than for new entrants. Although Stigler’s definition 
may appear somewhat ambiguous, in terms of measuring these barriers or when 
accounting for revenue-based, not cost-based, sources as barriers (i.e. product 
differentiation), his definition remains applicable in its broader generalized sense.  
 
The practical distinction between Bain and Stigler lies in the evaluation of economies 
of scale. Economies of scale, according to Bain, are barriers to entry due to the 
structural advantages they provide to the incumbent, whether the incumbent 
operates at minimum efficient scale or not. With Stigler, such economies do not 
present barriers if the incumbent is forced, after entry happens, to produce at 
suboptimal levels together with the entrant. Stigler attributes such cost disadvantages 
to new conditions in demand for the incumbent after entry, and not to the existence of 
particular barriers to entry. 
 
The normative school 
Von Weizsäcker’s concern is not with the factors that impede the mobility of capital, 
but rather with “socially undesirable limitations to entry of resources which are due to 
protection of resource owners already in the market” (Von Weizsäcker 1980, p. 13). 
His definition is a normative qualification of the definition proposed by Stigler: “…a 
cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) which must be borne by firms 
which seek to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry, and 
which implies a distortion in the use of economic resources from the social point of 
view.” This definition implies that there could be too little entry due to excessive 
protection, as well as too much entry due to too little protection.  
 
With new entrants likely to create excess capacity, economic surplus would increase 
with increased costs of entry as well. In cases where entry costs increased total 
economic surplus, von Weizsäcker’s definition of entry barriers would not apply. 
Demsetz (1982) has further extended this normative approach by arguing that, in 
many cases, what is called an entry barrier is an endogenous response to consumer 
preferences and supports an efficient allocation of resources. Rather than allowing 
resources into high profit industries, it might be better to take into account the role of 
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externalities, information and transaction costs, and to consider entry barriers as a 
valuable second best answer to real world frictions.  
 
The major strength of this approach - its normative focus - is also the source of its 
major weakness. It is difficult enough to determine and measure barriers to entry 
without adding an additional layer of normative complexity. Normative issues can still 
be discussed after a barrier has been identified and measured.  
 
Returning to the focus of this thesis, we then ask: “Based upon our understanding of 
barriers to entry (and to mobility): What types of entry barriers can we identify and 
how do they apply to the airline industry? And what are the likely consequences, 
especially in terms of firms’ strategic behaviour and pricing, of such barriers?” 
Ultimately, it was my intention in this thesis to develop a methodology that depicts the 
impact of entry barriers and strategic behaviour on the airline industry’s choices in 
pricing and output following deregulation in Europe. 
 
Obviously, the concepts behind the different types of barriers to entry needed to be 
closely examined. I also had to understand the impact of these barriers for 
incumbents in terms of strategic behaviour and how this applied specifically to the 
examined industry. As studies advanced on the subject, it became clear that eminent 
economists had developed different models that partially contradicted each other - 
models that remained theoretic and were subject to many constraints. How could I 
apply such theory and its potential predictive power to the real world of airlines and 
their changed competitive environment? Being convinced that the concept of entry 
barriers was highly relevant for real-world industry analysis, I decided that one way to 
advance was to understand the industry and to find relatively detailed operational 
data for capacity and prices that were used in the economists’ models. 
 
As my studies and research advanced, I became acquainted with the succinct theory 
of perfectly contestable markets. The more I learned about it, the more I realized its 
potential for my thesis. Contestability theory was intuitive and provided general 
predictions, especially in terms of pricing. There were few constraints to the theory, 
and the most important ones were exactly the ones I was out to test - entry barriers 
and strategic behaviour. In addition, significant studies based on this theory had 
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already been conducted for the airline industry in the US. Somehow, it appeared that 
specific industry knowledge could be reconciled with the robustness of contestability 
theory. To prove the non-contestability of the European airline sector despite 
deregulation it was essential to find very specific and relatively detailed data for 
parameters that were suspected of raising entry costs and thus impacting on prices. 
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II Economies of scale 
 
II.1 Explaining the concept of economies of scale 
 
Economies of scale are based upon decreasing unit costs. The reason for such 
decreasing unit costs is amount of output, driven notably by plant size. Bigger plants 
can produce more and are better at exploiting mass-production techniques. They can 
also specialize labor to specific, narrowly defined tasks. Bain (1956) distinguishes 
decreasing unit costs in production from those in distribution, with each one being 
susceptible to specific changes depending on (physical) output.11  
 
The central question around this concept is: Do unit costs change, depending on 
size? As higher output allows for greater specialization (impossible at smaller scales 
due to indivisibilities) and for bargaining power, such decreasing unit costs are 
plausible. These economies lead to a local minimum, i.e. the minimum efficient scale 
of a plant. At this point, a plant operates at the lowest unit costs for a given 
technology, or with the optimal degree of specialization of labour. If this minimum 
efficient scale is important compared to the total capacity of an industry, Bain regards 
these scales as significant. One important qualification needs to be made:  When 
increasing output beyond the point of minimum effcicient scale, diseconomies with 
growing unit costs may result. The logical process of economies with increasing scale 
simply reverses itself. 
 
Bain sees firms in industries adjust their size and the number of their plants to 
maximize their efficiency or minimize their cost per unit of production (Bain 1959, p.  
146). Two assumptions are critical: (1) Firms are induced to seek maximal efficiency 
and (2) the degree of efficiency is systematically influenced by the size a firm attains. 
He distinguishes economies of scale due to large plants from those due to large firms 
(so-called economies of the multi-plant firm). 
 
                                                          
11 As with economies for sales promotion, advertising, etc., Bain sees no “unique and irreversible 
general relationship between unit sales promotion and long-run rate of output or sales”. Unlike 
production and distribution unit costs, which are driven by the amount produced, advertising unit costs 
depend on the amount that can be sold over a given time or on the selling price. For Bain, promotion 
and advertising cost advantages remain inherently different from production and distribution cost 
advantages due to scale. He treats this issue as part of an analysis of product differentiation.  
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In another qualifier, Bain points out that his concept is not directly relevant to 
appraising the actual efficiency of a plant. This is due to volatility in output over time. 
Varying degrees in capacity utilization alter the relation of actual long-run average 
cost to scale: As larger scale operations realize their maximum efficiency under 
steady operations at planned capacity, market volatility may give advantage to 
smaller scale and more adaptable operations. As a consequence, market uncertainty 
may alter the actual optimal size of a plant.  
 
Spence discusses how advertising expenditures interact with production costs to 
yield economies of scale. He sees advertising expenditures as fixed costs and 
asserts that “a certain amount of advertising is needed to counteract rivals’ 
advertising, or to establish a market position…” (Spence 1980, p. 494). He argues 
that in an industry with differentiated products and advertising, it is the declining costs 
per dollar of revenues rather than declining production costs per unit of output that 
directly affect entry barriers and the profitability of established firms. Because 
advertising is designed to influence demand and therefore prices, it cannot be 
discussed entirely in terms of economies of scale or cost advantages in the normal 
sense. As demand and prices are affected by advertising, the relevant measure of 
scale economies, according to Spence, is to be found in the relation between the 
firm’s revenues and its costs per dollar of revenue, rather than in the relation between 
costs and output as measured in physical units. With his model, he conceives a 
production function with revenues as output, and the inputs being the product in 
physical units and advertising expenditures. If this production function is 
characterized by increasing returns to scale, then a firm’s cost per dollar of revenue 
generated will decline with growth in market share. It is quite possible to have 
diminishing returns to advertising alone, limited (or no) production economies, and 
considerable inherent differentiation, and still have overall economies of scale in the 
relevant sense. Just as in production theory, he sees that it is the sum of the 
response elasticities to the inputs that determines the extent of the returns to scale.  
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II.2 A model for limit pricing (Bain-Sylos-Modigliani) 
 
It is important to note that not only may economies of scale explain superior margins 
due to superior efficiencies in production, they may also work as deterrents to entry. 
The Bain-Sylos-Modigliani model of limit pricing depicts such deterrence  (Tirole 
1997, Sylos-Labini 1962): Economies of scale induce the incumbent to maintain 
output at the minimum efficient scale as the optimal reaction to new entry. High 
output around the minimum efficient scale of a firm allows for unit cost advantages 
compared with (smaller scale) entrants. These cost advantages act, of course, as a 
deterrent to smaller scale entrants (Bain 1956, p. 107).  
 
Exhibit 1: Limit Pricing with economies of scale 
 
 
Price and 
Average Cost 
   O              Xi=Y    Output 
AC entrant 
AC incumbent
P(Xo + Xe) 
Xo + Xe 
PL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dominant firm produces at output Xi which the entrant expects to be maintained 
by the incumbent if entry occurs. This implies that the entrant will face a residual 
demand curve, which is shifted to the right by the amount actually produced by the 
incumbent. The entrant cannot profitably enter, given the incumbent’s output and his 
expectations that the incumbent will maintain this output even after entry: The market 
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price PL is below the entrant’s average cost at output Y, and there is no feasible level 
of output for the entrant where his average cost curve actually intersects with his 
residual demand curve. As a consequence for price policy, he concludes: The larger 
the percentage of the minimum efficient scale to total market capacity, and the more 
steeply unit costs decrease with changes to scale, the more long-run prices can be 
elevated above the least cost level without inducing entry.  
  
Bain’s proposition was intuitively appealing in its original formulation, but it evoked a 
good deal of confusion about the expectations of potential entrants. Modigliani (1958) 
suggests that a useful assumption is that potential entrants expect existing firms to 
maintain their pre-entry output after entry occurs. If the entrants hold such 
expectations, then limit pricing deters entry since entrants would expect the post- 
entry price to be below their average cost. However, such expectations are irrational. 
Any potential entrant that did enter such an industry could immediately drive industry 
price below all firms’ average costs since there are no entry or adjustment costs in 
these models. The more inelastic the demand, the stronger the dynamic, i.e. small 
additional outputs will drive prices down quickly. The existing firms would then incur 
losses by maintaining their outputs while, whereas if they had decreased their 
outputs, they could have earned profits (Flaherty 1980, p. 160). 
 
Flaherty’s model lets a firm enter an established industry if and only if the potential 
entrant expects to be able to earn profits during the post-entry competition. The 
established firm’s pre-entry output level is such that the entrant would have average 
unit costs exceeding market prices for a range of output rates between zero and 
some positive level of output. If the entrant were to increase capacity slowly, he 
would experience a period of negative cash flow before entering a period of positive 
cash flow. By purchasing a large plant, the entrant would shorten the duration of his 
negative profit period and thus increase his net present value. This means that the 
entrant would then be able to operate at the same minimum efficient scale as the 
incumbent, and there would be no point in maintaining output at pre-entry levels.  
 
Flaherty agrees with Bain in that greater increasing returns to scale will enable an 
incumbent to deter entry more effectively. With steeper slopes in the AC-curve, an 
incumbent firm could still deter entry, even by lowering its output. This would enable 
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the dominant firm to maximize profits (by keeping prices high) while still deterring 
entry. For the entrant, this means that entry at large output levels (around minimum 
efficient scale) could be more advantageous than entry at small levels, although this 
is conditional on the slopes of the AC-curve.  
 
Scherer and Ross show that entrants who choose to enter at minimum efficient scale 
will depress the price, depending on the minimum efficient scale relative to the overall 
size of the market (other things, such as elasticity of demand, being equal). In an 
example, they assume unit elasticity and an minimum efficient scale of 10% of total 
quantity demanded. Then, as a consequence of entry at MES, prices will be 
depressed by 10%. Unless the pre-entry price exceeds the potential entrant’s 
expected unit costs by more than 11%, entry will be unprofitable. In comparison, with 
a minimum efficient scale of 5%, existing firms can hold their price no higher than 
5.25% above minimum unit cost without encouraging entry. In general, the smaller 
the minimum efficient scale is relative to the output volume demanded at a price 
equal to minimum unit cost, the less price can be held persistently above the 
competitive level without attracting new entry, ceteris paribus12 (Scherer and Ross 
1990, p. 378). 
 
This statement must be relevant for empirical observations: Only with steep falls in 
unit costs in the airline business and with significant minimum efficient scale, can 
economies of scale be found to matter for holding prices persistently above 
competitive levels. 
 
II.3 Are there economies of scale in the airline sector? 
 
After the deregulation of the US airline market in 1978, the question whether or not 
this industry showed economies of scale was discussed in several economic papers, 
most of them examining the US context. The question was initially less relevant for 
new entrants, who might have been concerned about minimum efficient scale to be 
                                                          
12 When entering at a size smaller than minimum efficient scale, a newcomer incurs the disadvantage 
of higher unit costs but gains the advantage of adding a smaller output increment and thus 
precipitating a milder price decline. This advantage is increased if demand is elastic (the market 
readily absorbs more supply without a large fall in price). 
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attained in order to be competitive with the incumbents. In reality, the economies-of-
scale-argument was more often used by representatives from the major airlines when 
discussing route extensions and merger activities with the federal authorities. 
 
II.3.1 General cost drivers in the industry 
Before examining some prominent economies in the industry in detail, I would like to 
provide a more general overview over the cost structure of the industry. This helps to 
situate possible economies of scale within the big picture of total costs of the industry 
or firm. In line with the remark already made by Spence on the role of advertising and 
economies of scale, I would like to show the possibility that within an industry or firm 
there are likely to be different sources for increasing returns to scale, which need not 
be aligned at all times. The introduction of several potentially important cost drivers in 
the industry will help to indicate such possible increasing returns, which may then be 
examined further on. This section will in large part be based on “An empirical study of 
cost drivers in the US airline industry” by Banker and Johnston (1993). The authors 
distinguish cost drivers that are volume based from those that are operations based. 
This distinction is noteworthy, seeing economies of scale (in the tradition of Bain, 
Spence et al.) as typically volume-based returns. Apparently, operations can also 
have significant influence on the firm’s unit costs. Indeed, while Bain saw plant size 
as the key for achieving economies, operations can just as well lower unit costs to an 
extent that any new entrant who cannot employ the same operations without a cost 
will face a cost disadvantage.  
 
The following operations-based drivers represent choices of alternative technologies, 
as such choices of aircraft models, route structures, flight frequency or density, and 
traffic flow control. These drivers need to be regarded separately from scale-based 
drivers, which are based on the number of passengers transported or on the capacity 
of seat miles offered. 
 
When the examined cost drivers showed either increasing or decreasing returns, 
marginal costs would also change with these operations-based drivers.13
                                                          
13 In contrast, with absolute cost advantages, these marginal returns would remain constant.  
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Exhibit 2: Cost drivers of airlines and their impact on unit costs14
 
Input category and 
measurement units 
Volume based drivers Operations based drivers 
Fuel in gallons Capacity seat miles  
by aircraft type (+) 
Average stage length (-) 
Flying operations, labour hours Capacity seat miles  
by aircraft type (+) 
Density (-) 
Hub concentration (-) 
Hub domination (-) 
Passenger service, labour hours Capacity seat miles  
by aircraft type (+) 
Density (-) 
Hub concentration (-) 
Hub domination (-) 
Maintenance, labour hours Capacity seat miles  
by aircraft type (+) 
Density (-) 
Hub concentration (-) 
Hub domination (-) 
Scale (+) 
Maintenance materials and 
overhead, deflated costs 
Capacity seat miles  
by aircraft type (+) 
Density (+) 
Hub concentration (-) 
Hub domination (-) 
Aircraft and traffic servicing, labour 
hours 
Passengers (+) Density (+) 
Hub concentration (-) 
Hub domination (-) 
Promotions and sales, labour hours Passengers (+) Density (+) 
Hub concentration (-) 
Hub domination (-) 
General overhead, deflated costs Total capacity seat miles (+) Density (+) 
Hub concentration (-) 
Hub domination (-) 
Scale (+) 
Group property and equipment, 
deflated costs 
Total capacity seat miles (+) Density (-) 
Hub concentration (+) 
Hub domination (+) 
Scale (+) 
(source: Banker and Johnston 1993, p.#580) 
 
                                                          
14 The authors go on to describe drivers such as: 
Aircraft type: The choice among different types of aircraft essentially involves different production technologies with differing 
input intensities and relative efficiencies. For example, wide-bodied aircraft can serve densely trafficked long-haul routes 
efficiently, while smaller aircraft can serve less densely trafficked short-haul routes relatively efficiently. Aircraft choices depend 
on network characteristics, particularly route length and traffic density, and the availability of particular models of aircraft. The 
output capacity of each aircraft, in turn, determines the required hours of pilot, co-pilot, flight engineer, navigator and flight 
attendant labour, required levels of maintenance and required quantities of fuel per capacity seat miles. 
Aircraft size and average stage length: In air transportation services, output capacity increases with both the number of seats 
made available and the distance travelled. If the volume of traffic is heavy enough for a carrier to use larger aircraft on a given 
flight and route, more capacity seat miles can be delivered for a given level of flight crew labour and fuel costs.  
Density: Here, the authors define density as increasing the number of flights over its network by which the carrier can offer a 
more diversified set of services. They see the proliferation of flights as coming about for two reasons: (1) efforts to provide a 
more attractive schedule of flights and (2) efforts to utilize productive capacity more fully. The conventional wisdom is that a 
carrier can utilize inputs more efficiently by operating more flights or carrying more traffic over a given network. There is some 
empirical evidence that economies of density obtain. However, the underlying dynamics in terms of increased production 
complexity are not addressed. By scheduling more flights over a given network segment, a carrier incurs additional set-up costs 
for each additional flight, in terms of handling aircraft on the ground and enplaning and deplaning passengers and cargo. At the 
same time, it may be able to better utilize its fixed ground property and equipment and general overhead inputs.  
Hub concentration: Carriers can thus achieve substantial economies, for example, maintaining and repairing their fleets, by 
using ground property, equipment and labour, and by filling larger aircraft on hub to hub routes. However, to achieve these 
economies, it is likely that carriers will also have to use more administrative and supervisory labour for communications and 
other support services. Moreover, at major hubs there may be intense competition for the use of air traffic control and of shared 
ground facilities. This often results in overscheduling, congestion and delays. The magnitudes of the economies a carrier can 
obtain by concentrating flights through hubs are likely to depend on whether the carrier has some monopoly power, as reflected 
in the dominant market shares at its hub airport. 
Scale: In a cost accounting framework of constant marginal cost, increasing returns to scale are indicated when fixed costs are 
present because average costs decrease with increasing levels of outputs. Therefore, ground property and equipment, general 
overhead, maintenance labour, maintenance materials and overhead inputs, all of which have fixed cost components, are likely 
to have increasing returns to scale associated with them, but constant returns to scale are likely to obtain for other cost 
categories. 
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Only with significantly negative coefficient estimates can we infer these cost drivers 
to present diminishing marginal costs.15
 
In their findings, Banker and Johnston estimate the marginal cost effects of different 
managerial strategies: Savings in marginal cost derived largely from concentrating 
flights through hubs (average savings of $27 per 1,000 capacity seat miles). The 
savings associated with increasing average stage length were smaller (average 
savings of $2 per 1,000 capacity seat miles). Finally, savings associated with 
increasing density were the least ($1 per 1,000 capacity seat miles). However, 
approximately 38% of the observations exhibited net increases in costs with 
increases in density:16
 
• The results for competitive and dominated hubs show large, significantly negative 
coefficients for labour that handles passengers, cargo and aircraft on the ground. 
Ground property and equipment and labour for flying operations are also 
significantly negative, and those for general overhead are significantly positive. 
Thus, by adopting a hub and spoke strategy, a carrier can achieve fairly 
substantial economies in the use of most inputs. 
 
• The coefficient estimate for average stage length is significantly negative for the 
fuel cost category. This lends support to the hypothesis that the marginal 
requirements for fuel inputs diminish as average stage length increases. 
 
• For promotions and sales labour, the coefficient for density is significantly 
positive, which indicates that adding flights on a given network requires additional 
support labour. The coefficient for passenger service labour is significantly 
negative. The coefficients for flying operations labour, maintenance labour, 
maintenance materials and overhead are insignificant. There are inherent 
difficulties in measuring capital inputs. 
 
                                                          
15 Cost drivers could, for example, also include constant returns to scale. 
16 The estimated net savings associated with all operations-based drivers average $33 and range from 
$10 to $132 per 1,000 capacity seat miles. 
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• Comparisons among older aircraft, notably between larger and smaller planes, 
indicated highly significant differences in coefficients and are consistent with the 
hypothesis and industry evidence that wide-bodied aircraft require less fuel and 
flying operations input than older regular-bodied aircraft. However, sharp 
differences between older large aircraft and newer, slightly smaller models are not 
indicated. This suggests that the improvements in fuel efficiency and reductions in 
required crew size for the newer models have made up for the size-based 
advantages larger aircraft had in the past. 
 
These findings give us important first leads on the mostly operational cost drivers that 
appear to matter when determining economies of scale in the airline industry. I will 
now elaborate on these variables further, and specifically try to show how these 
factors may depend on each other. 
 
II.3.2 Economies of scale versus density 
 
II.3.2.1 Defining the differences 
The question needs to be addressed of what is actually meant by “scale” in the airline 
industry. As we have seen, Banker and Johnston regard the number of passengers 
and capacity seat miles as scale, whereas density is an operations-driven variable.  
 
In a cost and factor productivity analysis of European flag carriers, Encaoua (1991) 
measures output in three ways: (1) Number of passengers, (2) Revenue-passenger 
kilometers (RPK), and available-ton kilometers (ATK). He sees an airline’s scale 
dimension as mainly driven by stage length and traffic density. His proxy for density 
is simply the airline’s load factor (RPK/ATK) on European routes compared to the 
North Atlantic ones. Scale to him is simply measured by the output measures number 
of passengers and revenue-passenger kilometers, while density depends completely 
on the average degree to which an airline loads its entire fleet for all European 
destinations compared with all North Atlantic routes. Unlike the other authors, 
Encaoua completely ignores factors such as network characteristics or technological 
arguments such as the relative efficiency of different aircraft sizes. He is interested 
more apparently in different factor costs within Europe and the factor productivity 
associated with them. By definition, whenever an airline achieves a higher load factor 
 24
than competitors, ceteris paribus, output must have gone up as well. The extent to 
which a higher density will result in increasing, decreasing or constant returns can 
hardly be shown on such an aggregated basis. 
 
Other authors focus on technological aspects (such as aircraft size) or network 
characteristics (average departures per airport or hub-and-spoke service) to correlate 
their definitions of density with the slope of returns, while keeping average stage 
length and average load factor constant. Kirby (1986) measures an airline’s output 
(as a scale dimension) in ton-miles-performed (TMP). He defines an identity 
relationship between TMP and five factors:  
 
TMP = PORTS * ADPP * ASL * AAS * ALF 17
 
It is important to note that Kirby employs variables - notably ADPP - that were already 
understood by Banker and Johnston to describe market density. Before Kirby, it was 
Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1984), who showed that differences in scale per 
se have no role in explaining higher costs for small airlines. In order to make this 
clear, they distinguish in their model between returns to scale and what they call 
returns to density. To do so, they include two dimensions of airline size: the size of 
each carrier’s service network and the magnitude of passenger and freight 
transportation services provided. They make this distinction between level of output 
and firm size, since “one might expect a lower level of unit costs if a given output 
were provided over a smaller number of cities” (p. 473). With returns to scale being 
accounted for separately from returns to density, definitions become somewhat more 
precise: Economies of density exist if unit costs decline as airlines add flights or seats 
on existing flights (through larger aircraft or denser seating configuration), with no 
change in average load factor, average stage length, or the number of airports 
served.18 Scale economies exist if unit costs decline when an airline adds flights to an 
                                                          
17 PORTS = number of airports served, ADPP = average number of departures per port, ASL = 
average stage length, AAS = average aircraft size, ALF = average load factor. 
18 Returns to density were defined as the proportional increase in output made possible by a 
proportional increase in all inputs, with the number of airports served, average stage length, average 
load factor and input prices held fixed.  
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airport that it has not been serving and the additional flights cause no change in 
average load factor, average stage length or output per airport served (density).19
 
Exhibit 3: The underlying framework for analysing average unit costs 
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(1992) see the hub-and-spoke characteristics of an airline network as the basis for 
economies of density. Given such a hub-and-spoke network, network size (the 
number of city origins and destinations) and the size of the connected cities will 
increase density within such a system. By funnelling all passengers into a hub, such 
a system generates high traffic densities on its “spoke” routes. In another paper, 
Brueckner and Spiller (1994) understand the growth of networks to be an attempt to 
exploit economies of traffic density, under which the marginal cost of carrying an 
extra passenger on a non-stop route falls as traffic on the route rises (p. 380). In 
other words, network size as a scale dimension matters for density, but it is the hub-
and-spoke characteristic that makes a given network size more densely employed.  
 
In contrast to the Caves, Christensen and Tretheway approach, Brueckner and 
Spiller consider details within the hub-and-spoke system that critically affect density 
levels. They quote the example that by holding the number of endpoints fixed, 
densities would fall as the number of hubs operated by the airlines increased, a 
network characteristic that was not accounted for by the Caves et al. model. The 
complex interdependence between scale and density in a hub-and-spoke network 
becomes clear in one of the paper’s main conclusions: Entry into a particular city pair 
market (increasing scale) will usually be a network-wide decision (because it impacts 
on density in different spokes), rather than a decision based on the characteristics of 
the individual market (the city pair). This higher density then can be exploited by 
higher load factors or bigger, more efficient aircraft. Within a hub-and-spoke context, 
the researched economies of density were referred to as economies of spoke density 
(Berry, Carnall and Spiller 1996).20 The exogenous variables of this model include 
distance between the endpoint cities and characteristics of the origin and destination 
airports. In this model, which does not account for the fixed cost effects of hubbing, 
only use of marginal costs is made.  
                                                          
20 Such economies would mean that more densely travelled spokes might have lower marginal costs. 
This would lead to economies of scope across itineraries that share a common spoke. These 
economies of scope in turn imply network economics. 
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Exhibit 4:  Analysing marginal costs in a hub-and-spoke network 
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measures unit costs, unit revenue, average distance and load factors computed for 
European and North Atlantic routes. The main reason for the lower unit costs on the 
North Atlantic routes (costs per available ton kilometre in Europe are two to three 
times those on North Atlantic routes) is seen as being linked to distance (p. 115). 
However, in 1986 unit costs also varied within European routes in a spread greater 
than 40% in 1986. The difference in average distance between carriers in Europe 
was not sufficient to explain such a difference. Variations in factor prices and factor 
productivity were considered part of the explanation. It was shown that the average 
load factor is categorically higher on North Atlantic routes than on European ones (p. 
116). He sees this as a clear indication that density of traffic is more important 
outside Europe than inside Europe. For this reason, he argues, the most dynamic 
European carriers try to increase the size of their North Atlantic network despite the 
fact that competition on these routes is more severe. All his observations confirm that 
geographical and network configurations are sources of substantive variations in unit 
costs (and unit revenues) between European carriers. 
 
Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller (1992, p. 309) relate the fare paid by a four segment 
passenger, whose trip requires a change of planes at a hub airport, to the 
characteristics of the network in which he travels. With market specific variables, 
distance was found to be highly significant for lower fares (p. 325). The authors 
conclude that there is evidence for the importance of hub-and-spoke networks in 
reducing airline costs. In another paper, Brueckner and Spiller (1994, pp. 379) find 
that economies of density are strong during the sample period, even stronger than 
previous estimates by Caves et al., which were derived from traditional cost function 
methods. In their model, they determine the level of competition jointly along with 
fares. Their estimates of the desired cost functions are based on a structural model of 
airline behaviour. Brueckner and Spiller show that in 1985 the marginal cost of 
carrying an extra passenger in a high density network was 13%-25% below the cost 
in a medium or low density network, giving the high density carrier a distinct 
competitive advantage. It was shown that fares in a city pair market are low when 
traffic densities on the spokes connecting the market cities are high. It was also 
shown that longer trips had higher fares. Fares were also lower in markets with high 
tourism potential. As a main result, the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to 
spoke traffic was computed: Marginal cost falls by about 3.75% for every 10% 
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increase in spoke traffic. This effect is stronger than the one estimated by Caves et 
al., which would correspond to a fall in marginal cost of about 2%. Brueckner and 
Spiller see the density effect as a causal factor leading to the emergence of 
dominated hubs.21
 
They go on to explain that cost efficiencies of hubs may arise from the use of large, 
cost-effective aircraft on the densely trafficked spokes of a hub-and-spoke system. 
This relies in part on an engineering argument that larger planes are cheaper to fly 
regarding unit costs, at least on longer routes. For a given flight frequency, dense 
spokes can efficiently use larger aircraft. Economies of scale at the level of airline 
spokes in turn imply network economies, since hubbing airlines can combine 
passengers with different final destinations on a single large plane that flies to a hub 
city. At that hub the passengers switch to different planes, which carry passengers 
from various initial origins (Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller 1992). 
 
We have seen that Kirby (1986) finds substantial economies of operation with respect 
to load factors, aircraft size and stage length. In contrast, his model suggests 
diseconomies when an airline serves more ports and when it operates more flights 
from a given port. He assumes that such increasing costs related to market density 
probably arise from airside congestion at busier airports and congestion within the 
airport facilities. Kirby infers from this that cost advantages from dense markets 
“result largely from the ability to operate large aircraft at relatively high load factors, 
rather than merely from the opportunity to make more flights”.22 He goes on to 
forecast the impacts of different policies on total airline operating costs. In particular, 
halving the number of departures and doubling the size of the aircraft is estimated to 
lower operating costs most significantly (by 17.4% over a three year period).  
 
Depending on demand conditions, airlines may respond to increased density by 
increasing flight frequency rather than by increasing plane size (Berry, Crandall and 
Spiller 1996, p. 5). In their results, these authors find that congestion appears to raise 
segment marginal cost. According to their model, at distances less than 500 miles, 
                                                          
21 Their marginal cost function would be: MC = 110.9 + 0.062 * DIST - 0.00117 * Q, where Q is the 
spoke traffic. In a high density network, MC would equal $107, in a low density network, MC would be 
$134 and in a network with moderate densities, MC would be $121. 
22 see Kirby 1986, p. 346: Table 3 for an estimated cost elasticity with respect to changed composition 
of output. 
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marginal cost increases as density increases up to about 150,000 passengers per 
quarter and then begins to decline. At shorter distances this effect of finally 
decreasing marginal costs may not be seen, since the increased cruising efficiency of 
larger aircraft may not make up for their higher take-off and landing costs over these 
shorter distances. Increases in density in such cases would need to met with 
increases in frequency. 
 
Their model of airline competition captures two major features of the industry: product 
differentiation and economies of density. On the cost side, their paper presents 
evidence of economies of density on longer routes. However, economies of density 
may depend on the nature of the route. In particular, economies of density at 
distances less than 500 miles were not found. Consistent with the “Southwest Airlines 
effect”, there was no evidence found concerning economies of density on shorter 
routes. According to these estimates, the “Southwest effect” may not be exclusively 
the result of lower labour costs, but rather may be the result of Southwest’s having 
found a particularly effective cost niche. 
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II.3.3 Tracing cost curves for the airline industry 
 
Exhibit 5: Cost relationships for the hub-density-aircraft complex 
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The above graphical depiction provides a somewhat broad map of the relationships 
in the hub–density–aircraft complex. The signs (positive or negative) depict the 
expected relationships that empirical studies have found on marginal and average 
costs. In this section, I am trying to find a specific operations-based cost curve for the 
airline industry, which allows discussion of the trade-offs between increasing and 
decreasing returns and – it is hoped – identification of the shape of “minimum 
efficient density” in analogy to Bain’s minimum efficient scale. 
 
As I have already pointed out, Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1984) define 
returns to density as declining unit costs, with increasing numbers of passengers 
being transported between two points without any change in load factor occurring. 
Their parameters for declining unit costs (as well as marginal costs) are frequency of 
flights and size of aircraft (I chose to neglect the option of adding more seats to 
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existing airplanes). Casually observed differences in unit costs for trunk airlines and 
for locals are largely explained by differences in characteristics of the firms, 
particularly by lower density of service and shorter stage lengths for the locals (p. 
483). Thus, the following cost curve can be drawn: 
 
Exhibit 6: A cost curve for the airline business (1) 
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Encaoua (1991) identifies higher density solely with a higher load factor. He admits 
that the average load factor’s impact on increasing, decreasing, or constant returns 
can hardly be shown on such an aggregated basis of overall airline operations. To 
him, what he calls geographical and network configurations are the source of 
variations in unit costs. He judges the aircraft type to be less relevant for such 
variations than average stage length. This statement per se does not contradict the 
above graph, though it lessens the significance of aircraft type for unit costs. 
 
Bailey, Graham and Kaplan (1991) focus on the returns of hub-and-spoke 
operations. Operating hub-and-spoke networks combines passengers with different 
origins and destinations – increasing the average number of passengers per flight 
and thereby reducing costs. Essentially the broader scope of operation lets the 
carrier take advantage of the economies of scale in aircraft (p. 74). The hubbing 
carrier would serve more passengers on its flights so it could use larger aircraft 
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and/or higher load factors. This indeed is a classical argument of economies of scale: 
Larger, more efficient aircraft may offer lower unit cost if their capacity is sufficiently 
employed, just as a larger production plant may produce at lower average unit costs 
if its production volume is sufficiently close to its minimum efficient scale. This is 
highly relevant, because if Bailey et al. are right, then the key parameters of density 
would be nothing but simple economies of scale, similar in nature to Bain’s concept 
of specialization. By funnelling traffic through a hub, hubs and spokes are 
instrumental in the exploitation of these economies of scale. Density together with 
hubs are a prerequisite for obtaining the minimum efficient scale, but would not be 
the origin of decreasing unit costs. Brueckner and Spiller (1994) build on this 
understanding of the density impacts of hubbing. They focus their research on 
marginal cost decreases when traffic on traffic spokes increases. They understand 
the growth of hub-and-spoke networks as an attempt to exploit economies of traffic 
density, according to which the marginal cost of carrying an extra passenger on a 
non-stop route falls as traffic on the route rises (p. 380). It is important to note that 
although they do not take into account the varying degrees of aircraft efficiency or 
load factors actually achieved, they nevertheless acknowledge their importance: “ 
This higher density then can be exploited, analogously to Bailey, Graham and Kaplan 
(1991) by higher load factors or bigger, more efficient aircraft. 
 
Exhibit 7: A cost curve for the airline business (2)  
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If we understand hubbing and increased density as the means for exploiting 
economies of bigger and more efficient aircraft later on, then the marginal cost 
elasticities empirically tested by Brueckner and Spiller can be analogously applied 
not only to density on spokes but also to the associated parameters of aircraft type 
and average load factor. The following graph depicts this relationship: 
 
Exhibit 8: A cost curve for the airline business (3) 
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$10 to $132 per 1,000 capacity seat miles. If we were to aggregate effects in hubbing 
with those in density, decreasing marginal costs would seem to be confirmed.  
 
The question remains about the ambivalent effect of average stage length on 
average unit and occasionally observed increases in marginal costs. It is well 
documented that within the range of each aircraft, unit costs generally decrease with 
distance (Encaoua, Geroski and Jacquemin 1986), largely due to the character of 
planes as fixed costs and also due to the fixed cost character of take-off and landing 
fees. Banker and Johnston (1993) find this impact small, albeit favourable, when 
compared with the hubbing-density complex. Brueckner and Spiller (1994) even find 
increasing marginal cost with distance, according to their formula.23 Decreasing 
marginal costs even at high densities could also not be found at short distances 
(Berry, Carnall and Spiller 1996). We conclude from this that the contribution of 
distance on decreasing marginal costs is small, and even strongly negative at 
distances below 500 miles, since it suffices to compensate otherwise strong 
economies of spoke density. This may also explain why Brueckner and Spiller had 
found a positive and slightly increasing relationship between overall marginal cost 
and the average distance in their sample. 
 
Exhibit 9: A cost curve for the airline business (4) 
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In order to find one general cost function for the airline sector, the counteracting 
slopes between density (aircraft, average load factor) and average stage length 
would need to be balanced and synthesized into one marginal cost curve. This can 
only be done by introducing a third axis (dimension) into our graph (for a three-
dimensional graph, see Berry, Carnall and Spiller 1996, p. 41). Here, we choose to 
represent three marginal cost curves, each representing another stage length, in 
order to keep our cost curves in two dimensions. This representation also proved to 
correspond to the empirical values of table “Derivative of marginal cost with respect 
to density”24 (p. 38). 
 
Exhibit 10: A cost curve for the airline business (5) 
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Aircraft type 
Av. load factor Spoke traffic        = 
MC(250 miles) 
MC(1,500 miles)
MC(600 miles) 
 
 
On the other side, costs that remain unaffected by a change of aircraft type are 
greater than those that depend on the type of aircraft (Encaoua 1991). Encaoua 
regards average load factor the key driver for increasing returns to scale, to be more 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
23 MC = 110.9 + 0.062 * DIST - 0.00117 * Q, with Q being the spoke traffic. 
24
DIST / DENS 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.50 2.00 
250 miles 0.794 0.808 0.733 0.568 -0.27 -0.980 
500 miles 0.125 0.204 0.194 0.096 -0.369 -1.190 
1,000 miles -0.737 -0.527 -0.406 -0.373 -0.576 -1.135 
1,500 miles -0.964 -0.623 -0.371 -0.207 -0.148 -0.446 
2,000 miles -0.556 -0.084 0.299 0.593 0.914 0.879 
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important than average aircraft size. Beyond the obvious trade-off of either choosing 
a larger, more efficient plane or keeping a smaller one and increasing its load factor, 
other economies “ex aircraft” are identified. The fact that such other costs could 
represent a larger part than aircraft-based costs would not matter if their returns were 
constant. At this point, it may be helpful to go back to Banker and Johnston’s (1993) 
empirical analysis of cost drivers. Now we are only interested in cost drivers for 
indirect airline costs, which are not determined by aircraft type. From their table with 
the hypothesized cost driver relationships, we retain the following:  
 
Exhibit 11: Cost drivers outside the operation of aircraft that affect indirect costs  
 
Input category and 
measurement units  
Volume-based drivers Operations-based drivers 
Aircraft and traffic servicing, 
labour hours  
Passengers (+) Density (+) 
Hub concentration (-) 
Hub domination (-) 
Promotions and sales, labour 
hours  
Passengers (+) Density (+) 
Hub concentration (-) 
Hub domination (-) 
General overhead, deflated 
costs  
Total capacity seat miles (+) Density (+) 
Hub concentration (-) 
Hub domination (-) 
Scale (+) 
Group property and 
equipment, deflated costs  
Total capacity seat miles (+) Density (-) 
Hub concentration (+) 
Hub domination (+) 
Scale (+) 
 
 
The results for the four categories above show significantly increasing returns to 
scale with respect to hubbing. These returns were even stronger when an airline 
dominated an hub. Levine (1987, p. 473) sees hubs as a means of reducing the time 
during which traffic builds to long-term levels, thus reducing the firm-specific non- 
recoverable entry costs (this would not affect marginal cost). He sees these and other 
lower incremental costs from hub operations as close to zero. Apparently, hubbing 
exhibits additional economies of scale, probably due to (organizational) centralization 
effects, which are independent of aircraft economies of scale. Congestion effects 
may be the most likely constraints to these increasing returns (Kirby 1986). These 
economies of scale due to centralization may be more pertinent than the possible 
efficiencies of density and bigger aircraft. 
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xhibit 12: A cost curve for the airline business (6)  E
 
 
Marginal 
cost for 
hubbing 
Degree of central- 
ization in a hub No hub Competitive 
hub 
Dominant 
hub 
Congestion 
effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Only by accounting for both effects - economies due to aircraft and due to hubbing - 
can one general average unit cost curve be found, which represents the minimum 
efficient scale for all major cost functions of an airline business. A clear 
understanding of which parts of density and hubbing are reflected in aircraft 
economies of scale and which in centralisation economies is key for the following 
integration of both effects. In short, an airline would tend towards its own minimum 
efficient scale by trying to organize hub-and-spoke operations and trying to dominate 
them, though avoiding congestion at the airport. At the same time, it would choose 
the most efficient aircraft to handle the increased traffic, probably wide-bodied long-
haul carriers, to direct them at high load factors to other hubs for maximum economic 
gain.  
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Exhibit 13: A cost curve for the airline business (7) 
  Av. unit 
costs 
Centralization at 
hub airport  
(CSM at hub) 
AC1  
(old, small aircraft) 
AC2  
(new, big aircraft)
For ASL > 600 miles
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above graph suggests the combined impact of economies of scale with wide-
bodied, more efficient aircraft and economies of scale due to hub dominance. We 
assume more efficient, wide-bodied jets to be more expensive to buy than smaller 
ones. That’s why AC2 is initially higher than AC1. At a higher load factor, the new 
aircraft’s efficiency starts to show, where average unit costs become smaller 
compared with a narrow-bodied plane. However, the big plane’s minimum efficient 
scale is achieved at higher capacity seat miles than with the small one. That is, a hub 
has to funnel consistently more passengers towards bigger planes serving its spokes 
in order to achieve its minimum efficient scale (or even to undercut average unit costs 
of smaller planes). With the risk of over-concentration at hubs, the risk of traffic 
congestion rises. In the case of traffic congestion, we assume marginal costs for 
bigger planes to be significantly above those for smaller ones. This explains why the 
slopes at high centralization of traffic at hubs are steeper for bigger, albeit efficient, 
planes. We expect the shape of average cost lines to hold for distances between 600 
and 1,500 miles approximately, following empirical tests by Berry, Carnall and Spiller 
(1996). With greater distances, the differences between low and high density are 
probably more important. Below 600 miles, however, we expect both AC1 and AC2 to 
flatten out significantly. 
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II.3.4 Economies on European routes 
 
We are interested in locating European airlines on these depicted cost curves. In 
particular, we will try to determine if certain airlines appear to be operating closer to 
their minimum efficient scale than others. In order to do so, we need to look at the 
average stage length for city pairs of European carriers and at their respective flight 
concentration from and to their hub airports. The latter is a strong indicator for 
density, in the sense of having the opportunity to employ larger aircraft with higher 
load factors, and also indicating the potential to centralize operations at the hub.  
 
II.3.4.1 Stage lengths of European routes 
The distance between European city pairs is known to be significantly shorter than, 
for example, most US routes.  
 
Exhibit 14: Table of exemplary European city pairs and their distances 
 
Departure city Arrival city Average distance  
(in km) 
Average distance 
(in miles) 
London Brussels 269 145 
London Stockholm 1,942 1,048 
London Athens 3,412 1,841 
Frankfurt Lisbon 2,481 1,339 
Frankfurt Barcelona 1,421 767 
Frankfurt London 724 391 
Paris Brussels 296 160 
Paris Vienna 1,307 705 
Paris Athens 3,009 1,624 
Rome Frankfurt 1,314 709 
Rome Amsterdam 1,771 956 
Rome Milan 573 309 
Madrid Milan 1,736 937 
Madrid Athens 4,007 2,162 
Madrid Lisbon 637 344 
Note: In air transportation, the use of nautical miles (1,852 meters) is common. 
 
A first look at the distances within Europe is already revealing. Three broad 
categories of city pair distances can be distinguished: 
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 (1) Distances below 500 miles 
Here, marginal costs are expected to increase (with density) and average 
costs are relatively high. Five out of fifteen city pairs of Exhibit 14 fall into this 
category. 
 
(2) Distances greater than 500 miles, but less than 1,500 miles 
Here, we expect constant or slightly decreasing marginal costs with increasing 
density and average costs to be located on a cost curve that is lower than the 
first category even though its slope is rather flat. Seven out of the fifteen 
routes in the table correspond to this category. 
 
(3) Distances above 1,500 miles 
Only under these conditions can we expect marginal costs to decrease 
significantly with density and average costs to lie on a cost curve that obtains 
the lowest unit costs of all shown cost curves, provided that a critical degree of 
density (or hub concentration) is achieved. Only at average stage length 
above 1,500 miles would we expect relatively steep slopes for the convex 
average cost curve. Only here would we expect a distinct minimum efficient 
scale to be identified. Three out of fifteen city pairs in the table above fulfil 
these requisites.  
 
It has to be noted that only peripheral European routes, such as Madrid–Athens, 
Athens–London or Stockholm–Madrid, constitute such stage lengths. These routes 
traditionally have never been the most densely travelled ones in Europe. So, even if 
we expect such routes to be situated on lower average cost curves, these routes do 
not constitute the bulk of the airlines’ network structure. They are the exception rather 
than the rule. In addition, density on such routes has traditionally not been the 
highest in Europe.  
 
This situation changes if the intercontinental routes of some European airlines are 
included in the picture. With average stage lengths to the US about nine times the 
typical stage lengths within Europe, carriers with such long-distance connections 
apparently have significantly lower unit costs with regard to their whole network than 
 42
competitors who are constrained to purely European markets. This has been pointed 
out by Encaoua before. Only a few entrants in Europe offer such intercontinental 
connections, including Lauda Air and Virgin Atlantic.  
 
Exhibit 15: A cost curve for the airline business (8) 
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For same aircraft
3.4.2 Hub concentration at the origin or destination airport 
 order to account for both economies of scale stemming from larger aircraft (and 
gher load factors) and economies of scale from concentrating operations at a hub, 
 use the amount of capacity seat miles an airline generates from its principal 
rport as a suitable parameter to describe both potential economies. From different 
atistics, we can infer that only a few European airlines do indeed have such 
evated numbers: British Airways at Heathrow, Lufthansa at Frankfurt and Air 
ance at Charles de Gaulle. 
llowing the logic of the above, these airlines should be located at significantly lower 
ints on their respective average cost curves, that is, closer to their minimum 
ficient scale, if we assume that they can avoid diseconomies from airport 
ngestion.  
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Exhibit 16: A cost curve for the airline business (9) 
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 Zone 1 
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Zone 3 
e three shaded zones attempt to categorize European airlines according to their 
try barriers with respect to economies of scale. Zone 1 depicts airlines that operate 
mewhere around the minimum efficient scale in the industry. Their unit costs are 
wer than those of their competitors because they serve longer distances and are 
le to exploit denser routes due to their hub-and-spoke structure. Airlines such as 
fthansa, British Airways and Air France might fit in here. Zone 2 consists of airlines 
at serve intercontinental routes - and might exploit the advantage of lower unit 
sts there - but do not have dominance on specific hubs. This means that their 
utes may tend to be less dense, and operating economies from centralization may 
 diminished as well. Airlines such as Lauda Air, Iberia, Virgin Atlantic and SAS may 
 located here. Former flag carriers, which still hold relatively the most airport slots 
t are not dominant anymore, would be located towards the lower part of Zone 2.  
ne 3 shows airlines such as Ryanair, easyJet, Deutsche BA, and many others that 
 not serve intercontinental routes. The fact that they do not have any dominant 
sitions at hub airports does not allow them to take advantage of the funnelling 
fect of hub-and-spoke operations. That is, they tend to serve their city pairs in a 
ss dense manner. Theoretically, a fourth zone is conceivable: European airlines 
thout any intercontinental routes, but with dominance at certain hubs. However, in 
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reality, the only airlines that have obtained something like dominance on certain hubs 
are former flag carriers. All former flag carriers do have intercontinental routes in their 
network structure. 
 
II.4 Implications for strategic behaviour 
 
The implications for strategic behaviour can be derived by analogy with what has 
already been said for dynamic limit pricing: Hub concentration determines the locus 
of minimum efficient scale and average stage length determines the slope of such an 
average cost curve. As a consequence, for the years following deregulation, 
incumbents should maintain their hub dominance or even grow it, if possible. They 
should concentrate more city pairs on their hubs (without congesting the hubs’ 
infrastructure) to funnel in sufficient traffic for high-density hub-to-hub routes and try 
to increase the percentage of intercontinental, long-distance routes within their 
network system. These measures would then act as a deterrent to new entrants for 
given city pairs. If entry were to occur on certain city pairs, the incumbent would 
maintain his output on the particular spoke and cut prices below the entrant’s 
average costs.  
 
But the entrant could also be tempted to enter not only on a single city pair but also 
network wide in order to duplicate the incumbent’s efficiencies. Only with such large-
scale entry could we expect incumbents to lower their outputs and to increase prices, 
in order to maximize profits. Such a significant scale would require dominance at a 
major airport. At the moment, there are several important European airports where 
incumbents dominate: Paris – Charles de Gaulle, London – Heathrow, and Frankfurt. 
With reference to Scherer and Ross (1990), such large-scale entry would lower 
prices significantly, if we assume unit elasticity for demand and incumbents 
maintaining output: If about 15% of an incumbent’s traffic were to involve a hub, new 
entrants who entered the same hub at the same scale would roughly depress prices 
(for competing city pairs) by 15%. As a consequence, an entrant would prefer not to 
enter at such a scale, unless pre-entry price is more than 15% above the entrant’s 
unit costs. 
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If an entrant had the possibility to “buy” himself into airport dominance, he could 
shorten the period in which he would incur losses before making profits, due to the 
same average unit costs as the incumbent. However, these adjustment costs appear 
as infinitely high, since airport slots are only selectively marketed (Civil Aviation 
Authority 1998, pp. 47) and both construction and extensions of airports are highly 
limited. The increasing returns (steeper slopes for unit costs with higher density) due 
to international routes within an airline’s network are equally difficult to obtain for new 
entrants. Virgin Atlantic was able to exploit British-American bilateral transatlantic 
agreements, as did Lauda Air on the Austrian side. These agreements, however, do 
not apply to other intra-European entrants to the industry. Again, adjustment costs for 
these unit cost advantages would be infinitely high, mostly for bilateral trade and 
legal reasons. These factors make it very unlikely that entrants could replicate an 
incumbent’s AC-curve and obtain the same structural conditions for operating at the 
same minimum efficient scale as the incumbent. The incumbent would anticipate 
entry at particular city pairs and limit price below the average unit costs of entrants, 
while maintaining capacity on those spokes to deter entry. 
 
The question remains by how much the entrant is truly disadvantaged, given these 
factors, since entrants may exhibit firm-specific economies (for a comparison of 
actual unit costs, see Civil Aviation Authority 1998, p. 141).  
 
II.5 Describing maintained output 
 
The major research question of this thesis is how entry barriers influence the pricing 
and output decisions of airlines. This chapter has examined economies of scale. 
Specifically applied to the airline industry, maintaining output because of economies 
of scale would be reflected in: 
 
o Average aircraft size 
If the incumbent switched to smaller planes, we could hardly assume this would deter 
entrants in the sense of dynamic limit pricing. 
 
o Average load factors  
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These are not only dependent on the incumbent’s choice of capacity but also on 
demand. Although smaller aircraft with higher load factors could provide the same 
output as bigger albeit less loaded aircraft, the signal to the entrant would not be one 
of deterrence, but of accommodation on a particular city pair.   
 
o Average departures per airport 
Another way of making capacity choices, which has already been mentioned (Kirby 
1986), is to change the number of average departures per airport. One would 
assume that increasing flight frequency would maintain output, even when using 
smaller planes. This last parameter, however, is negatively related to the industry- 
specific economies of scale as outlined above. Average departures per airport takes 
an average flight frequency among all airports in a network, thus neglecting the 
density effect of hubs. Even when looking at the flight frequencies originating or 
feeding into a hub airport, we confirm a negative relationship with average aircraft 
size: For a given demand between two cities, an airline could employ one big aircraft 
(say a Boeing 757) with one daily connection. If it were to increase flight frequency to 
twice a day, or even three times a day, the company would need to switch to smaller 
carriers (say Boeing 737s) to keep the plane reasonably loaded. The argument of 
economies due to centralization of services at a hub does not apply for the average 
departures per port parameter either. Why should unit costs for passenger service, 
maintenance, etc. be lower if the airline were to send two smaller aircraft instead of 
one bigger? In short, only if we see average aircraft size for given city pairs staying 
constant or even increasing, can we confirm entry deterrence after deregulation 
along the lines of dynamic limit pricing (with the incumbent to be understood to lower 
prices below the entrant’s average costs). 
 
The following exploratory scatterplot provides a first perspective on part of what is to 
be tested for statistical significance in the empirical part of this paper. After examining 
178 different cases involving 35 heavily travelled city pairs served by several airlines, 
our scatterplot suggests that the vast majority of airlines did not follow our reasoning 
derived from dynamic limit pricing and applied to the airline industry: Airlines, 
especially incumbents, preferred smaller aircraft to larger ones, and the trade-off 
between flight frequency and aircraft size most often was resolved in favour of 
increasing frequency. 
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Exhibit 16: Aircraft size versus flight frequency (changes between 1993 and 1997) 
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he period between 1993 and 1997, we see that flight frequencies of airlines for 
en city pairs increased - more so when the use of smaller aircraft was maintained 
eat capacity was only slightly increased. The cluster around Manchester –
ssels with KLM will be disregarded, since it depicts cases where traffic was shut 
n after deregulation. The fact that this cluster appears on the upper boundary of 
reasing aircraft size is due to the computations involving the sum of squared 
rs, etc. thus eliminating negative signs. Instead of finding an indication for an 
reasing (or even a vertical) slope between changes in frequency and aircraft size, 
ich would have supported the hypothesis of exploiting economies of scale, we find 
learly decreasing, almost horizontal, slope. The scatterplot does not provide 
pirical (though only exploratory) support for the hypothesis of operating at 
imum efficient scale through hub dominance either: The suggested tendency to 
rease frequency on short-distance European city pairs, rather than using larger 
raft, will hardly lower average unit costs. 
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III Product differentiation 
 
III.1 Definition 
 
Product differentiation advantages stem from buyer preferences for products or 
services. According to Chamberlin (1933), advertising, packaging, branding or 
auxiliary services can add to such differentiation. Product differentiation provides       
“independent jurisdiction” over price (Bain 1956). This jurisdiction implies an ability to 
raise price above that of rivals, while retaining some, but not all, of the customers 
who prefer the product. Correspondingly, a firm can lower its price without attracting 
away all of the competitors’ buyers who prefer other firms’ products. 
 
Bain (1959, p. 240) identifies three possible sources of product differentiation: 
• The accumulated preferences of buyers for established brand names and 
company reputations. 
• The exclusive control of superior product designs by established firms, through 
patent protection. 
• The ownership or control of favoured systems of distribution (or distribution 
systems with disadvantageous cost to the entrant). 
 
A product differentiation barrier to entry would occur if its height remained the same 
regardless of the scale at which entry was made (ignoring the effects of sales 
promotion economies). Apart from price differences, product differentiation may result 
in other consequences as well: 
• Higher selling costs tend to be incurred for the non-differentiated firm to gain and 
maintain a share of the market against established rivals and also against 
potential entrants. 
• Alterations within the organization may be made that aim to favour sales 
promotion: for example, the integration of distributive functions and facilities may 
be encouraged. 
 
For an entrant, not being differentiated may be disadvantageous, taking the form of 
either lower prices or higher selling costs for the product. An entrant would then need 
to incur higher sales promotion costs per unit of output than the incumbent in order to 
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sell at the same unit price. The sum of this lower price and the selling cost 
disadvantage will be the total disadvantage vis-à-vis a differentiated product.25 In 
general, incumbents are assumed to possess inherently such customer preferences 
when compared with new entrants. As Bain states: “…a preference, transitory or 
permanent, for some or all established products as compared to new entrant 
products makes it unlikely, ceteris paribus, that entrants will be able to replicate post-
entry the pre-entry price-cost margins enjoyed by incumbents without expending 
resources to develop their own consumer loyalties…”(1956, p. 114). 
 
In the field of transport, product differentiation among the services of competing 
carriers of the same type is present, but it is evidently more important in the field of 
passenger transport than in that of freight transport (Bain 1959, p. 221). Moreover, 
differentiation between products of established sellers and those of potential new 
entrant sellers ought to be distinguished. Customer preferences may have their 
specific distribution among incumbents and entrants (p. 237). 
 
III.2 The issue of switching costs 
 
The key question for an entrant then must be: “How can I win over clients from 
established firms?” Evidently, to make reasonable choices among “experience 
goods” (those the consumer must consume in order to usefully evaluate them; 
Nelson 1970), the consumer must acquire information. However, these search costs 
are sunk costs, and so a prior investment with one particular brand will weaken 
consumer’s interest in other new brands which arrive later on the market (Geroski, 
Gilbert and Jacquemin, p. 47). Thus entrants must persuade consumers already 
settled in their ways to collect information, compare products with different 
specifications and then re-evaluate their purchasing habits. Switching costs dissuade 
a consumer from changing brands – either because of the direct costs of switching or 
because of a distaste for sampling other brands. They are a source of diseconomies 
                                                          
25 Empirical data suggest that incumbents’ advantages are more likely to originate from higher prices 
than lower selling costs than entrants: Advertising and distribution costs as a percentage of total 
operating expenditures are shown for different carriers in the UK (Civil Aviation Authority 1998, p.142).
  
Distribution costs 1996 BA BM Air UK Ryanair
(% of operating costs) 29% 20% 20% 18% 
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of scope in consumption because, with switching costs, a consumer is better off 
continuing to purchase from the original supplier even though another supplier offers 
the same product at a slightly lower price.  
 
Exhibit 17:  Demand with switching costs 
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as a Stackelberg leader, and both firms have identical and constant marginal costs. 
They show a unique equilibrium in which the entrant serves only new customers at a 
price p and the established supplier serves only old customers at a price p+f. The 
incumbent would never compete for the new customers. Allowing for economies of 
scale, a customer base with switching costs can lead an established firm to allow 
entry even when entry prevention would be more efficient. They conclude that if 
economies of scale are not too great, keeping its established customer base while 
allowing for entry would be the best strategy. 
 
III.3 Differentiation as a means for higher prices for incumbent airlines 
 
The most logical observation of substantial differentiation within European city pairs 
would be to examine one criterion: higher prices vis-à-vis an entrant. Such a pattern 
of price premiums paid for otherwise identical services closely reflects the rationale 
outlined by Farrel and Shapiro with their analysis of switching costs: The incumbent 
could choose to maintain his customer base and continue to charge a premium for its 
services vis-à-vis the entrant. The incumbent’s market share would remain relatively 
stable (if the overall market did not grow because of new entrants) and a price 
premium over the entrant’s price would persist. This strategy could be measured by 
the persistence of a price differential with entrants. 
 
A casual survey using different examples illustrates price premiums in favour of 
incumbents for the same ticket class (Civil Aviation Authority 1998, pp. 235). 
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Exhibit 18: A comparison of ticket fares (1) 
 
Fare Type26 Carrier Nov ‘92 Nov ‘94 Nov ‘96 Nov ‘97 
Paris – Lisbon (FRF) 
C2 TAP, Air France - 5,900 5,960 6,080 
C2 Air Liberté - 5,900 4,900 - 
Y2 Air France - 5,900 5,075 5,180 
Y2 Air Liberté - 4,680 3,500 - 
Lisbon – Paris (PTE) 
C2 TAP, Air France - 156,000 151,500 151,000 
C2 Air Liberté - 100,000 96,000 - 
Y2 Air France - - 133,000 137,000 
Y2 Air Liberté - 66,000 58,000 - 
Vienna – Paris (ATS) 
C2 Air France  11,880 11,180 11,180 
C2 Austrian  11,880 - - 
C2 Lauda  11,880 6,000 9,280 
London – Milan (GBP) 
CE3D Alitalia    428 
CE3D Air One    349 
 
This handful of examples suggests that indeed a significant price premium can be 
obtained by incumbents for otherwise identical tickets.27 This first observation, 
regarding business and coach/economy class tickets, can be confirmed when looking 
at discount fares (from table I13, p. 237). 
 
Exhibit 19: A comparison of ticket fares (2) –  
Lowest return fares of low-cost carriers (April 1998) 
 
Low-cost carriers and routes Lowest return 
fare 
Example of lowest fare offered by 
national carrier 
easyJet London (Luton) to GBP  GBP 
Amsterdam 58 BA 67 
Barcelona 78 BA 124 
Nice 78 BA 128 
Palma 98 British Midland 155 
Debonair London (Luton) to GBP  GBP 
Barcelona 99 BA 124 
Düsseldorf 66 BA 98 
Hamburg 130 BA 129 
Madrid 109 BA 124 
Munich 90 BA 117 
Nice 99 BA 128 
Debonair Düsseldorf to DEM  DEM 
Barcelona 399 Lufthansa 499 
                                                          
26 The C code stands for business class, Y represents economy class. 
27 Civil Aviation Authority (1998) also points out that the incumbents increased flight frequency on the 
examined routes. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that market share was necessarily lost by charging 
higher prices than entrants. 
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Low-cost carriers and routes Lowest return 
fare 
Example of lowest fare offered by 
national carrier 
Go London (Stansted) to GBP  GBP 
Copenhagen 100 BA 122 
Milan 100 BA 149 
Rome 100 BA 149 
Ryanair Dublin to IEP  IEP 
London 49 - 59 Aer Lingus 76 
Brussels 49 - 69 Aer Lingus 99 
Paris (Beauvais) 79 Aer Lingus 99 
Ryanair London (Stansted) to GBP  GBP 
Oslo (Sandefjord) 89 BA 157 
Stockholm (Nykoping) 89 BA 138 
Virgin Express Brussels to BEF  BEF 
London (Heathrow/ Gatwick) 3,200 Sabena 4,300 
Milan 5,600 Sabena 7,120 
Copenhagen 5,600 Sabena 7,140 
Rome 5,600 Sabena 6,120 
Madrid 5,600 Sabena 5,620 
Barcelona 5,600 Sabena 5,620 
Nice 5,600 Sabena 7,030 
 
 
Apparently, in all major price segments (business, economy and discount), some 
incumbents manage to maintain price premiums over the entrants. As we have no 
indication that the incumbents lose their customer base with such pricing behaviour 
(if exit occurs, it is the entrant rather than the incumbent that drops a route), we can 
find empirical support for post-entry equilibrium according to Farrel and Shapiro 
(1986). A closer examination of several factors that may contribute to such apparent 
barriers due to differentiation may further explain its underlying dynamics.  
 
III.4 The means of differentiating airline services28
 
Why are passengers willing to pay more for otherwise identical tickets only because 
they come from an incumbent airline? Different aspects might explain such customer 
preference: 
 
                                                          
28 The average net advantage due to differentiation would not be expected to remain for ever. It is 
likely that an entrant would anticipate large initial disadvantages, which decrease with the passage of 
a certain number of years. 
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III.4.1 Active differentiation 
 
III.4.1.1 Advertising 
 
Attempts to measure product differentiation barriers often start by equating barriers 
due to product differentiation with barriers due to advertising, at least partly because 
many scholars see advertising as the principal cause of product differentiation 
barriers. Comanor and Wilson (1967, p. 423) argue that advertising expenditures are 
“…both a symptom and a source of differentiation…”. In practice, they used 
advertising-sales ratios and found significant positive correlations between 
advertising intensity and firm profitability.  
 
There are, however, a number of reasons for avoiding equating product 
differentiation with advertising and for thinking that advertising expenditures may be a 
fairly poor way to measure the height of barriers associated with product 
differentiation. The major objections arise because advertising is not a structural 
characteristic of markets. The basic structural determinants of the choice of 
advertising levels are consumer preferences, consumer informativeness, and the 
technology of production and of information transmission, and clearly, it is in these 
structural conditions that the source of product differentiation barriers lies (Geroski, 
Gilbert and Jacquemin 1990, p. 52). Hence, correlations between advertising 
intensity and firm profitability cannot necessarily be read as reflecting entry 
difficulties. 
 
Even if we were to accept advertising expenditures as the valid (and easily 
measurable) proxy for product differentiation, it would be net revenue effects, and not 
costs, that were the relevant quantity to measure the height of such differentiation 
barriers (Spence 1980). In the case of the airline business, due to price discrimination 
and rather general advertising campaigns, measuring such net revenue effects 
becomes difficult. Since price premiums for incumbents only exist on certain city 
pairs, over certain periods of times, in certain price classes, the allocation of general 
advertising expenditures to these sub-markets becomes virtually impossible. Deriving 
net revenue effects from these raw data would be impossible. 
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Rather, we shall try to elaborate on several structural market characteristics, mostly 
in relation to differing customer preferences, which are at the root of successful 
advertising. 
 
III.4.1.2 Brand loyalty 
 
The concept of brand loyalty has been the focus of widespread attention in marketing 
literature. However, a precise, generally accepted definition of brand loyalty is still 
lacking (Palda 1969, pp. 122-124; Engel, Kollat and Blackwell 1968, ch. 26; Walters 
and Paul 1970, pp. 507-510). Comanor and Wilson (1967, p. 425) summarize as 
follows: “…Because of buyer inertia and loyalty, more advertising messages per 
prospective customer must be applied to induce brand switching as compared with 
repeat buying...”. It was widely assumed that continuous advertising expenditures 
would create such brand loyalty, which, in turn, would make it disproportionately 
expensive for entrants to match these expenditures in order to win over “loyal” 
customers (Schmalensee 1974, p. 579).  
 
Instead of discussing whether advertising is the only means of creating lasting brand 
loyalty, we shall make some other inferences: Brand loyalty appears to be similar to 
the switching cost disutility of consumers. Loyal customers tend to stick to their 
brand, even if prices are higher than for comparable products. If this were also the 
case for airline incumbents, why would they incur additional costs to develop an 
existing customer base? If incumbents’ customers were already loyal, why would 
there be to create expensive frequent flyer programmes (the same rationale holds 
true for computer reservation systems and commission overrides for travel 
agencies)? Frequent flyer and similar programmes indicate a priori a lack rather than 
a surplus of customer loyalty, be it induced by advertising, superior service or other 
factors. Even accepting the hypothesis that frequent flyer programmes would actually 
create such loyalty, net earnings effects - not only price premiums over entrants - 
would need to be considered.  
 
We can deduce that net earnings effects can rarely be positive for discount tickets, 
for two main reasons: Passengers in these classes tend to be, by definition, more 
price sensitive and, thus, less loyal. If entrants offer lower prices in these classes, 
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incumbents would need to compensate with enough “bonus miles”. Taken together 
with the administration costs for frequent flyer programmes, net earnings in discount 
classes can hardly be higher than those of low-priced entrants. Even without taking 
into account the heightened price sensitivity of discount class passengers, we find 
that price premiums in absolute terms are regularly lower than with fully flexible 
economy or business class tickets,29 mostly due to the lower base prices in these 
classes. The costs of administering frequent flyer programmes accounts do not alter 
between business, economy and discount. Sufficiently30 high price premiums over 
entrants (in absolute terms) will realistically only be found with fully flexible economy 
or business class tickets. 
 
III.4.1.3 Flight frequency31
Flight frequency was considered in earlier sections as a measure of capacity choices. 
It was also discussed in the context of hub-and-spoke services. Offering more flights 
on given days than competitors may indeed differentiate services. It is obvious that 
frequency must benefit customers, provided flights take place at convenient times. 
Again, business class passengers (time is money) are expected to be more sensitive 
to such increased frequency than economy or discount passengers. Price premiums 
due to flight frequency should be more significant in business than economy class, 
simply because of higher opportunity costs in this customer segment. If entrants were 
able to offer the same frequency as incumbents on given city pairs, ceteris paribus, 
no price premiums favouring incumbents would then be justified. 
 
III.4.1.4 Point to point 
In perfect analogy with what we have said about flight frequency, direct point-to-point 
connections should be preferable to spoke-hub-spoke connections. The increased 
customer utility of point-to-point flights holds even more true in Europe than in the 
US, because of regularly shorter distances between departure and final destinations. 
If entrants manage to provide such direct flights, and incumbents choose hub 
airports, it would be hard for the incumbent to justify price premiums. Again, business 
                                                          
29 See exhibit 19 
30 “Sufficient” here meaning to provide overall positive net earnings. 
31 Refer to chapter IV.3.1.3. 
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class passengers should be particularly responsive to such arguments, but possibly 
also economy and even discount passengers.  
 
III.4.1.5 Service quality 
Service quality is intrinsically difficult to measure, or even to define adequately for the 
airline sector. Some reports refer to readily obtainable data, such as frequency, point-
to-point connections or the use of jet aircraft (for example, General Accounting Office 
1986, p. 3). Other aspects, such as frequent delays could be considered as quality 
issues as well. However, delays can only rarely be attributed to particular airlines; 
they are usually due to airport congestion. Other factors are more subjective, such as 
the friendliness and professionalism of the cabin crew. In terms of aircraft used, 
entrants widely use jets, as do the incumbents, thus no difference in quality can be 
derived from this. We shall thus assume that service quality between incumbents and 
entrants is equal, for a given ticket class. 
 
III.4.1.6 Unique value propositions  
Price discrimination is usually linked to different classes of ticket. Associated with this 
type of price discrimination are corresponding value propositions. Business class 
tickets are more expensive than economy class tickets. On a more subtle level, 
economy class tickets can be subdivided into several classes of their own: Y, Y2, 
Pex, Superpex, etc. These tickets have different constraints tied to them: weekend 
stopover, fully flexible, non-refundable, two weeks in advance purchase, etc. It is 
pointless to try to find a source of differentiation vis-à-vis entrants in such tickets, if 
the entrant offers identical pricing schemes. The discrimination happens within the 
same airline, not towards other airlines. 
 
However, it is conceivable that incumbents might offer class categories that are not 
matched by entrants on specific city pairs. Price premiums then would be justified, 
although they would need to be compared to different value propositions from the 
entrants. Whenever incumbents are able to introduce such new value propositions, 
and to attribute a new class to them, differentiation occurs and price premiums 
become, theoretically, possible. If we assume that specific groups of ticket class 
(notably first, business and fully flexible economy) were offered by the incumbent on 
certain routes, without being matched by an entrant, significant price premiums could 
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occur. These price premiums would exceed those premiums that exist solely due to 
price discrimination between an incumbent’s fare classes. 
 
Exhibit 20: Synopsis of operational factors that determine differentiation  
   Unique value 
proposition for a 
given route 
Brand loyalty 
Flight frequency 
Point to point 
Price premiums 
- Business 
- Economy 
Frequent flyer 
programmes, 
 
Computer 
reservation 
systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III.4.2 Passive differentiation 
 
With active differentiation we sought to identify factors that might induce customers to 
pay premium prices due to their own preferences. We found that business 
passengers and economy passengers paying full economy fares are most likely to 
demand such services. But this demand driven approach is not necessarily what 
airlines, especially incumbents, tend to apply within their different flight classes. 
Exhibit 21 shows an example of price differentiation as exercised by an incumbent. It 
is noteworthy that a so-called Euro-budget fare (BB) is applied across all seasons, 
with a price level reflecting business class. This Euro-budget price is two and a half 
times the tariff of the lowest price offered on the same route by the same airline. For 
the designated economy fares, we identify clear price premiums for high season 
versus low season and shoulder season. It is however, arguable whether external 
factors, such as seasons, do really reflect customers preferences or rather present 
forces that leave passengers no other choice but to pay a price premium. We could 
argue that the passenger is still free to choose another season to fly with the same 
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airline or to try to find a low-cost carrier with maybe less frequent flights, less service 
and perhaps more inconvenient flight connections. In addition, fully flexible tickets 
(designated by F) are sold with a premium over restricted tickets (R).32 This premium 
appears to be significantly higher during high season compared with low or even 
shoulder season. Flights on weekends (W) are also valued at a slight premium when 
compared with those during the working week (X). We can observe price premiums 
in the economy class in the following order of significance:  
(1) season, (2) ticket flexibility and (3) weekend. For simplicity, we have grouped the 
incumbent’s lowest fares in one single group (S). The different Super Saver fares are 
rather insensitive to season, but can differ between weekdays and (not considered in 
this study) flight number. The range of these lowest fares in the given example was 
between GBP93 and GBP104. It is equally noteworthy that fares during low season 
are already on a level comparable with Super Saver fares.  
 
Exhibit 21: BA pricing for a European city pair in November 1997  
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III.4.2.1 Ticket classes indicating differentiation 
 
Beyond, for example, the frequency for a given city pair, the number of different flight 
classes offered may also indicate the airline’s propensity to differentiate its services.  
                                                          
32 Tickets are considered flexible when they can be exchanged at least once against other flights 
without additional cost. Ticket restriction means that a flight change would incur fees either for a new 
ticket or for cancellation. 
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Exhibit 22 lists the change in flight classes offered between 1993 and 1997 by the 
incumbents, other participating airlines or made by IATA for a selection of 32 city 
pairs in Europe. Exhibit 22 is a reduced version of a more comprehensive table that 
can be provided by the author upon request. Using the Official Airline Guide (1993 
and 1997) as our source, we checked for the change in the number of ticket classes 
offered by the respective airlines or for changes in “official” fares (see column “NN”). 
These “official” fares can be considered default fares that apply in the absence of 
airline specific fares. Such fares are established in coordination with the International 
Air Transport Association (IATA). Darker shaded fields indicate the reduction of ticket 
classes by an airline or other entity (ticket classes reduced by at least two). Medium 
shaded fields show increases in ticket classes by at least two. 
 
Exhibit 22: Increasing, decreasing and maintaining the variety of ticket classes 
 
City pair  AF AZ BA BD EI IB KL LH OA SK SN TP UK NN 
Amsterdam - Brussels Class '93           4   5 
 Class '97              4 
Amsterdam - Düsseldorf Class '93              4 
 Class '97              3 
Amsterdam - Frankfurt Class '93       4 5       
 Class '97              4 
Barcelona - Rome Class '93      2         
 Class '97              6 
Birmingham - Dublin Class '93     8         8 
 Class '97              2 
Brussels - Frankfurt Class '93        7   5    
 Class '97           6   4 
Brussels - Hamburg Class '93        6   6    
 Class '97           6   4 
London - Cologne Class '93   4     4      5 
 Class '97   6     5      4 
London - Copenhagen Class '93   5       7    6 
 Class '97   5 8          5 
London - Cork Class '93     7         9 
 Class '97   11           8 
London - Dublin Class '93   11 11 12         11 
 Class '97   11 15          10 
London - Düsseldorf Class '93   8     4     6 5 
 Class '97   6     5      4 
London - Frankfurt Class '93   4 6    5     6 5 
 Class '97   20 15    5      4 
London - Hamburg Class '93   4     4      5 
 Class '97   5     5      4 
London -Brussels Class '93   7 9       11  1 19 
 Class '97   20 14       7   7 
London-Amsterdam Class '93   8 13   10      9 12 
 Class '97   25 15          8 
Madrid - Athens Class '93      2   6      
 Class '97              6 
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City pair  AF AZ BA BD EI IB KL LH OA SK SN TP UK NN 
Madrid - Copenhagen Class '93      2    3     
 Class '97              6 
Madrid - Lisbon Class '93      2         
 Class '97              7 
Madrid - Milan Class '93      2         
 Class '97              6 
Madrid - Rome Class '93      2         
 Class '97      3        7 
Manchester - Amsterdam Class '93   9    8       13 
 Class '97   20           10 
Manchester - Brussels Class '93   6        7   12 
 Class '97   19        8   7 
Manchester - Dublin Class '93     5     5    8 
 Class '97              2 
Manchester - Frankfurt Class '93   4     4      5 
 Class '97   18     5      4 
Paris - Athens Class '93 6        6      
 Class '97              5 
Paris - Barcelona Class '93 6     3         
 Class '97              4 
Paris - Lisbon Class '93            3   
 Class '97              3 
Paris - Madrid Class '93      3         
 Class '97              5 
Paris - Milan Class '93 7 5             
 Class '97              4 
Paris - Rome Class '93 6              
 Class '97              4 
Rome - Athens Class '93              6 
 Class '97         1     6 
 
The findings are relatively surprising. Of all the airlines, only BA (along with its 
partner British Midland) reinforces the use of ticket classes as a means to 
differentiate its fares. It is astonishing to see BA and BM increase their ticket classes 
to sometimes 15 or even 20 different classes for the same city pair. Among the other 
airlines, the important incumbents drop their airline specific classes altogether and 
seem to trust such differentiation – in the form of “official” airline independent rates - 
to a somewhat more collective body. These “official” fares regularly create between 
four and six new classes, with the total of classes offered the same. The exception 
may be Lufthansa, which maintains a relatively advanced degree of ticket 
differentiation for its Heathrow route.  
 
By examining this exhibit on the basis of city pairs served, we find indication that 
hubs induce the creation of new ticket classes (either by the hub’s dominant airline or 
by introducing new “official” rates supposedly valid for all contenders). Indeed, these 
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findings tend to underline the significance of hubbing even for differentiating airline 
services and not as usually written, solely for “economies of scale or density”.  
 
III.4.2.2 A survey of airlines’ tendency towards passive differentiation 
 
With the above exhibit in mind, we now can focus on those airlines and city pairs that 
increased their ticket classes with respect to “official” rates between 1993 and 1997. 
Our intention in this survey is to identify the factors of differentiation used most for 
creating new ticket classes. With this iterative approach we hope to filter out the key 
factors for differentiation actually used, independently of the price premiums that they 
may incur. In the following exhibit we show all city pairs that increased the number of 
ticket classes for “official” fares and present a further disaggregation of these 
selected “official” fare classes as of June 1997.  
 
Exhibit 23:  “Official” ticket classes June 1997 
 
Types of classes  
City pair CY BB EE *PX*M HPX*M KPX*M LPX*M HSX*M LSX*M NN Total 
Amsterdam - Frankfurt 2 1  1       4 
Barcelona - Rome 2 1   1 1 1    6 
Brussels - Frankfurt 2 1  1       4 
Brussels - Hamburg 2 1  1       4 
Madrid - Athens 2 1   1 1 1    6 
Madrid - Copenhagen 2 1   1 1 1    6 
Madrid - Lisbon 2 1   1 1 1   1 7 
Madrid - Milan 2 1   1 1 1    6 
Madrid - Rome 2 1   1 1 1   1 7 
Paris - Athens 2  1     1 1  5 
Paris - Barcelona 2  1 1       4 
Paris - Lisbon 2   1       3 
Paris - Madrid 2  1 1      1 5 
Paris - Milan 2  1 1       4 
Paris - Rome 2  1 1       4 
Total 30 9 5 8 6 6 6 1 1 3 75 
 (Source: Official Airline Guide 1997) 
 
The various ticket classes divided into groups now reveal ticket classes in full - 
economy and business (Y and C, although the same prices are now charged for 
these services). A Euro-budget fare (BB) applies to many city pairs and is 
comparable to former business fares. Special Excursion fares (EE) exist on some 
southern routes linked to Paris. We are more interested in the fare structure in 
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economy class. As expected, we find a distinction between high, low and shoulder 
season fares (H, K, L) but only on six city pairs – not on routes linked to Paris. Also, 
we find solely flexible tickets (PX and SX) in economy class. The “official” fares do 
not include either restricted fares or Super Savers. The least we can say about these 
newly created ticket fares is that they do not introduce “no-frills” or other low-priced 
ticket classes. Moreover, we cannot filter out factors of differentiation in the above 
sample (apart from seasons, perhaps, for the six city pairs mentioned). 
 
It may be that such factors are easier to identify from the city pairs with increased 
ticket classes served by BA and BD (see associated medium shaded areas for these 
airlines in exhibit 22). In exhibits 24 and 25 we further disaggregate the ticket classes 
offered by these airlines into their components and compare their changes between 
June 1993 and June 1997. For example, if BA offered a specific restricted ticket for 
flights on weekends during a shoulder season (IATA code: KWAP), we registered 
three elements for this single ticket: K (shoulder season), W (weekend) and R 
(restricted ticket). Also, special discounted fares appear: Excursions (E) and Super 
Savers (S).33 All these elements were compared.  
 
Exhibit 24:  BA’s changes in ticket features between June 1993 and June 1997  
 
Route Class Season Week Flexibility Specials 
 B C H K L X W F  R E S 
LON - CPN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LON - Cork 4 1 3 0 3 0 0 2 4 0 0 
LON - DBN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LON - FRA 2 0 3 4 3 8 8 5 5 0 4 
LON - BRU 1 0 2 4 2 8 6 2 6 0 4 
LON - AMS 3 0 5 4 1 6 8 -1 11 0 4 
Total 10 1 13 12 9 22 22 8 26 0 12 
 
For BA, we find true business class fares grouped under B (IATA code D2, D2RT or 
DBB, etc.). These business class tickets have significantly higher prices than all other 
ticket classes. We see that BA created 10 new ticket classes within this segment. In 
total 34 new ticket classes included differentiation according to season and 44 more 
tickets took account of the day of the week in 1997 than in 1993. In terms of ticket 
flexibility, 26 more restricted ticket fares existed in 1997 than in 1993, compared with 
                                                          
33 We checked that these special fares do indeed reflect significantly lower prices compared with other 
ticket classes, including restricted tickets. 
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only eight fully flexible tickets for the six city pairs selected. This indicates growing 
pressure from low-cost carriers, especially on the routes London-Frankfurt, London-
Amsterdam and London-Brussels: 22 out of the 26 net increase in such tickets stem 
from these city pairs. This observation is underlined by the same development with 
Super Saver fares (S). BA chose to differentiate its ticket classes at both the high and 
low ends of the market, and the middle segment sees significant fares increases 
according to factors such as season, day of the week and flexibility. Each city pair is 
considered a separate market, as no global changes in these new fares become 
apparent that affect all city pairs the same.  
 
Exhibit 25:  BD’s changes in ticket features between June 1993 and June 1997 
 
Route Class Season Week Flexibility Specials 
 B C H K L  B C H K L 
LON - CPN 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
LON - Cork 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LON - DBN 1 0 0 3 -1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
LON - FRA 3 0 -1 3 1 4 4 3 -1 0 4 
LON - BRU 2 0 -2 3 0 2 2 0 0 0 3 
LON - AMS 2 0 -1 3 -3 1 1 4 -3 -3 2 
Total 12 1 -3 12 -2 8 8 8 -3 -3 13 
 
Like BA, BD increased the number of business class fares. It reduced its excursion 
and restricted ticket fares on the route to Amsterdam, but increased Super Saver 
fares on most city pairs. BD made increasing use of shoulder fares, apparently to the 
detriment of high and low season fares. More differentiation as a function of the day 
of the week was applied on fares for four out of the six city pairs highlighted. Eight 
new fares involving fully flexible tickets were created, although they focused on the 
more densely travelled routes to Frankfurt and Amsterdam, two major European and 
international hubs. In comparison with patterns observed for BA, differences appear 
for restricted flights, where BD reduced the variety of such ticket classes by three 
(whereas BA increased his by twenty-six). Across all city pairs BD has reduced high 
and low season types of tickets whereas BA has increased them significantly. On a 
route-by-route comparison, differences appear for flights to Copenhagen, Dublin and 
Cork. For London-Copenhagen and London-Dublin BA did not change its fare 
structure but BD had undertaken such changes: To Copenhagen, four new business 
classes were introduced and small adaptations were made for seasons (H and L 
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only), as well as for flexibility and super savers. For routes to Dublin served by BD, 
major changes were made on the lower side of the spectrum with three new Super 
Saver fares, as well as for seasons (three new shoulder season fares). Small 
adaptations were made on business class and on days of the week, but not on 
flexibility. For London-Cork it was BD that did not modify its offer of ticket classes. 
 
III.5 When differentiation meets scale effects: lever or constraint? 
 
For Bain (1956, p. 118), product differentiation and economies of scale could go in 
different directions. It is possible that the scale that minimizes the product 
differentiation disadvantage is so small as to be sub-optimal from a production-
distribution standpoint. When such a situation is encountered, the scale at which 
entry takes place is likely to be altered because of product differentiation 
disadvantages. 
 
Conversely, measures aimed to create or increase differentiation may at the same 
time exacerbate the effects of scale economies on the profitability of entry. When 
combined with a scale related barrier to entry, firms might find it profitable to enhance 
product differentiation in order to exploit the benefits of scale. Spence (1980, pp. 493) 
shows how advertising expenditures can influence the optimal scale of production by 
affecting both the cost of operation and the revenues that can be collected at a 
particular level of output. To Spence, it is not increasing returns in comparison to the 
physical volume alone that best measures such entry barriers. For differentiated 
products, it is the combination of  three elasticities34, that determines the extent to 
which costs per dollar of revenues decline with revenues (p. 506). In his terms, trade-
offs between economies of scale in the “traditional” sense and differentiation would 
then occur mostly at the level of demand elasticities: Given the tendency with 
economies of scale to increase physical output, combined with a stable customer 
base willing to pay premium prices for differentiated products, we cannot per se 
expect new customers who are less sensitive to the differentiated product to pay the 
same premium. Ergo, potential economies of scale are to be traded off against 
probably lower prices for increased demand. Reasoning from the perspective of 
                                                          
34 The three elasticities are: response of costs to physical output, response of prices to differentiation- 
enhancing measures – i.e. advertising - and the response of prices to output. 
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obtaining price premiums, we would argue for higher expenditures on advertising, for 
example, to maximize revenues, while production costs have reached their optimum 
minimum level. Again, the overall profitability of increased spending on advertising 
will depend on the response of demand to higher prices.35
 
Dixit (1979) employs a simple model (indeed a variant of the Bain-Sylos-Modigliani 
model) to trace the interactions between economies of scale, product differentiation 
and the scope for entry deterrence: There is an established firm (firm 1) and a 
potential entrant (firm 2), with demands of the form: 
 
 P1 = a1 – b1x1 – cx2 
 P2 = a2 – b2x2 – cx1 
 
In this model,36 the established firm can commit pre-entry to an output level that it will 
produce post-entry, acting as a Stackelberg leader. The extent of product 
differentiation affects all of the parameters of demand for the two brands. He calls 
particular attention to the effects on the intercepts of the inverse demand functions 
and the cross-product term c. An increase in advertising and marketing expenditures 
(as the proxies for differentiation) may increase a1 relative to a2, while decreasing 
the cross-product term c. The intercept (a) effect measures an increased willingness 
to pay for brand 1 relative to brand 2 at every level of output; the decrease in the 
cross-product term (c) lowers the cross-elasticity of demand for the two brands (they 
become poorer substitutes). Therefore, within the price elasticity due to 
differentiation, Dixit also distinguishes between the increased willingness to pay 
(price premium) and the demand elasticity not only for the differentiated product itself 
(b1), but also for the non-differentiated one (c). So far, he would have no problem 
with Spence’s assertion (1977) that differentiation is still subject to demand 
elasticities, which may change due to differentiation. Going further than Spence, 
however, Dixit introduces the cross-demand elasticity to affect demand of the non-
differentiated firm as well, showing a clear negative correlation between increased 
differentiation and decrease in demand for the non-differentiated product. This finding 
                                                          
35 This may be the reason for the proliferation of new classes and increased price discrimination 
between them: Demand elasticities may become more elastic the better the market is segmented.  
36 The products are substitutes if c>0. Each firm has a cost function including fixed costs. 
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is important, because it clearly states that entry prevention becomes more difficult the 
more the incumbent chooses to differentiate his products (Gilbert 1989, p. 506). As a 
consequence, limit pricing becomes less effective, eventually useless, if both firms 
offer independent products. 
 
In order to decide to what extent to apply differentiation-enhancing measures, Dixit 
compares the incumbent’s profit when entry is prevented (that is, at the limit output) 
to the profit the firm would earn if entry occurred.37 The a effect increases the profit 
earned when entry is prevented, and the c effect goes the other way, since entry 
prevention is more difficult when products are poorer substitutes.   
 
A priori, differentiation favours neither entry prevention nor entry accommodation. It is 
irrelevant whether an entrant will be able to make sustainable profits or not. What 
matters are simply the incumbent’s own profits to be maximized: For one, the 
incumbent may choose to maintain heavy investment to continue or to create high 
price premiums with a somewhat limited customer base. This was at the origin of our 
reasoning with the Farrell and Shapiro model based upon switching costs.  
 
III.6 The alternative with less differentiation 
 
Certain qualifications of the Farrell and Shapiro (1986) model had to be made in the 
first place, in order to apply it to the airline sector: Price discrimination is fostered 
rather than excluded in this industry, and marginal costs between incumbents and 
new entrants differ significantly in favour of the entrants. Farrell and Shapiro 
assumed the opposite in their model. The application of marketing tools, such as 
frequent flyer programmes, aims to increase switching costs for both customers and 
travel agents. The interpretation of this evidence can only be the following: Rather 
than exploiting existing switching costs, incumbents seek to create them. With the 
exception of artificially created frequent flyer programmes (which are mostly relevant 
for business class), we cannot find any significant switching costs for passengers. 
Due to price discrimination (mostly between business and economy class 
passengers), a single proposed equilibrium for incumbents by simply keeping old 
customers will not hold: At least for mass transport in economy class, where price 
                                                          
37 Although Dixit ignores in this comparison the cost of product differentiation. 
 68
sensitivity is very high, switching to a cheaper airline presents benefits, not costs, to 
the end consumer. However, when focusing only on the customer segments of first 
class, business and possibly fully flexible economy, Farrell and Shapiro’s conclusion 
not to lower prices while keeping the established customer base remains quite 
intuitive, in the airline industry as well. 
 
In his model, Dixit points out the possibility of taking profits from a lesser extent of 
differentiation, also due to lower costs (advertising, etc.) and possibly higher demand 
due to the prevented entry of competitors and a certain degree of substitutability 
between products.38 This strategy, apparently competing with the one based on 
differentiation advantages, would be trying to prevent the entrant from gaining market 
share by lowering the price differential and thus to gain market share at the cost of 
lower prices. It should be remembered that this approach would only work if the 
incumbent’s service proposition were clearly considered at least equivalent or 
superior by most clients (customer preference), so that lower prices would win over 
entrants’ potential clients. Within the Farrell and Shapiro model, this strategy would 
not present an equilibrium solution in the context of switching costs.  
 
An approach based on product proliferation with limited product space may lend itself 
to the incumbent’s option to respond to entry when demand is very price sensitive. A 
common pattern among monopolists facing new entrants is product proliferation to 
prevent entry: The established firm may try to pack the product space and leave no 
profitable market niche unfilled for any entry. This form of pre-emption is a form of 
first mover advantage (Tirole 1997, p. 346) and so favours the incumbent only. In the 
context of the airline business, it is factors such as flight frequency and the variety of 
different flight classes that could proliferate in the indicated sense. An increasing 
variety of flight classes under one major carrier brand does not necessarily prove 
strong passenger loyalty to the incumbent. Rather, the introduction of frequent flyer 
programmes (with their costs) aims to compensate for this lack of brand loyalty. Such 
brand-packing makes particular sense for incumbents with dominance at airport hubs 
(Borenstein 1991, p. 1237).39 Only at dominated hubs will a physically limited product 
                                                          
38 This concept of differing degrees of differentiation is also compatible with Hotelling’s model of linear 
product differentiation (see Tirole).  
39 We reiterate that the impact of FFPs was strongly dependent on network size and a central hub. 
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space be found (unlike point to point).40 Also, as the number of airport slots is 
confined, the incumbent can indeed use increasing flight frequency to pre-empt 
entrants. We also assume that only at hubs will the concentration of passengers 
allow for the broad variety of different ticket classes – for point-to-point routes 
demand will possibly be less elastic, so the multitude of classes may become 
pointless. As product proliferation aims to pack all, or most, of the conceivable (from 
an entrant’s perspective) profitable niches, the products cannot be differentiated 
endlessly. That is, products will tend to be positioned “more centrally” (compare with 
Hotelling’s concept of a line describing product space). Only at such less 
differentiated positions will the trade-offs between entry prevention, price premiums 
due to differentiation and costs for differentiation be reconciled. 
 
Exhibit 26:  Hub dominance and product space packing  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other factors for differentiation such as point-to-point service or advertising do not 
lend themselves to pre-empting entrants. We infer that the pre-emption of entrants is 
possible by incumbents if they dominate an airport hub. Pre-emption may be pursued 
there by increasing flight frequency more than wanted by passengers, or by offering 
an excess number of differently branded fare classes, even though passengers to 
whom tickets are sold are sensitive to prices. 
 
Pursuing strategies of both increased product differentiation and pre-empting new 
entrants at the same time is not easy. Neither are the strategies equally profitable for 
the incumbent.41 If we take further into account that unit costs for entrants tend to be 
significantly lower than for incumbents, then the second strategy presented becomes 
                                                          
40 This sheds new light on the hub-spoke advantage of airlines: The argument of economies of 
density, which has been put forward so often in the literature may only be secondary - if significant at 
all - in the European context. 
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- No frills 
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less and less sustainable for the incumbent. We can conclude that if a low-cost, non-
differentiated entrant manages to obtain reliable slots for certain city pairs, or even at 
otherwise dominated hubs, an incumbent cannot profitably compete (without cross-
subsidization) with that entrant, assuming a price-sensitive customer base. One 
single low-budget entrant obtaining airport slots for a given city pair makes the choice 
of entry pre-emption redundant for the incumbent on that given city pair. 
 
III.7 Finding the optimal degree of differentiation while allowing for entry 
 
According to what has been shown above, it may be optimal for the incumbent to 
allow for entry and to maximize profits with a single or only a limited number of 
differentiated products. This would possibly place the product at a greater distance 
from any competing no-frills entrant’s service proposition, while obtaining higher 
revenues due to higher prices, even net of differentiation costs. It is obvious that first 
and business class passengers are more disposed to pay such premiums for 
superior service, cabin comfort, etc., ultimately creating genuine brand loyalty. But 
even passengers flying economy may be willing to pay a premium above no-frills 
fares for direct point-to-point, high-frequency connections with a decent service on-
board when buying a non-restricted, flexible economy ticket. As we showed in the 
chapter on economies of scale, there are no significant minimum efficient scales for 
intra-European traffic. Modern, smaller aircraft were especially adapted for regional 
markets in Europe, and we did not find significant economies due to bigger aircraft for 
average distances between 300 and 900 miles in Europe. So differentiating services 
further would not impede producing at low unit costs. Clearly, possible economies 
due to hubbing (centralization of work) and funnelling of traffic in order to fill up wide-
bodied intercontinental carriers do not matter in our context of differentiation. On the 
contrary, passenger preferences for direct point-to-point connections in Europe and 
the risk of delays due to airport congestion (mostly at the hubs that are dominated by 
an incumbent) favour alternatives to hubbing instead.  
 
Well-differentiated service propositions by incumbents would allow for entrants, and it 
is possible that market share among price-sensitive passengers could rapidly be won  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
41 We assume the same elasticity of demand for both incumbent and entrant, as do Farrell and 
Shapiro. 
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by such entrants. To incumbents with higher unit costs than entrants, this would 
mean specialization in some classes only and emphasizing quality service (exploiting  
the subjective, non-measurable aspects as well: hostess’ friendliness, etc.), in 
addition to the customer preferences shown above. Specific investments could 
include better-qualified personnel, service extension beyond the flight itself, 
redesigned cabins, more leg room, etc. (Frequent flyer programmes do not 
necessarily add to such differentiation as outlined).  
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IV Sunk costs 
 
IV.1 The role of commitment 
 
In order to deter entry, the Bain-Sylos-Modigliani (BSM) model suggests to producing 
close to the minimum efficient scale, with prices near average costs. This choice in 
output and price would only deter entry if it was applied before entry actually 
occurred. This postulate was criticized as unrealistic (Dixit 1980, p. 95). Why should 
pre-entry and post-entry prices or quantities necessarily remain the same? Trying to 
deter entry by threatening to keep output high and prices low was one thing, but 
would the monopolist really act accordingly once a new entrant came in? The issue 
of credibility emerged. In order to make his threats credible, the incumbent would 
need to “assure” potential entrants he would act once entry happened. 
 
It was safe to assume the monopolist would deviate to adapt his former price and/or 
output choice when entry occured, but only if such action was profit maximizing to 
him. In other words, post-entry profit maximizing choices (in prices and output) would 
be considered credible by definition. 
 
A post-entry price/output choice aimed at deterring entry, as outlined in the Bain-
Sylos-Modigliani model, is indeed not very credible when applied in the context of a 
liberalized airline industry. Keeping in mind that entry is politically desired, then 
deterrence of such new entrants needs to be considered futile anyhow. In any case, 
an incumbent (who formerly occupied the role of a quasi monopolist for itineraries to 
and from his home market) cannot necessarily be expected to maximize profits when 
threatening to deter entry in the sense of Bain-Sylos-Modigliani. We can state that 
post-entry dynamics as predicted by Bain-Sylos-Modigliani a priori lack the credibility 
required to deter entrants. 
 
This is where the critical role of commitment sets in. Threats that would be costly to 
carry out after entry actually happens can be made credible by committing oneself in 
advance (Schelling 1960, Chapter 2). Such commitment before entry can render its 
fulfillment after entry optimal or even necessary. Whereas with a threat the actor has 
no incentive to carry out a particular action, a committed actor finds it in his own 
interest to take action after an event (such as entry) occurs. “Burning one’s bridges” 
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is a well-known example of commitment. Two armies wish to occupy an island that is 
located between their two countries and is connected by a bridge to both. Each army 
prefers to let the opponent have the island instead of fighting. Army 1 occupies the 
island and burns the bridge behind it. Army 2 then has no other option than to let 
army 1 have the island, because it knows that army 1 has no choice other than to 
fight back if army 2 attacks. This is the paradox of commitment: Army 1 does better 
by reducing its set of choices (Ghemawhat and Sol 1998). 
 
Although such commitment, as described in most of the literature (Spence 1977) 
would still be aimed primarily at deterring entry, it is also conceivable to commit to 
certain choices that would allow for entry. The common feature of strategies involving 
commitment is not necessarily to prevent entry from happening, but to create an 
incentive to determine post-entry actions to the detriment of entrants. It is in this 
intertemporal aspect of commitment that sunk costs become relevant. Sunk costs will 
act as a binding commitment because they present irreversible investment (Stiglitz 
and Mathewson 1986). Technically, this incentive is created by irreversibly altering 
the profit function of the incumbent.  
 
Only those costs that are irreversible can be considered sunk costs and have as such 
“commitment value”. These need to be distinguished from fixed costs, which may 
have salvage value. The airline sector is a particularly suitable example for 
distinguishing these costs. Planes are certainly fixed costs and are highly mobile: On 
certain routes they may be considered the fixed cost component of unit costs. But 
planes can also be sold or deployed on other routes; thus, in general, they do not 
present irreversible investment and there is no commitment associated when buying 
a plane. But this general remark on planes needs to be qualified when taking into 
account further constraints of the airline business. For example, it is known that the 
airline industry operates in a highly cyclical market. During an economic slump, it 
may become difficult to sell such planes, with salvage values being extremely low 
and few alternative routes available to serve instead. Under such circumstances, the 
investment in planes becomes de facto irreversible, that is, sunk.  
 
A distinction needs to be made between firm-specific capital and industry-specific 
capital. The point made here is that industry-specific capital is much more easily 
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recoverable than firm-specific capital. If certain sunk costs, which have accumulated 
over the years and present a form of capital investment, are not only specific to a 
single firm but can also be profitably sold within the entire industry - or even outside - 
the capital owner has not tied his own hands, that is, he is not really committed. 
Krishnan and Röller (1993) acknowledge this fundamental distinction in their paper 
examining the resaleability of resources. Accordingly, Gilbert (1989) defines as sunk 
investment only capital that is firm-specific, such as product-specific technology, 
human capital and advertising goodwill. As we are primarily interested in examining 
differences between incumbents and new entrants, we shall consider only 
incumbents’ specific capital. If their specific capital would be easily resaleable within 
the industry, also to new entrants, the definition of sunk costs would not apply. 
 
If, for instance, an airline constructed a highly specified, proprietary airport, which for 
one reason or another could be used only by the incumbent’s own fleet and no other 
airline (see network specifics, required density to operate economically, etc.), then 
such an investment could be considered as sunk, beyond being merely fixed. We can 
apply the same line of reasoning to an airline’s fleet structure: Larger airplanes are 
likely to require more and better trained staff than smaller planes. Flying a Boeing 
747 is reserved for only the most senior and experienced pilots. Smaller aircraft, such 
as a Canadair Jet or a Boeing 737, are regularly piloted by graduates fresh from 
aviation school. Maintenance requirements are much more demanding for larger 
planes and may present real challenges to industry entrants. The specific economics 
of larger planes also require highly specific routes, such as long haul and high 
density, in order to break even during operation. As a consequence, the market for 
such aircraft is much smaller than for short- and medium-distance carriers, which can 
economically operate on medium- or even low-density routes. Even during economic 
downturns, smaller aircraft seem to be much less penalized by low salvage values or 
lack of alternative uses than bigger aircraft. In addition, the possibility of leasing these 
planes to subsidiaries or other companies provides another means to reverse the 
investment. We therefore affirm that the type of airplanes per se that are currently 
used by incumbents to serve intra-European routes do not represent sunk costs for 
the operator.  
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IV.2 Commitment with excess capacity 
 
It was Spence (1977), who recognized that the incumbent’s prior and irrevocable 
investment decisions could be a commitment. He argues (1979) that entry would be 
deterred when existing firms have enough capacity to make a new entrant 
unprofitable, although this capacity need not be fully utilized if entry does not take 
place. Thus, if the incumbent’s capital level lowers the profitability of entry, he may 
want to “overaccumulate” capital.  
 
He assumes that the incumbent would build enough capacity to produce nearly 
competitive output. Before entry, monopoly output would be produced, while 
threatening to use maximum capacity if entry occurred. This threat, then, would only 
be credible if it were in the incumbent’s post-entry interests to execute it (Dixit 1981). 
Only under these conditions would the incumbent expand his output and reduce 
prices in the post-entry period.  
 
If we assume that the demand structure before and after entry does not really 
change, and especially that price elasticity remains constant, we can infer something 
important: The choice of capacity before entry is really the choice of the cost function 
with which the incumbent will operate in the short run and in response to entry.  
 
In the following graph, production costs depend on installed capacity K (Dixit 1981), 
in addition to output. Capacity has a cost of s per unit and, once installed, has no 
alternative use. Marginal cost is v whenever there is excess capacity, and v+s when 
capacity and output are equal.  
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Exhibit 27: Kinked cost curve with excess capacity 
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Only if the incumbent’s excess capacity lowers marginal cost sufficiently for post-
entry will the incumbent be induced to follow up on his threats to increase output. 
Post-entry marginal costs of the incumbent would need to be lower than average unit 
costs of the entrant. If marginal costs due to excess capacity did not undercut the 
entrant’s average unit costs, the entrant could profitably exploit the incumbent’s 
established route and reduce residual demand for the incumbent’s operation on that 
given route.  Then there would be no point for the incumbent in expanding output by 
reducing prices after entry has occurred.  
 
The differences between dynamic limit pricing and Spence’s reasoning for the 
incumbent’s pre- and post-entry behaviour in setting prices and output are now clear.  
 
Exhibit 28: A comparison between two different strategic behaviours 
 
 Dynamic limit pricing Excess capacity 
Lever Economies of scale: Lower average unit 
costs due to optimal choice in capacity 
Reduced marginal costs post-entry due to 
excess capacity 
Pre-entry Higher output takes advantage of 
economies of scale. Prices are 
accordingly low, signalling no profit 
potential for smaller scale entrants. 
Incumbent chooses monopoly output and 
pricing. Low output, high prices still deter 
new entrants because of commitment. 
Post-entry High output and low prices are 
maintained, driving out entrants lacking a 
minimal efficient scale. 
Output at full capacity, with lower prices, 
takes advantage of lowered marginal 
costs and aims to drive out new entrants. 
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Although Spence (1977) suggests that this analysis of excess capacity only formally 
applies to homogeneous product industries with some economies of scale, the spirit 
of his analysis carries over to other cases of capital investment. However, all of these 
alternative forms of investment would need to incorporate the following features:  For 
one, they would need to sufficiently lower the marginal costs of the incumbent in the 
case of entry, as shown in Exhibit 27. Furthermore, the incumbent would need to be 
committed to his excess in capacity. As we have already mentioned, flight capacity 
cannot necessarily be considered as sunk. If an airline can find alternative uses for 
such excess capacity, entrants will not be deterred by it. We shall elaborate on this 
issue under IV.3. 
 
Following the rationale for sunk costs as reflected in the concept of excess capacity, 
post-entry competition will happen on a Cournot basis. The dominant model for such 
post-entry Cournot-Nash equilibria was formalized by Dixit (1981). The following 
exhibit shows the corresponding reaction functions for an incumbent as well as a 
potential entrant. 
 
Exhibit 29: Reaction functions and equilibria with capacity investment 
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 The reaction function Ri(xe/m) is the incumbent’s reaction function when the firm has 
no excess capacity, so that its marginal cost is v+s = m. If K>xi , the incumbent’s 
marginal cost is only v and his reaction curve is Ri(xe/m), which is to the right of the 
reaction curve without excess capacity. The reaction function of the incumbent then 
depends on the installed capacity and its level of output xi. The entrant has no 
installed capacity. Therefore with respect to its entry decision, the entrant faces a 
marginal cost of v+s, which includes the cost of capacity. The entrant’s reaction 
function is shown as Re(xi/m).  
If the incumbent has no installed capacity, his reaction function is Ri(xe/m), and the 
Cournot equilibrium occurs at the point E(m,m). If the incumbent holds excess 
capacity, its reaction function is Ri(xe/v), and the Cournot equilibrium occurs at 
E(v,m). Depending on the incumbent’s choice of capacity, K, the post-entry 
equilibrium can be at any point between A and B on the entrant’s reaction function. 
Point A corresponds to the incumbent’s equilibrium output at E(m,m). This is the 
smallest output that can be sustained by the incumbent as a Cournot equilibrium. 
Point B corresponds to the incumbent’s output at E(v,m) and is the largest output 
that can be sustained as a Cournot equilibrium. Outputs between A and B are 
equilibria for corresponding capacity investment, K. If, given an investment in 
capacity K, the equilibrium output that results if a firm enters the market is such that 
the entrant would not break even, a rational firm would choose to stay out of the 
market. Thus, prior capacity investment is a way to make an entry deterring limit 
output “credible”. 
 
IV.3 Sunk costs in the airline industry 
 
At this point we should ask which forms of sunk costs could present such 
commitment within the European airline industry. After identifying capital investments 
that were sunk - and not only fixed - we could check whether such capital is provided 
in excess by incumbents. 
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IV.3.1 Air transport capacity 
 
The most obvious point to start searching is transport capacity, usually measured in 
available ton kilometres or available seat kilometres: Is there any excess capacity 
among European former flag carriers? To answer this question, we have to account 
for the airline industry’s idiosyncracies. Capacity can be reflected in the larger fleet of 
aircraft. It can also be reflected in a larger size of the average aircraft, given the same 
fleet. In addition, capacity would also be increased if given planes were used more 
frequently. While from the outside all these variables may appear to represent the 
capacity of an incumbent, their effects are very different. 
 
Exhibit 30: Division of an incumbent’s capacity 
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Only new aircraft that are deployed on routes to old, or established, destinations can 
conceivably deter entry. Increasing capacity on new city pair routes is not viable to 
deter other entrants from entering older, already established routes. Any reflection on 
excess capacity, then, must focus on the evolution of capacity on city pairs, which 
was already established before liberalization started in 1992.  
 
As we have seen, airlines can make capacity choices for given city pairs along two 
dimensions: changing aircraft size and the frequency of flights to city pairs. Both 
dimensions impact on the average load factor: For a given demand, increasing flight 
frequency on a city pair lowers average load factor, as does the utilization of larger 
aircraft. The following table depicts the changes in average load factor of industry 
incumbents on European routes. 
 
Exhibit 31: European traffic of national airlines  
 
 1992 1996 1992 - 1996 
 
Airline 
Passengers 
(million) 
Average 
load factor 
Passengers 
(million) 
Average 
load factor 
% change in no. 
of passengers 
Aer Lingus 3.6 63% 3.9 69% 9% 
Air France 25.7 57% 24.4 64% -5% 
Air Portugal 2.8 65% 3.2 63% 17% 
Alitalia 17.1 61% 20.1 63% 18% 
Austrian 2.2 53% 2.2 50% -3% 
BA 17.4 66% 21.0 69% 20% 
Finnair 2.9 47% 4.5 60% 51% 
Iberia 19.3 65% 17.7 64% -9% 
KLM 5.2 57% 6.9 67% 33% 
Lufthansa 22.0 54% 26.8 58% 21% 
Luxair 0.5 54% 0.6 53% 39% 
Olympic 4.9 66% 5.7 66% 16% 
Sabena 2.4 46% 4.3 49% 75% 
SAS 13.6 58% 18.6 57% 37% 
TOTAL 139.7 59% 159.7 62% 14% 
(Source: Civil Aviation Authority 1998, p. 97) 
 
Indeed, the above table strongly suggests excess capacity among major flag carriers 
at the beginning of the liberalization period. This excess capacity was utilized 
increasingly, while output increased in most cases. Among the major European 
carriers, excess capacity was particularly strong with Lufthansa and Air France, less 
so with BA. In comparison to the European mean, Lufthansa still maintained some – 
albeit reduced - degree of excess capacity in 1996. Without being able to pinpoint the 
source of excess capacity now, we can see its relevance to what was said by Spence 
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earlier on excess capacity and lowering marginal costs, although the overall 
equilibrium output and average load factors differ significantly among incumbents. 
The fact that double digit passenger growth was reflected in only a small increase in 
the seat factor shows that airlines were keen on keeping up investment in capacity, 
instead of using existing capacity more efficiently. 
 
The question has to be asked, whether such excess capacity does in fact represent 
commitment, provide for lower marginal costs of the incumbent and thus deter new 
entrants?  
 
IV.3.1.1 Aircraft size as commitment? 
As indicated in Chapter 1, bigger aircraft tend to have lower marginal costs than 
smaller aircraft.42 This is especially true for high-density routes, where a single mid-
sized airplane may not suffice to transport all passengers. However, filling up bigger 
aircraft is much riskier than filling up smaller ones. Adding one more passenger to a 
flight with many seats still available implies marginal costs that may be negligible. 
The reason for this is the overwhelming percentage of fixed costs on scheduled 
flights. In this respect, choosing the bigger aircraft would mean presenting more 
excess capacity, which would be filled up at very low marginal costs in comparison 
with entrant’s smaller planes. So far, Spence’s approach fits.43  
 
A potential new entrant for a particular city pair would find an incumbent serving the 
same route with an aircraft half empty. Even if the incumbent’s prices for this route 
were excessively high, the entrant would be deterred because minimal marginal 
costs would encourage the incumbent to lower his prices if entry were to occur. 
Spence’s approach still applies. We shall not assume that the potential entrant would 
want to invest in the same size of plane, since neither of the competitors would be 
profitable. But the entrant could either invest in a smaller plane or in a used plane the 
same size as the incumbent’s. Both choices would imply lower fixed costs for the  
                                                          
42 When we examine aircraft size, we assume the plane already to be in the air. That is, higher 
operating costs for maintenance, crew, fuel, depreciation, etc. do matter on an average cost basis, but 
not for marginal costs.  
43 The legendary price wars among the major US airlines especially during the mid 1980’s display this 
reasoning based upon marginal cost-pricing. 
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entrant, and consequently a lower break-even point than the incumbent. The entrant 
could be profitable even with a smaller output than the incumbent, while crucial 
passengers would be taken away from the incumbent, incurring losses for the latter.  
 
During economic growth, the incumbent’s investment is not really sunk, as there is a 
favourable resale market for used aircraft. Under such conditions, the incumbent may 
look for other, more lucrative deployments of its plane, or consider the opportunity 
costs of leasing or selling it, instead of starting a price war against a low-cost entrant. 
If there was an economic slump, however, markets for “oversized” aircraft may dry up 
and then the definition of sunk costs is more likely to fit. Operating such “oversized” 
planes during periods of low demand for given city pairs, even when charging high 
prices to the customer, certainly shows an airline’s commitment to that route. The 
incumbent would be forced to lower prices even below the entrant’s average unit 
costs to maintain customer demand on his side and to prevent the entrant from 
breaking even. As a result, new entrants might effectively be deterred. 
 
Anecdotal evidence, however, strongly suggests that incumbents do not compete on 
aircraft size against entrants. On the contrary, they have invested heavily in smaller, 
but modern and comfortable aircraft such as Canadair Jets or Avro RJ85s, which 
seat only 50 or 85 passengers, respectively. Other aircraft, such as the ATR42, the 
Fokker 70 or the Saab 2000, also target this range of 50+ passengers per flight. 
Successful entrants, such as easyJet or Ryanair, operate Boeing 737s, which can 
seat between 120 and 140 passengers each. Clearly, in order to identify excess 
capacity with the incumbent, we have to look elsewhere. 
 
IV.3.1.2 Routes as commitment? 
This question has to be considered in the context of the paragraph on excess 
capacity. Excess capacity on a route level would mean that an incumbent maintained 
routes in its network even though demand was clearly lacking, with not even the 
smallest aircraft reaching the usual average load factor. With such reasoning, the fact 
that an incumbent were serving a certain city route would deter new entrants from 
trying to fly the same city pair. This would be the case if the incumbent’s marginal 
costs for serving such a route were lower than the entrant’s average costs for 
operating on the same route. In fact, marginal costs for maintaining service on a 
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given route may be quite substantial: Counters for ticket sales, check-in and 
embarkation are marginal costs based on the choice of a certain route. So are the 
costs for operating a plane - possibly empty - between city pairs, including costs of 
landing rights, air traffic control, etc. These marginal costs for the incumbent cannot 
be expected to be lower than the entrant’s average unit costs, given that there is a 
minimum of demand. We can also consider the aspect of operating different sizes of 
aircraft on such routes: The bigger the plane, the higher marginal costs are going to 
be, due to higher operating costs when serving a city pair with a large empty plane, 
compared with flying a smaller plane - still empty - on such routes.  
 
Remarks that an incumbent’s hub structure may offer lower marginal costs than the 
new entrant’s average unit costs are not valid, because other profitable routes could 
be served more frequently with the same marginal cost advantages due to an 
airline’s hub structure. All factors of production deployed for a certain city pair (such 
as aircraft, personnel, etc.) can easily be reassigned to other routes. The network 
structure of hub-and-spoke operations makes such shifts in resources between 
different spokes easier instead of harder. That is, such investment in particular routes 
cannot be considered sunk or irreversible.  
 
We may also reflect on the possibility of the incumbent “burning his bridges” by 
overextending his fleet of small planes (lower marginal costs), so that the existing 
routes are saturated by the incumbent’s flight operations, and the potential for 
reassigning planes to other routes is very low, even within a hub-and-spoke system. 
The issue of opportunity costs would disappear, and the incumbent’s marginal costs 
(post-entry) might remain on a very competitive level when compared with entrant’s 
average costs. Such network saturation may indeed present the characteristics of 
sunk costs. Its salient feature would be to serve existing city pairs (providing there is 
a minimum of demand) with as many aircraft as possible. Such strategic behaviour 
could best be described as excess capacity through flight frequency. 
 
IV.3.1.3 Flight frequency as commitment? 
Maybe excess capacity with regard to flight frequency for established city pairs is 
more apt to deter new entrants? Such frequent flights would need to present a form 
of sunk costs. As pointed out before, incumbents can saturate their route network (be 
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it domestic or European) to a degree that alternative uses for the fleet of planes 
already deployed becomes extremely limited. The incumbent could furthermore 
concentrate such saturation on medium- to high-density routes within Europe 
because those are the routes on which entrants would be most likely to break even. 
Such deterrence would be reinforced if marginal costs for very frequent flights on a 
given city pair were significantly below the entrant’s average costs for its smaller 
number of flights. If the incumbent could serve a given city pair many more times 
than the entrant without yielding any significant difference between the entrant’s 
average costs and the incumbent’s marginal costs, then there would be no 
commitment, as the low-cost competitor could profitably enter and even take away 
passengers from the incumbent, thus incurring lasting losses to the incumbent. 
 
Operating several flights on one city pair instead of several routes can indeed have 
decreasing effects on marginal costs. High frequency may substitute for intensive 
advertising, since the incumbent is already known for serving one particular route. 
The routine for sales, check-in and on-board personnel serving one city pair may be 
better developed than if they were to serve more city pairs. Aircraft and staff 
dedicated to only one city pair may be more productively employed, possibly making 
more roundtrips than if they were serving several city pairs a day. Turnaround at the 
airport is likely to be faster with only one city pair, and risky delays due to airport 
congestion are less likely for one city pair than for two. The example of shuttle 
services acknowledges these cost advantages: Ticket sales and distribution, as well 
as check-in, are streamlined and significantly less expensive. Errors in servicing, 
such as luggage handling, appear to be less costly to compensate. We can infer that 
a new entrant is more likely to be deterred from entering a city pair that is already 
frequently served by an incumbent than if the incumbent served different city pairs 
less frequently, ceteris paribus. We can conclude that the advantages due to shuttle 
service can be substantial but such investment may be hard for the incumbent to 
reverse: Although there are significant economies, there is little opportunitiy to deploy 
these services equally profitably outside of shuttling, since sufficiently dense city 
pairs are already saturated. The smaller aircraft types are usually dedicated to shuttle 
service only, with their own branding and advertising budgets (see Lufthansa’s 
CityLine, etc.).  
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We shall now examine whether changes in flight frequency really mattered in the 
years following deregulation. In particular, we are interested in validating these 
changes by comparing them to changes in the number of routes. 
 
Exhibit 32: The operations of EU airlines to/ from and within their home state 
 
 Airlines Routes Flights 
 Dec ‘92 Dec ‘97 Change Dec ‘92 Dec ‘97 Change 
Aer Lingus 25 26 4% 1,897 2,228 17% 
Air France44 137 120 -12% 10,119 13,877 37% 
Air Portugal 48 40 -17% 1,175 1,487 27% 
Alitalia45 120 93 -23% 7,662 8,988 17% 
Austrian 25 22 -12% 1,055 1,455 38% 
BA 92 81 -12% 7,129 8,897 25% 
Finnair 44 53 20% 2,304 3,784 64% 
Iberia46 159 134 -16% 8,793 8,960 2% 
KLM47 53 50 -6% 4,619 4,491 -3% 
Lufthansa48 223 254 14% 14,124 12,840 -9% 
Luxair 16 22 38% 515 518 1% 
Olympic 70 73 4% 2,279 2,619 15% 
Sabena 42 44 5% 2,541 3,847 51% 
SAS49 124 136 10% 12,738 16,390 29% 
TOTAL 1,178 1,148 -3% 76,950 90,381 17% 
 (Source: Civil Aviation Authority 1998, pp. 105) 
 
The above figures are telling: Despite increases in output, the actual routes served by 
the incumbents were reduced (see BA, Air France or Iberia). The most notable 
exception to this rule is Lufthansa, which significantly increased its route network in 
Europe. The growth in the number of flights was generally strong, however. Bearing 
in mind that fewer routes were served, the frequency for particular city pairs must 
have grown even stronger. We can infer that incumbents chose to increase flight 
frequency on selected city pairs, possibly by installing shuttle services, as a dominant 
strategy to increase capacity. Again, Lufthansa is the most notable exception to this 
rule, apparently decreasing flight frequency for given city pairs and focusing instead 
on new routes.  
 
 
                                                          
44 Air France figures include Air Inter and UTA. 
45 Alitalia figures include ATI. 
46 Iberia figures include Aviaco and Viva Air. 
47 KLM figures include KLM Cityhopper. 
48 Lufthansa figures include Lufthansa CityLine and Condor. 
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IV.3.1.4 Hub-and-spoke operations as commitment? 
The strategic role of hub-and-spoke operations has already been discussed in terms 
of economies of scale. In such networks, airports serving small- and medium-sized 
communities served as spokes, connected to hub airports by frequent services of 
smaller jets (i.e. 737s) or turboprops. This system implied that direct flights from 
medium-sized airports tended to turn into at least one-stop flights via the carrier’s 
hub. According to the US Department of Transportation (DOT), the hub-and-spoke 
system had increased competition and service in the US for small- and medium-sized 
communities as follows: 
 
Smaller cities have benefited from the shift to hub and spoke service. Most 
small cities receive more frequent service than previously, and many now 
receive service to connecting hubs from more than one major airline or their 
affiliates, thereby providing the traveler with a choice of airlines and routings to 
most destinations (General Accounting Office 1996). 
 
However, the hub-and-spoke system proves far less relevant for intra-European 
connections. Although exact data are lacking in official reports, we can assume that 
Europeans’ willingness to change flights, or even to accept an extra landing of the 
same aircraft, in order to get to their European destination is rather low. Indeed, most 
major European cities are already interconnected by direct flights from the 
incumbents on domestic routes.50
 
Exhibit 33: High-frequency domestic non-hub routes served by incumbents51
 
Country  Typical number of weekday services 
Germany Airline December 1992 December 1997 
Munich Düsseldorf LH 14 12 
Munich Berlin LH 12 11 
Berlin Düsseldorf LH 11 10 
Munich Hamburg LH 11 11 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
49 SAS figures are not consolidated for operations between Sweden, Norway and Denmark. 
50 NB: The fact that such direct routes may originate or lead to hub airports does not imply by definition 
that economies of a hub-and-spoke system are exploited. If a businessman commutes from Berlin to 
Frankfurt, the potential for economies due to hub-and-spoke operations remain unexploited 
(economies of centralization, which could easily be exploited by other, long-distance routes due to the 
near-congestion of such hub airports).  
51 We chose to exclude all routes involving the incumbent’s hub airport in order to isolate direct flights, 
which do not operate on a hub-and-spoke basis. 
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Country  Typical number of weekday services 
Germany Airline December 1992 December 1997 
Berlin  Cologne LH 11 10 
Munich  Cologne LH 9 9 
Berlin  Stuttgart LH 9 8 
Munich Dortmund LH 0 4 
Berlin  Nürnberg LH 3 5 
Düsseldorf Hamburg LH 10 8 
Berlin  Dortmund LH 0 4 
Berlin Hamburg LH 9 8 
Munich  Hanover LH 6 7 
Hamburg  Dresden LH 2 2 
Total 107 109 
Italy    
Milan Bari AZ 3 3 
Milan Reggio AZ 1 2 
Milan Naples AZ 7 8 
Cagliari Florence AZ 0 1 
Cagliari Genoa AZ 1 1 
Palermo Lampedusa AZ 1 1 
Palermo Pantelleria AZ 1 1 
Total 14 17 
Norway    
Bergen Stavanger SAS 1 6 
Bodo Trondheim SAS 5 4 
Total 6 10 
Spain    
Barcelona Palma IB 10 9 
Valencia Palma IB 3 7 
Barcelona Ibiza IB 3 6 
Menorca Palma IB 4 4 
Barcelona Malaga IB 4 4 
Barcelona Menorca IB 3 5 
Barcelona Seville IB 5 5 
Barcelona  Bilbao IB 4 4 
Ibiza Palma IB 3 4 
Barcelona  Valencia IB 3 7 
Barcelona Pamplona IB 1 3 
Alicante Palma IB 3 3 
Total 46 61 
United Kingdom    
Edinburgh Manchester BA 2 5 
Belfast Birmingham BA 0 4 
Belfast Glasgow BA 3 6 
Aberdeen Newcastle BA 0 3 
Jersey Manchester BA 2 1 
Belfast Manchester BA 5 8 
Aberdeen Edinburgh BA 1 0 
Guernsey Southampton BA 0 1 
Glasgow Manchester BA 5 5 
Birmingham Glasgow BA 6 9 
Aberdeen Manchester BA 3 4 
Newcastle Southampton BA 0 1 
Total 27 47 
(Source: OAG 1993 and 1997) 
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The intuition that hub-and-spoke operations are irrelevant on a national scale was 
confirmed by the above data.  
 
The same question needs to be raised and examined on a European scale: Due to 
longer flight distances, hub and spokes may become more efficient52 and the 
availability of a wider route network than on direct city pair routes may induce the 
passenger to make an extra stop at a hub. 
 
Exhibit 34: Some high-frequency European routes served by incumbents53
 
Country  Typical number of weekday services 
France Airline December 1992 December 1997 
Paris London AF 19 19 
Paris Madrid AF 6 7 
Paris Milan AF 6 7 
Paris Dublin AF 1 3 
 Hub total 32 36 
Nice London AF 19 19 
Nice Rome AF 1 3 
Lyon London AF 3 3 
 Non-hub total 23 25 
Germany    
Frankfurt London LH 5 10 
Frankfurt Graz LH 1 4 
Hub total 6 14 
Düsseldorf London LH 4 8 
Munich Barcelona LH 1 2 
Berlin London LH 1 0 
Düsseldorf Barcelona LH 1 1 
Hamburg London LH 4 4 
Hamburg Helsinki LH 1 2 
Munich Vienna LH 4 5 
Munich Rome LH 2 3 
Munich London LH 3 6 
Munich Madrid LH 1 2 
Non-hub total 22 33 
                                                          
52 See Chapter 1 for the potential efficiency gains due to hub-and-spoke operations. 
53 The table shows sample data and is in no way meant to represent exhaustively all hub or non-hub 
traffic flows of an incumbent. The distinction between hub and non-hub traffic only involves the 
incumbent’s own hub, because traffic on competitors’ hubs will not impact on the incumbent’s marginal 
costs (i.e. a LH flight from Berlin to Madrid might continue with Iberia). 
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Country  Typical number of weekday services 
France Airline December 1992 December 1997 
Spain    
Madrid Paris IB 6 7 
Madrid Lisbon IB 3 3 
Madrid London IB 6 6 
Madrid Brussels IB 2 3 
Madrid Rome IB 3 3 
Madrid Porto IB 1 2 
Madrid Munich IB 1 2 
Hub total 22 26 
Barcelona Munich IB 1 1 
Barcelona London IB 4 3 
Barcelona Rome IB 2 2 
Barcelona Lisbon IB 1 1 
Barcelona Düsseldorf IB 1 1 
Non-hub total 9 8 
United Kingdom    
London Dublin BA 0 4 
London Frankfurt BA 7 8 
London Brussels BA 10 8 
London Stockholm BA 4 7 
London Amsterdam BA 11 11 
London Paris BA 22 18 
London Nice BA 5 4 
London Düsseldorf BA 4 7 
London Copenhagen BA 5 6 
London Madrid BA 7 7 
London Lyon BA 2 3 
London Berlin BA 5 5 
London Vienna BA 5 5 
London Rotterdam BA 3 4 
London Munich BA 5 7 
London Lisbon BA 3 4 
London Milan BA 6 7 
London Cork BA 0 2 
London Hamburg BA 4 5 
London Barcelona BA 3 5 
London Rome BA 4 7 
London Oslo BA 5 5 
London Athens BA 3 3 
Hub total 123 142 
Manchester Copenhagen BA 1 0 
Non-hub total 1 0 
 (Source: OAG 1993 and 1997) 
 
The interpretation of the above table is somewhat ambiguous. For the sample data 
chosen, flights involving an incumbent’s hub airport increased, for most of them 
above overall output growth rates (see also Exhibit 31). Whether this growth is 
particularly aimed to exploit the economies of hub-and-spoke operations, however, 
cannot be definitely inferred, as no data are available showing the percentage of 
passengers transferring to other flights at the incumbent’s hub. If a person takes a 
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flight from Frankfurt to London with either BA or LH for tourism or business, it is 
difficult to see how hub-and-spoke operations vis-à-vis point to point can lower 
marginal costs. On the contrary, an airline serving, for example, Düsseldorf–London 
(Luton) on a point to point basis is more likely to have lower costs, even when adding 
a second flight (due to lower landing fees at Luton compared with Heathrow). As we 
saw in Chapter 1, marginal costs on hubs and spokes decrease significantly only 
beyond a flight distance of 1,500 miles. Since most of the distances in Europe are 
shorter, marginal costs increase in fact. Looking at the table, however, we can 
observe that the densest frequencies (Paris–London, London–Frankfurt, London– 
Brussels, London–Amsterdam, Paris–Madrid, etc.) are well below the threshold of 
even 500 miles.  The other rationale for using hubs and spokes was to be able to 
feed enough passengers into one hub, from which long-distance, high-capacity wide-
bodied jets could be filled up, with very low unit costs per seat. Again, this rationale 
can only work for intercontinental flights, where such aircraft are used. Indeed, 
European incumbents rarely use bigger aircraft on intra-European traffic, although 
demand would allow for it. As we have shown, incumbents prefer to increase flight 
frequency instead. We can conclude that possible excess capacity due to hub-and- 
spoke operations is not apt to deter entry within Europe. The problem of airport 
congestion is too real, and public authorities could force incumbents to sub-lease  
any available excess in slots at hubs. As the allocation of airport slots is managed by 
the airport and public authorities, and the incumbents do not truly own these slot (so-
called grandfathered rights), the allocation of such slots can be reversed by these 
public or semi-public bodies.  
 
IV.3.2 The commitment in frequent flyer programmes 
 
Frequent flyer programmes (FFP) were introduced as a competitive tool by airlines to 
win frequent travellers by providing rewards for flights taken on a particular airline or 
group of airlines. These rewards usually take the form of points that count towards 
free flights, ticket upgrades, leisure travel and holidays, among other benefits. Many 
airlines view FFPs as defensive, because they were used for maintaining their 
existing customer base rather than gaining additional customers. FFPs offer two 
advantages for the airlines. First, they provide a useful marketing tool, supposedly 
better matching customer requirements on the basis of new marketing strategies. 
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And second, since they are constrained by available capacity, they enable airlines to 
improve their load factors. The major drawbacks are the costs associated with 
administering the programme and providing the rewards. The airlines in the EU had 
introduced FFPs cautiously and with a large variation in the levels of rewards. 
 
By 1996, more airlines were awarding points the lowest fares and leisure travellers as 
well, having somewhat extended their prior focus on business or fully flexible tickets. 
Hence, airlines were keen to fill up economy seats of the aircraft on a marginal cost 
basis. There were also indications of competition on FFPs, with airlines increasing 
rewards and in some cases doubling them. Finally, business travellers seemed to be 
shifting their preferences for FFP rewards from earning free miles to being at the 
head of the waiting list for overbooked flights. 
 
Though the number of members in the major EU airlines’ frequent flyer programmes 
was still tiny compared with US numbers, membership was rising. More than 85% of 
business travellers belonged to a frequent flyer scheme in 1996. 
 
But despite their apparent success, it was doubtful whether FFPs represented 
incumbents’ commitment to deter new entrants. One key point of FFPs was to lock in 
customers and to increase an aircraft’s load factor, thus allowing for lower costs due 
to less residual capacity available. To this extent, the potential for higher load factors 
and for larger, more efficient aircraft could imply lower marginal costs for the 
incumbent. Furthermore, European incumbents with their united FFPs (such as 
Lufthansa, SAS and Austrian) should then have a significant advantage. This, 
however, is not the case.  
 
For one, the administration of FFPs is expensive. Each FFP passenger has his or her 
own account, with the relevant administration, mailing and dedicated customer 
service at the airports to be taken into accounted. This increases marginal costs. 
Also, the low-cost approach of new entrants, especially with savings in personnel and 
service-related costs, is much greater than any effect of FFPs could possibly be.54 
This holds particularly true for economy or discount frequent flyers, where 
                                                          
54 See, for example, Civil Aviation Authority 1998, p. 142, table E12 for a comparison of cost positions 
per unit between BA and entrants. 
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administration costs for these programmes become an important factor in overall 
costs. Here, the incumbent’s marginal costs will probably be higher than those of a 
new entrant. For the business frequent flyer, as already mentioned, more of them 
prefer to use their bonus miles for upgrades or non-flight perks (vouchers for hotels 
or car rentals, etc.) rather than for more flights. Again, the theory of diminishing 
marginal costs due to FFPs does not hold. Moreover, in order to be committed to 
FFPs, the incumbent must not be able to sell them. The principle of  “burnt bridges”, 
however, does not apply. Nothing prevents an incumbent firm either stopping FFPs 
or even selling them if they prove to be less profitable than expected. The fact that 
FFPs are already diluted in their flight-specific dedication shows in the integration of 
not specifically flight–related services (car rentals, hotels, tourist tours, duty-free 
vouchers, etc.). In addition, it may even be lucrative for the incumbent to take a new 
entrant into its FFP, if this entrant adds value to it by enlarging the route network. All 
these considerations contradict a classification of FFPs as sunk costs.  
 
IV.3.3 Computer reservation systems 
 
The real sunk-cost content of most IT-management systems - be it capacity 
management, yield and revenue management or FFPs - lay in the airline’s computer 
reservation systems (CRS). Based on their fixed cost character, CRS provided 
significant potential for earnings with revenues growth. These CRS could be owned 
by a single airline (Sabre, for example, belonged to American Airlines). In Europe, 
CRS were usually held by consortia of airlines. Amadeus, a system operated jointly 
by Lufthansa, Air France and Iberia (each holding a 29.2% stake, with Continental 
Airlines holding 12.4%) had linked up in 1992 with two other systems operated by 
American and Asian airlines.55 Worldwide, Amadeus counted 35 partner and owner 
airlines.56 Another European CRS was Galileo International, whose European partner 
airlines were Aer Lingus, Alitalia, Austrian, BA, KLM, Olympic, Swissair and Air 
Portugal. The most important US partners were US Airways and United. All Galileo 
partner airlines also held stock in the company, although to a much lesser extent than 
                                                          
55 SAS became part of the consortium in the mid-’90s, but had dropped out of it by 1997. 
56 Amadeus web-page January 1999. 
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the owners of Amadeus.57 On a worldwide scale, Amadeus had 44,148 travel 
agencies linked up, while Galileo had 38,400 agencies served with its CRS.58
 
In Rezendes (1988), the anti-competitive effects of airline CRS were examined. For 
one, such effects were found with incremental revenues. These incremental 
revenues arose initially because of biased display of flights on travel agents’ video 
screens. Such a bias was somewhat tempered from the beginning in Europe, since a 
code of conduct for CRS was adopted as a regulation by the European Community in 
July 1989 (Civil Aviation Authority 1993, p. 8). As the inherent incentives persist for 
owners of a CRS to favour their own flights directly or indirectly, and as the 
technology of CRS continues to develop rapidly, these codes of conduct will need to 
be revised continuously to avoid such incremental revenues. For the US, a DOT 
report found that even after the screen bias rule had gone into effect, CRS-vendor 
airlines increased revenues by 9% to 15% (according to CRS vendors’ data) and by 
12% to 40% (according to DOT’s own analyses) over what they would have been 
without of CRS ownership.59 In Europe, the aforementioned biases were not longer 
an issue in reports on the European airline industry. This may also be partly due to 
the adoption of the no host technology by both Amadeus and Galileo in the early 
1990s.60 This technology provided the agent with reliable and unbiased information, 
also on smaller or non-owner airlines. As we are looking for an analogy with excess 
capacity, we are interested in identifying diminished marginal costs after entry and 
not in increased marginal revenues vis-à-vis an entrant. 
 
The other potential for anti-competitive effects came from booking fees linked to 
CRS. Such booking fees, if they exceeded costs, could transfer cash flows made by 
one airline to another airline. Competing airlines, who pay booking fees, have little 
alternative but to pay those fees if they wish to remain competitive in the air travel 
business.61 The option of being listed in CRS, but not paying booking fees and thus 
being excluded from CRS bookings is not considered viable. The Rezendes (1988) 
                                                          
57 In 1996 : United Airlines (38%), BA (14.7%), Swissair (13.2%), KLM (12.1%), USAirways (11%), 
Alitalia (8.7%), Olympic (1%), Air Canada (1%), Aer Lingus, Austrian and Air Portugal (0.1% each). 
58 Information from Amadeus and Galileo web pages January 1999. 
59 GAO report T-RCED-88-62, p. 9 
60 Doganis 1991, p. 277. 
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report states: “…An airline competing with other airlines in major routes, particularly a 
new entrant, could not use this strategy…”(p. 11). In Europe, probably the most 
notable exception to this rule is easyJet, where flights cannot be booked over CRS 
and reservations are made directly with the airline. 
 
Exhibit 35: The marginal cost benefits of owning a CRS 
 
 Marginal 
Cost 
 
Airline selling directly without CRS 
Booking fees 
exceeding unit costs  
Saved 
commission on 
travel agents 
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we preferred to assume that such unit profits are transferred to the CRS owner 
airline, where they will be strategically used to diminish marginal costs on the owner’s 
routes in order to deter new entrants. Any airline wishing to establish its own 
reservation and sales system can theoretically escape from this mechanism. A direct 
sales approach may even save between 7% and 15% of the regular travel agent’s 
commission on tickets sold (see below). This, however, is likely to work only for low-
cost entrants on specific low- to middle- density city pair routes.   
 
Exhibit 36: Distribution of owner and non-owner potential passengers  
for booking on CRS 
 
Airline’s stake  in 
corresponding CRS 
 
Amadeus 
 
Galileo62
Non-owner 
incumbents 
Non-
incumbents63
Aer Lingus         (0.1%)  3,90   
Air France        (29.2%) 24,40    
Air Portugal       (0.1%)  3,20   
Alitalia                (8.7%)  20,10   
Austrian             (0.1%)  2,20   
BA                   (14.7%)  21,00   
Finnair   4,50  
Iberia               (29.2%) 17,70    
KLM                 (12.1%)  6,90   
Lufthansa        (29.2%) 26,80    
Luxair   0,60  
Olympic                (1%)  5,70   
Sabena   4,30  
SAS   18,60  
TOTAL (m passengers) 68,9 63 28 80 
% of total passengers 28,72% 26,26% 11,67% 33,35% 
 
If we assume that both CRS in Europe have similar market presence (and that cross 
bookings for owner airlines on another CRS would be mutually balanced), we can 
observe a residual 45% of European scheduled passenger traffic, which may 
significantly alter the profits generated by the competing CRS. However, we have no 
reason to believe that these smaller airlines would favour one CRS over the other. 
The salient feature of entry-deterring effects of CRS in Europe then would be their 
differing ownership stakes. Iberia, Lufthansa and Air France are likely to lower their 
marginal costs significantly, due to profit transfers from other airlines’ paid booking 
fees. It is interesting to note that Swissair has both a relatively high participation in 
                                                          
62 Galileo numbers does not include Swissair figures. Including Swissair, Galileo’s total would 
approximately equal Amadeus’ total of passengers moved by CRS owner airlines. 
63 There were no exact figures for total non-incumbent traffic in Europe. The given figure is an 
approximation from the CAP685. 
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Galileo (13.2%) and transports relatively few passengers in Europe. The combination 
of these factors is likely to reduce Swissair’s marginal costs even more than 
Lufthansa’s much higher stake in Amadeus reduces its marginal costs. KLM’s 
situation is comparable to Swissair’s. 
 
The interest in selling its ownership and buying another one for an airline in the 
competing CRS is not very pronounced. A shareholder would lose its stake, and it 
would be unlikely that as a new comer to an established system it could get the same 
percentage share as it had before with the former CRS. It is also likely that clauses 
within the CRS agreement would make it difficult and expensive for shareholding 
incumbents to bail out. We conclude that ownership stakes in CRS do present 
commitment. The higher the stake and the bigger the underlying route structure, the 
more the incumbent will be apt to deter new entrants, in analogy with Spence’s 
kinked cost curve. 
 
IV.3.4 Alliances: Code sharing and franchising 
 
The most rapid transformation of the industry structure was happening through 
alliances, both within the EU and around the globe. These alliances took a number of 
forms, from equity investment to code-sharing agreements and franchising. The latter 
two will be discussed in more detail. 
 
Code sharing 
Code sharing was a form of cooperation between airlines. It let airlines place their 
flight codes on flights that were actually operated by other airlines. Conceptually, two 
forms of code sharing were distinguished. Interlining involved placing an airline’s 
code on a connecting service that was in reality operated by another airline. This 
meant that an airline was able to offer to the customer a wider network in its own 
name than it actually operated. The other form of code sharing went further and 
adjusted flight operations of both airlines involved. With shared codes, formerly 
competing airlines might have chosen to operate only one flight for a certain city pair, 
where before they had one flight each.64
                                                          
64 Of course, each of the airlines would eventually have had to operate the flight, but arrangements 
such as blockspacing also committed the non-operating airline to provide a certain capacity for a given 
city pair. 
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Exhibit 37: National carrier code shares with other EU airlines in 1992 and 1997 
 
Airline 1992 1997 
Aer Lingus Sabena Sabena, Finnair, Hamburg 
Airlines, KLM 
Air France Luxair, Austrian, Sabena, 
Tyrolean 
Luxair, Alitalia, Brit Air, CityJet, 
Eurowings, Finnair, Flandre Air, 
JEA, Maersk Air, Regional 
Airlines 
Air Portugal LAR Transregional Aerocondor, Hamburg Airlines, 
Portugalia, SATA Air Acores 
Alitalia Austrian Air France, Alpi Eagles, Azzurra 
Air, Brit Air, British Midland, 
Eurofly, Finnair, Luxair, Maersk 
Air, Meridiana, Minerva 
Austrian Finnair, Air France, Alitalia, KLM, 
Olympic, SAS 
Finnair, Iberia, Lauda Air, 
Lufthansa, Sabena, Tyrolean 
British Airways CityFlyer, Deutsche BA, Brymon CityFlyer, Deutsche BA, Brymon, 
Air Liberté, British Regional, GB 
Airways, Loganair, Maersk Air 
(UK), Sun-Air 
Finnair Austrian, Lufthansa Austrian, Aer Lingus, Air France, 
Alitalia, Braathens, Maersk Air, 
Sabena 
Iberia  Air Nostrum, Austrian, British 
Midland, Lauda Air, Luxair, 
Regional Airlines 
KLM Tyrolean, Austrian Tyrolean, Aer Lingus, Air Exel, 
Air UK, Eurowings, Maersk Air, 
Regional Airlines, Transavia 
Lufthansa Cimber Air, Lauda Air, Tyrolean, 
EuroBerlin, Finnair 
Cimber Air, Lauda Air, Tyrolean, 
Air Dolomiti, Air Littoral, 
Augsburg, Austrian, Britrish 
Midland, Business Air, Contact 
Air, Luxair, Rheintalflug 
Seewald, SAS, VLM 
Luxair Air France Air France, Alitalia, Conseta, 
Iberia, Lufthansa 
Olympic Austrian  
Sabena Air Lingus, Maersk Air, Air 
France, British Midland, Brymon
Aer Lingus, Maersk Air, Austrian
Finnair, Regional Airlines, 
Tyrolean, Virgin Express, VLM, 
Sobelair 
SAS Austrian British Midland, Cimber Air, 
Falcon Aviation, Lufthansa, 
Regional Airlines, Skyways, 
Spanair 
Wideroe’s 
(source: Official Airline Guide 1993 and 1998) 
 
Besides the overall growth in code sharing, this table also shows the volatility of such 
partnerships. Most of the more important partnerships of 1992 had been replaced by 
new, more promising ones in 1997 (see partners for Austrian or Air France, etc.). 
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Unfortunately, we cannot tell from this table which kind of code shares prevailed: 
simple interlining or the more collusive adjustment of mutual flight operations.  
 
At this point, we shall continue with an approximation, albeit a realistic one: Code 
shares between incumbents tended to fall overwhelmingly into the second category. 
If Lufthansa, for instance, shared codes with SAS, we know that both networks had 
covered the most important routes for Europe from their own hubs independently 
before. Routes from Sweden, Norway or Denmark to Germany (and vice versa) were 
based on former bilateral agreements. We can infer from this historical evidence that 
these newly formed code shares do not intend to exploit new routes that have 
previously never been served by one of the carriers. Nor is it likely that the routes 
concerned would be low-density routes (within Europe), which were unprofitable for 
an incumbent to exploit by himself with his regular flight operations. 
 
Exhibit 38: European incumbents and their code-sharing incumbent partners 
 
 Incumbent partners in 1997 Code-sharing potential65
Aer Lingus Sabena, Finnair, KLM Low 
Air France Luxair, Alitalia, Finnair Average 
Air Portugal  None 
Alitalia Air France, Finnair, Luxair Average 
Austrian Finnair, Iberia, Lufthansa, Sabena High 
British Airways  None 
Finnair Austrian, Aer Lingus, Air France, 
Alitalia, Sabena 
High 
Iberia Austrian, Luxair Low 
KLM Aer Lingus Low 
Lufthansa Luxair, SAS, Austrian Average 
Luxair Air France, Alitalia, Iberia, Lufthansa High 
Olympic  None 
Sabena Aer Lingus, Austrian, Finnair  Low 
SAS Lufthansa Average 
(Derived from Exhibit 37) 
 
The question at this point is whether such shared codes (not interlining) represented 
commitment of the incumbent. At first glance the answer would appear to be 
negative, due to the short duration of most such alliances. Indeed, those airlines that 
appeared to extract the greatest advantage were relatively small players (see Luxair, 
Austrian or Finnair). Looking at the table we find the most important European 
                                                          
65 This rating was directly related to the partner’s network size in Europe. The bigger the network, the 
more route operations could be adjusted between both incumbents. Another factor was the density of 
 99
players (see BA, LH, Air France or KLM) were not particularly disposed to these 
kinds of alliances. The market values intra-European routes, especially high-density 
ones, and, a priori, nothing prevents an incumbent from changing partners if he 
believes this to be more advantageous. The definition of sunk investment does not fit 
with this type of code sharing. But maybe there are decreasing marginal costs as a 
function of the number of codes shared? Can shared codes present a form of excess 
capacity? This would imply that airlines that shared many codes would present lower 
marginal costs than those that held fewer code shares. This is not the case: The 
potential for reducing costs by combining, and consequently by eliminating, flights on 
high density-routes aims to reduce excess capacity, not create it.  
 
Interlining is another dominant form of code sharing. In Europe, it most often took the 
form of regional alliances and usually involved a national airline which formed a 
partnership with a regional carrier.66 The regional airline was presumed to have a 
more appropriate fleet as well as greater expertise in serving the smaller markets, 
consisting of low density routes. The proliferation of such partnerships was 
impressive.67 and Lufthansa was said to hold the greatest number of regional 
alliances in 1997. 
 
Exhibit 39: Lufthansa’s regional partners in 199768
 
 Home country Number of code shares 
Air Littoral France 26 
Air Dolomiti Italy 12 
Rheintalflug Seewald Austria 3 
Tyrolean Austria 3 
VLM Belgium 3 
(Source: Civil Aviation Authority 1998, p. 154) 
 
The system of interlining maintained access for incumbents to routes, that the 
incumbent could not economically serve by himself (due to his cost structure and 
operational constraints). In this respect, marginal costs for an incumbent serving such 
routes with his own operations would not be sufficiently low to undercut an entrant’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
key routes between the partners: Dublin–Amsterdam (AL/KLM) had less potential for adjustment than 
Frankfurt–Helsinki (LH/SAS). 
66 These regional partnerships, though pervasive, mostly served low-density routes. 
67 From Exhibit 37 we can derive approximately the number of regional partners for the European 
incumbents in 1997: Aer Lingus (1), Air France (7), Air Portugal (4), Alitalia (8), Austrian (1), BA (9), 
Finnair (1), Iberia (3), KLM (7), Lufthansa (10), Luxair (1), Olympic (0), Sabena (6), SAS (7). 
68 Non-exhaustive, see Exhibit 37. 
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average costs. However, in order to determine, whether these interlining 
arrangements presented a viable commitment to deter new entrants, we need to 
compare the average cost curves of the regional, interlined airline with those of a 
potential new entrant. Regional airlines do not reason on a marginal cost basis, as 
they seek to break even and to compete head to head against low-cost entrants. A 
priori, we cannot say whether the cost structure of the regional code-share partner is 
lower than that of a new entrant. But we know that incumbents use these agreements 
to feed a certain number of passengers  on to these code-shared flights.69 Regional 
flights from or to airports where the code-sharing incumbent maintains a dominant 
share are especially powerful in providing a minimum average load factor for the 
partner airline. This enables the regional partner to plan with lower residual capacity 
(higher load factor) or even to employ larger aircraft than the new entrant, hence 
exploiting advantages in efficiency when operating larger planes. Due to the regional 
partner’s dependence on the incumbent’s steady provision of passengers, and due to 
the geographical dependence on an incumbent with hub dominance, it is very 
unlikely that these partners will leave for other incumbents. For the same reasons it is 
unlikely that the incumbents would transfer shared codes to other incumbents. Their 
value is simply too closely linked to the incumbent’s hub dominance to be worth 
selling. Interlining then must be considered as commitment to deter entry on these 
regional routes. Employing “Jumbolinos” or Canadair jets on such routes could be 
interpreted as a form of excess capacity when new entrants would most likely serve 
such routes with turbofan-powered smaller aircraft.70 However, as we have stated, 
the lever for such cost advantages of the interlined partner airline is linked to the 
incumbent’s hub dominance. That is, interlining arrangements for undominated 
airports, especially for seventh freedom routes, can hardly present such commitment 
and are unlikely to deter new entrants effectively.  
                                                          
69 CRS are a helpful tool in listing code-shared flights before other ones and thus biaising the client’s 
or  travel agent’s choice towards the interlined carriers. 
70 Another form of excess capacity would be the interlined carrier serving given routes more frequently 
due to the “assured” contingent of interlined passengers. 
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Exhibit 40: Average costs (per passenger) for regional carriers with interlining  
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Franchising 
The concept of code sharing for interlining became more fully developed with the 
franchising approach. The basic rationale, however, remained the same: to maintain 
a presence on such routes (mostly low-density ones) where the franchisee was more 
suited to serve than the incumbent with his high-cost operations. The incumbent’s 
interest was to transfer such routes, which he had previously operated by himself, to 
the franchisee. Usually, the partner operated under the incumbent’s brand and this 
allowed the incumbent to maintain his own profile on such routes (Flight International, 
7-13 May 1997). Unlike most interlining arrangements, the franchisee could easily 
operate beyond an only regional scale. BA’s partners, like CityFlyer, Brymon or GB 
Airways, served the domestic market and even some international routes. Air 
France’s partners, like JEA or Brit Air, clearly went beyond a merely regional level 
with their international routes between France and the UK.  
 
Although data on franchising between European incumbents are scarce, some 
observations in the case of BA can be made. 
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Exhibit 41: Scheduled traffic before and after franchise arrangements 
 
 Total Domestic 
 1992 1996 Change 1992 1996 Change 
Brymon 293,439 461,158 57% 190,119 350,898 85% 
Maersk 311,671 443,100 42% 116,643 154,760 33% 
CityFlyer 234,818 849,145 262% 145,815 330,659 127% 
Loganair 590,727 251,214 -57% 573,029 244,186 -57% 
British Regional 
- Manx 
643,932 1,589,154 147% 524,520 1,346,835 157% 
GB Airways 233,837 484,400 107% - - - 
Total of BA 
franchisees 
2,308,424 4,078,171 77% 1,550,126 2,427,338 57% 
BA 27,387,460 32,340,654 18% 5,765,337 6,132,523 6% 
Other UK 
carriers 
8,546,604 14,710,257 72% 4,379,964 6,425,249 47% 
(source: Civil Aviation Authority) 
 
It was assumed that these significant increases in traffic were largely due to BA’s 
feed traffic in connection with its airport hubs (Heathrow and Gatwick). About 500,000 
passengers a year were estimated to connect between BA and its franchisees (Flight 
International, 25-31 March 1998). A 1996 Civil Aviation Authority origin/destination 
survey compared the level of connecting traffic on a sample of routes operated by a 
franchisee and by an airline independent of BA. In all cases the franchisees had a 
higher proportion of traffic connecting on to BA services than their rivals and, 
generally, a higher overall connecting proportion, even when the fanchisee was 
based at Gatwick and its rival at Heathrow. 
 
We can infer that the connecting traffic from or to incumbents had a decreasing effect 
on the franchisee’s average costs, similar to the effects of interlining. We are tempted 
to apply the same average cost curve for franchisees as we have done for the 
regional partners with interlining agreements. However, these franchise partners 
quite often serve other airports, where the incumbent has only low local presence 
and hence little traffic to feed on to the partner’s connections. Especially for the fifth 
and seventh freedom routes, there is no reason why an independent carrier should 
have higher average costs than a franchised one. The franchise agreement can also 
be considered as relatively durable in its nature. In any case, franchise agreements 
are more durable than most large-scale intercontinental alliances between major 
incumbents’ networks (say KLM and Northwest). The reasons for such durability are 
several: For one, franchise contracts cannot be resold. The franchisee’s interest in 
 103
getting connecting services from the incumbent prevents it from looking for other 
partners with geographically less interesting hub airports. On the incumbent’s side, 
his potential gains in finding another new entrant that might serve the same routes 
even less expensively while maintaining a minimum standard of quality, are remote. 
We can conclude that franchise agreements represent an incumbent’s commitment, 
as long as they involve a significant amount of the incumbent’s connecting service. 
 
IV.3.5 Advertising  
Schmalensee (1983) shows how advertising is to be considered differently from sunk 
costs. In particular, over-investment in advertising before entry is not optimal to deter 
entrants: “Despite the obvious resemblance to… the use of investment in production 
capacity to deter entry, here the incumbent monopolist never finds it optimal to 
advertise more if entry is possible than if it is not... These results and others 
presented make plain the dangers of analysing investments in advertising largely by 
analogy to investments in production capacity. They also suggest that the strategic 
implications of investment in advertising are highly sensitive to the effects of 
advertising on buyer behaviour and to the nature of post-entry equilibrium…”(p. 636). 
The issue of advertising is more profoundly treated in chapter III, which deals with 
product differentiation.  
 
IV.4 The Dixit model applied to sunk costs in the airline business 
In order to deter a new entrant from serving a city pair, the incumbent would need to 
serve – in using Dixit’s model of excess capacity as an analogy - the given city pair 
by committing to a particular kind of strategic behaviour. 
 
IV.4.1 Entry deterrence by committing to flight frequency 
The incumbent can commit to serving the city pair with a very high frequency, such 
as a shuttle service. As shown, high flight frequency presents commitment, lowering 
marginal costs in the case of entry. Such commitment is independent of efficiency  
gains due to operating bigger aircraft. With this logic, deterrence would be successful 
if such high frequency lowered marginal costs (when operating below full capacity 
after entry), so that prices would drop enough to prevent the entrant from achieving a 
sufficiently high load factor to operate at least one flight profitably on the given route. 
In analogy with Dixit, the incumbent would operate high frequency flights (with 
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smaller aircraft) at lower average load factors and at comfortable prices before entry 
occurs. Excess capacity in both seats and frequency would allow the incumbent to 
jack up prices on special occasions, such as peak periods, holidays, etc. Once entry 
happens, pricing can be done on a marginal cost basis, undercutting the entrant’s 
average unit costs and thus preventing him from breaking even. In addition, the 
incumbent may even maintain his full service range, maintaining premium passenger 
service and thus finding potential for subsidizing losses from marginal cost pricing at 
the bottom end of the passenger spectrum. A low-cost entrant is not likely to propose 
such a full range of services to his customers. Therefore, in order to fill up his entire 
capacity, he cannot discriminate on price, but will need to counter the incumbent’s 
lowest price, which will be based on his marginal costs. 
 
The empirical part of this thesis (see section VII) will focus on the significance of flight 
frequency as a barrier to entry and proceed to measure its impact on ticket prices. An 
empirical assessment of price and output changes with respect to entry or exit of 
competitors into established routes, as suggested by the Dixit model, shall not be 
conducted. Although the Dixit model may apply for sunk costs, other types of barriers 
to entry may have the same or even a greater impact. Section VI presents a 
framework that is more universally applicable for our purpose of identifying all 
relevant barriers to entry and measuring their impact on prices, independently of 
entry/ exit dynamics. 
 
IV.4.2 Consequences of strategic behaviour with CRS 
The issue of cross-subsidies arising from ownership in CRS is not easy to apply to 
the Dixit rationale. If we assume that profits derived from booking fee profits are used 
strategically to diminish existing marginal costs for the incumbent’s own operations, 
we can only allocate these lowered (or rather subsidized) marginal costs to the entire 
route network of the CRS-owner incumbent. Evidently, the smaller the incumbent’s 
route system for a given ownership stake, the greater the cross-subsidization effect 
on a per city pair basis. 
 
Applying Dixit’s graph, we can discern two main effects: 
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(1) A shift of the incumbent’s reaction function to the right. This depends on the 
incumbent’s ownership stake in the CR system, the size of his own route 
structure and, of course, the extent to which the CR system produces profits. 
 
(2) Whether the entrant will join a CRS or not. This determines the entrant’s own 
marginal costs, and thus may lower his own Cournot-reaction function. 
 
The hypothetical case that extremely expensive booking fees might alter the demand 
for tickets and may change the slope of the depicted reaction functions can be 
ignored. This yields an adapted Dixit graph: 
 
Exhibit 42: An analogy to Dixit’s model with commitment in Computer Reservation  
Systems 
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ownership stake is relatively low in comparison with his overall route network and the 
degree to which he uses the CR system himself. Second, the entrant’s own marginal 
costs do not increase with the CR system if the entrant bypasses such systems. The 
other extreme, at F provides maximum deterrence to new entrants because an 
entrant subscribed to a CR system would compete against an incumbent benefiting 
from CR system due to his high ownership stake relative to the size of his own route 
structure (and his own bookings). Under these circumstances (at equilibrium F), CR 
systems develop their highest degree of deterrence. In other words, if an entrant 
were to chose a city pair to compete against an incumbent, it should pick, ceteris 
paribus, those routes with competition from BA or Alitalia, without having to do 
bookings on computer reservation systems. Between the extremes shown, multiple 
equilibria (B, C, D, E) are all possible, with their differing degrees of deterrence. 
 
It is, however, not impossible, that entry may be successful at point F: If booking fees 
were modest, and cross-subsidization from CRS low (due to low profitability of such 
systems, especially in the first years of operation), the differential of an entrant’s and 
an incumbent’s marginal costs may become very small. If CRS were to become 
unprofitable, due to the emergence of alternative channels of distribution, or, due to 
competition from other CR systems, then indeed, deterrence might collapse 
altogether and entrants might actually benefit from competing on costs by advertising 
their lower costs on incumbents’ CRS. 
 
The question whether computerized reservation systems act in the way that the 
analogy of the Dixit model would suggest, or in some other way that might reflect a 
barrier to entry, shall be empirically assessed in chapter VII. If CRS are found to be a 
significant factor, its impact on price changes will be measured.  
 
IV.4.3 Consequences of interlining behaviour (post-entry) 
 
Applying Dixit’s model to strategic behaviour with interlining seems obvious. The 
action to cover low-density city pairs from dominant hub positions by applying the 
interline partner’s lower cost structure can be interpreted as the post-entry reaction 
along models with excess capacity. In fact, interlining agreements appear even more 
subtle than the “classical” excess capacity approach of entry deterrence: Instead of 
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having to invest in excess capacity, and thus incurring higher average costs, and 
taking the risk of under-utilization of this spare capacity, interlining leaves this risk 
entirely to the interling partner. Also, instead of threatening to use this excess 
capacity, the interlining partner actually already operates on these routes with 
adapted operations. The effects of entry deterrence due to excess capacity seem to 
be obtained, while limiting sunk costs for the incumbent airline. 
 
Exhibit 43: Kinked cost curve for interlining agreements 
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he incumbent’s capacity choice is based upon service on medium- and high-density 
utes. For lower-density routes, his operations are less adapted and marginal costs 
re not sufficently low (see v1 compared with v2+s2, which are average unit costs for 
 regional airline). Operating at lower-densitiy city pairs than the incumbent can still 
e profitable for the regional partner. If entry occurs on this regional level, the 
terlined regional airline can still lower prices to its idiosyncratic marginal costs (v2) 
 drive out or deter entrants. In addition, feeder service with the interlined partner 
cumbent will provide, ceteris paribus, more traffic for the interlined regional airline 
an for any entrants.  
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The constraints of such deterrence by interlining are, however, clear: The incumbent 
needs to “recruit” an existing airline for this partnership. If several low-cost airlines 
are already competing on a given city pair, the advantage of such interlining 
agreements may not be substantial enough to force the other airlines to exit the 
route, as they in turn may use pricing based on marginal costs. The scenario for entry 
deterrence with interlining then must be: The incumbent code shares with the only 
low-cost operator on given routes (which feed into the incumbent’s hubs), or the 
incumbent sets up his own low-cost company as the first operator serving these 
routes (also by eventually withdrawing existing route service by the incumbent’s own 
operations). 
 
In fact, the incumbent is not trying to undercut low-cost competitors’ prices on 
regional routes, but to capture as much existing demand as possible along the lines 
of Cournot competition by attaining a similarly competitive cost structure as potential 
entrants. It is questionable whether such a Cournot share of a low-density market, 
plus additional demand for feeder services into the incumbent’s hub, will suffice to 
deter or drive out other competitors. If this Cournot share plus additional demand due 
to feeder advantages (shared codes, schedule alignments, connecting services, etc.) 
allow the interlined carrier to use bigger, more efficient aircraft at equally high load 
factors as the non-interlined competitors, then average costs can decrease further 
than those of the regional competitors. In such an optimal case, non-interlined 
competitors could become unprofitable and eventually be driven out of the market.  
 
IV.4.4 Consequences of strategic behaviour with franchising  
 
The effects of post-entry Cournot competition with franchising are similar to what has 
already been described for interlining arrangements. In fact, the incumbent tries to 
lower his cost structure to a level comparable with low-cost operators by finding 
franchisees, as a first step. As a second step, a uniform branding and assured quality 
control by the incumbent franchisor, as well as a high percentage of connecting 
services between the incumbent franchisor and the franchisee, may allow for higher 
load factors than would be the case with interlining partners. Also, due to the usually 
longer flight distances - as compared with mostly regional interline arrangements - 
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larger, more efficient aircraft for the franchisee can be employed. The impact on 
average costs could be depicted as follows: 
 
Exhibit 44: Average cost effects of franchising on low-density routes  
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In analogy to Dixit’s post-entry Cournot competition with excess capacity, we would 
derive the following post-entry equilibria under franchising agreements: 
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Exhibit 45: Cournot equilibria with franchising partners 
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powerful brand with the notion of quality, as well as connecting services through 
hubs. 
 
The empirical validation of the above predictions for strategic behaviour based on 
interlining and franchising agreements, however, is outside the scope of the research 
design of this thesis: our sample of 35 city pairs contains mostly high and medium- 
density routes. On such routes, interlining and franchising are extremely rare – too 
rare to be tested statistically. In these cases, code sharing with other incumbents was 
more prevalent (the impact of such code-sharing on prices was empirically tested, 
although we had not confirmed commitment value of such code sharing, see IV.3.4). 
 
Beyond the practical aspects of sampling the “right” city pairs, empirical testing of 
such strategic behaviour should focus on intertemporal aspects of price changes 
before and after entry of competitors on such low-density routes. Our research 
design, however, uses contestability theory that allows us to empirically test for entry 
barriers and to measure their impact on prices, independently of actual entry. At last, 
interlining and franchising partners cannot necessarily be considered a full part of the 
incumbent’s network. Even if their efficient cost structure may deter other low-cost 
entrants from competing on certain routes, it would not necessarily imply that the 
incumbent would reap the financial rewards of such behaviour.  
 
IV.5 A comparison between Dixit and Bain-Sylos-Modigliani 
 
With a commitment to flight frequency and code sharing agreements, we can indeed 
confirm that a mechanism corresponding to excess capacity is in place. Lower 
marginal costs do not originate from economies that lie in the aircraft’s technology, 
but rather from economies in organization and economies on-ground (shuttle-
economies). In terms of interlining and franchising agreements, the incumbent 
controls city pairs without owning an adapted cost structure to operate these flights 
by himself. Again, hub-and-spoke operations prove instrumental, with a player 
dominating a hub being privileged to exploit such effects of excess capacity. After 
entry, or in the presence of competition on a given city pair, flight frequency should 
be maintained at levels well above the entrant’s. In the presence of entrants, the 
excess capacity rationale would predict price competition on a marginal cost basis. 
 112
Like this kind of Cournot competition, the BSM model would also predict lower prices 
after deregulation for the incumbent, who will seek to exploit his minimum efficient 
scale as monopoly output can no longer be maintained. Ceteris paribus, these prices 
would need to undercut the entrant’s average costs on given city pairs in order to 
make the entrant’s operations unprofitable.  
 
Unlike the assumptions made by Dixit or the BSM limit pricing model, the incumbent 
does not even have to sink capital or invest in minimum efficient scale to obtain these 
effects, since hub dominance (enabling the incumbent to provide shuttle services and 
supporting code-shared flights) is largely based on allocated airport slots: slots that 
are “grandfathered rights”, without requiring capital expenditures on the part of the 
incumbent! 
 
An incumbent’s commitment to CR systems can provide significant cross-
subsidization. Although, being a capital investment, CR systems cannot be used 
strategically for given city pairs, but only on a network-wide level. In one extreme 
case, an incumbent could significantly influence the post-entry Cournot equilibrium 
(at point F, Exhibit 42) if a major stakeholder in the CR system operated only a small 
route network itself, and if entrants subscribed to a CR system. In this case, and 
ceteris paribus, post-entry Cournot competition might render the entrant’s operations 
unprofitable. The incumbent would then rather decrease than increase his route 
network, especially low-density routes with little risk of profitable new entry, in order 
to maximize the subsidizing effet from CR systems on a per route basis. Price 
policies would aim at increasing revenues from booking fees (for increasing CR 
system profits, as well as increasing marginal costs for entrants subscribed to CR 
systems). Price policies on competitive city pairs would also be oriented towards 
undercutting the entrant’s average costs.  
 
Finally, for commitment in interlining and franchising agreements, capital investment 
is not the criterion. The aim is rather to reduce the advantage of low-cost competitors, 
trying to catch up with their lower marginal costs. Only under optimal circumstances 
would such agreements yield lower costs for the incumbent’s partner: If connecting 
services, due to the incumbent’s hub dominance, allowed for larger aircraft and 
hence – limited - economies of scale. This approach might delay new entry - and 
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sometimes even induce exit – but it implies that the incumbent actually gives up 
routes to partners instead of operating them by himself. These code-sharing partners 
would be expected to apply a Bain-Sylos-Modigliani-like behaviour, even if their 
economies compared with other small entrants were very limited. Then, prices would 
remain below the entrant’s level of average costs, and output would remain high to 
exploit small advantages in efficiency. This would mean that the franchisee would 
need to maintain high load factors with its larger, more efficient aircraft compared 
with the competitor. 
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V Absolute cost advantages 
 
V.1 What are absolute cost advantages? 
 
As a first reference, again, we need to call on Bain (1956) to define absolute cost 
advantages. According to him, absolute cost advantages reflect costs in production 
or distribution that differ between established firms and entrants, independently of the 
scale of output. Costs, at any comparable scale of operation, would be at a lower 
level for the established firm than for potential entrants: “…if the prospective unit 
costs of production of potential entrant firms are generally, and more or less at any 
common scale of operations, higher than those of established firms…” (Bain 1956, p. 
44). Using a graph to depict this relationship, the long-run average cost curve of the 
entrant would then lie at a higher level than the established firm’s. 
 
In order to explain such continuous differences in unit prices, he identifies two root 
causes: Either the entrant must use inferior production techniques compared with the 
established firm. Or he pays higher prices for the productive factors used than the 
established firm. Of course, both disadvantages can also appear cumulative. 
 
Having identified the possible causes of absolute cost advantages, (Bain 1956, p. 
144) defines the following four categories: 
• Established firms control superior production techniques and are able to deny 
their use to entrants or to levy royalty charges for their use, thus elevating 
entrants’ costs. Frequent flyer programmes, for example, may be examined under 
this aspect. 
• Imperfections in markets for productive factors purchased by all firms permit 
established firms to secure such factors at lower prices than potential entrants 
can. 
• Strategic factor supplies may be owned or controlled by established firms, so that 
entrant firms might be entirely denied access to essential materials, or be forced 
to use either inferior materials involving higher costs or to purchase materials from 
established firms at premium prices. We shall examine later whether hub 
dominance at a major European airport will match this category. 
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• The market for investible funds may be such as to impose higher effective interest 
costs on entrants than on established firms, or to impose a more severe rationing 
of funds on potential entrants. 
 
As such asymmetries between established firms and entrants regarding productive 
factors or factor prices often involve some form of ownership or control, Bain sees 
them intrinsically linked to the degree of a firm’s integration (p. 148). It is highly 
significant that Bain sees the third category concerning strategic factor supplies as 
only relevant for natural resources. Any other strategic factor would obviously be 
integrated into the entrant’s firm, as “…such integration generally seems the better 
alternative for him, all things considered". Again, the particular situation with airport 
slots and hub dominance comes to mind. 
 
Gilbert (1989) adds that a cost disadvantage arising from inefficient production 
techniques should not be considered a barrier to entry (Pt.2.2.1). At a minimum, 
absolute cost disadvantages should be qualified to refer to some factor of production 
that is denied to the potential entrant (under equal terms as to the established firm). 
Moreover, he takes opportunity costs into account as well. Considering opportunity 
costs, apparent absolute cost advantages due to scarce resources, technology, 
management, etc. might disappear when higher returns from alternative uses were 
possible. This leaves the possibility for absolute cost advantages due to resources 
that are specific to particular firms. Since such specific factors may have a lower 
value in the free market than inside the firm or industry, opportunity costs are less 
important and absolute cost advantages may arise. Such firm specific resources 
need not necessarily be mobility barriers in the sense of always being held by 
incumbents only.71 Barriers to the mobility of resources are not typically present in 
the downstream industries that use the scarce resource, but rather exist upstream in 
the structure of the regulatory authority. It is at these stages where he identifies 
incumbency rents. Gilbert then concludes the real entry barriers are located at the 
level of the legal authority that does the licensing.  
 
                                                          
71 Gilbert quotes the example of taxi medallions: As strategic factors of production, they are made 
available to only a contingent number of taxi cabs. They may be traded, thus opportunity costs exist. 
However, they are not a source for supra-natural profits as established firms and entrants alike can 
obtain them (p. 40). 
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V.2 The incumbent’s strategic behaviour creating absolute cost advantages 
 
In a logical extension of what was defined by Bain earlier, Gilbert shows that effects 
identical to those observed with absolute cost advantages could be created by 
established firms. Such behaviour is always based on the same asymmetries of 
access to productive factors between the entrants and established firms. Although 
Gilbert uses the term “endogenously created cost asymmetries”(Gilbert 1989, p. 
450), the types of behaviour listed in the following paragraphs can hardly be 
considered a qualification of what was said by Bain. They are rather a presentation of 
particular cases, which had not been mentioned as such before. The following 
paragraphs describe examples of actions created by firms to lever on the typical 
effects of absolute cost advantages. 
 
V.2.1 Learning by doing 
 
This concept is associated with the notion of lowering production costs by increasing 
experience on the job (Lieberman 1984). This notion can be considered as 
comparable to Bain’s access to superior management and working techniques. Such 
experience-related economies can be the origin of cost asymmetries favouring an 
incumbent over new entrants. The interesting aspect of such experience-related 
economies is that the incumbent can maintain this cost asymmetry by simply 
imitating the entrant’s actions. Production decisions are the means to develop such 
learning effects (increase output, extend life cycles of production, etc.). This, 
however, implies that learning by doing will not diffuse easily to competitors.  
 
The nature of post-entry competition would determine the incumbent’s strategic 
behaviour with experience-related economies. In the case of post-entry Bertrand– 
Nash competition, the incumbent would price just below the entrant’s average costs 
(Gilbert 1989, p. 496). Such entry deterrence along the lines of Bertrand-Nash can 
increase profits, but is not necessarily profit maximizing (Mookherjee and Ray 1986). 
A large cost advantage due to learning effects can in fact favour allowing entry 
because of the greater efficiency of the established firm (Geroski, Gilbert and 
Jacquemin 1990, p. 44). Prices then might remain above the entrant’s average costs, 
but sufficiently low to prevent the entrant from increasing output rapidly and from 
gaining the same experience as the incumbent. 
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There is no empirical study to this day that has suggested learning effects in the  
airline industry subject to higher output, capacity or increase in flights, etc. We 
assume the business of airlines is shaped by routines that are easily replicated and 
transferable to other airlines, be it incumbents or entrants. Most airline employees are 
rather narrowly skilled with highly specific tasks. These job characteristics suggest a 
rather flat learning curve. 
 
V.2.2 Raising a rival’s costs 
 
Along the lines of Bain’s second condition for the absence of absolute cost 
advantages “…(b) that the entry of an added firm should have no perceptible effect 
on the going level of any factor price”, Salop and Scheffman (1986) argue that 
behaviour intended to increase industry costs can benefit established firms (despite 
increasing their own costs) because it causes rival firms to reduce their output. 
Efforts to increase union wages would figure as part of such behaviour. 
 
Williamson (1968) examines the Pennington case in the coal industry from such a 
perspective: Given structural differences in the employment of labour versus capital 
between big firms and smaller ones, the “manipulation” of wage rates might favour 
the firm with a low labour ratio by increasing the average cost curve for the high-
labour content firm disproportionately. Although this logic was developed from the 
perspective of driving competitors out of a market, the same rationale may be applied 
to deter entrants by incumbents whose output is not determined so much by costs 
involving labour. 
 
Provided that the incumbent had a lower labour factor in production than the entrant, 
he would aim to gain output and decrease the entrant’s output. This would prevent 
the entrant from investing in capital to replace the high labour content in his 
production function and would also lower the entrant’s profits. The incumbent would 
at least maintain his pre-entry output choice later. This can be encompassed by 
pricing below the entrant’s average costs.   
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V.2.3 Long-term contracts with customers 
 
Such strategies are based on agreements between established firms and/or 
customers that limit access to particular markets by actual or potential competitors.72 
They are aimed at limiting the size of a rival’s market and increasing the rival firm’s 
average costs if the rival’s production technology has increasing returns to scale. 
One particular case of such contracts is described by Aghion and Bolton (1987, p. 
389) with their “optimal contracts between the buyer and the incumbent seller”. In this 
model, an established firm can enter into long-term contracts with customers that 
specify prices conditional on the entry of a competitor. Although Geroski, Gilbert and 
Jacquemin (1990, p. 46) consider such strategies are related to absolute cost 
advantages, we do not follow this analogy for two reasons: (1) demand-reducing 
strategies are not cost-increasing strategies: cause and effect need to be treated 
separately; and (2) as Gilbert says, these strategies are based on the assumption of 
increasing returns to scale for the entrant. Only then will the entrant experience 
higher average costs than the incumbent. However, as Bain has defined, absolute 
cost advantages provide lower average costs independent of the scale of output. 
This second argument reinforces the first one. 
 
Since such strategies may be relevant for the discussion of frequent flyer 
programmes, we have chosen - even though they may not be considered absolute 
cost advantages - to mention them. 
 
V.3 Absolute cost advantages in the airline business 
 
V.3.1 Airport slots 
 
V.3.1.1 Some regulatory background 
Incumbents’ airport slots in Europe are commonly referred to as “grandfathered 
rights”. Historically, these former national flag carriers were granted sufficient slots for 
landing and departure at the respective airports in order to ensure continuous, safe 
and sufficiently frequent air traffic in a non-competitive environment. This meant that 
most of the available airport capacity had been created for the former flag carriers 
                                                          
72 Gilbert (1989) considers such strategies are linked to “raising a rival’s costs”. As he puts it: 
“Demand- reducing strategies can be similar in effect to cost-increasing strategies.” 
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anyway. With the exception of fees for landing and take-off, no other forms of 
compensation for these allocated slots, which de facto represented many features of 
actual property to the incumbents, had been agreed upon. In particular, there were 
no payments made by incumbents for leasing or renting such slots. In contrast, 
excess capacity in airport slots is known to have been sub-leased by incumbents to 
other airlines (such as charter, etc.). Incumbents always considered these slots “as 
theirs”, even when they were not fully exploited in the past. As a consequence, these 
“de facto” assets do not appear on incumbents’ balance sheets. 
 
In February 1993, the Council Regulation on Common Rules for the Allocation of 
Slots at Community Airports took effect. The regulation’s main provisions were: 
 
• Confirmation of the principle of grandfathered rights 
• Creation of a pool of newly created, unused and returned slots of which 50% 
would be made available to new entrants under certain conditions 
• Slots would be lost if not used for at least 80% of the time for which they were 
allocated 
• Slots could be freely exchanged between airlines or transferred between routes 
and types of service. 
 
The directive focused on entry at the airport level rather than on competition at the 
individual route level. It also excluded any airline already holding more than 3% of 
slots at an airport from benefiting from these new entrant provisions, which were 
supposed to encourage entry. It is noteworthy that the provision did not include a 
mechanism by which airlines would have to surrender slots to make way for new 
entrants (Civil Aviation Authority 1993, p. 208).  
 
The impact of these new policies, however, was not convincing. Civil Aviation 
Authority (1998, p. 49) puts it bluntly for the typical case of London-Heathrow: “Only 
five of 14 prospective wholly new entrants at Heathrow began passenger services as 
a result of the new procedures and only two of these were on intra-EU routes… 
However, the small number of slots received were used to increase frequency on 
existing routes and not to introduce new ones…In no case had the regulation 
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resulted in effective new competition from an additional carrier on an intra-EU 
monopoly or duopoly route from Heathrow”. 
 
We deduce that these provisions failed to allow for entry on a sufficient scale by non-
incumbents. As a consequence, different new ways of allocating airport slots are 
being discussed currently, especially the possibility of auctioning off slot capacity at 
airports. These new propositions from industry experts, however, have encountered 
tremendous opposition, mostly based on the rather peculiar role of grandfathered 
rights. As Civil Aviation Authority (1998, p. 51) puts it: “...the auctioning of slots ab 
initio would require the confiscation, or at least the phased withdrawal, of substantial 
numbers of slots from those presently holding them. It seems politically unrealistic to 
suppose that it would be achievable even if it were economically desirable”. 
 
V.3.1.2 Development of slot capacity at major European hubs 
As a whole, airport capacity grew significantly in Europe during the examined period. 
For Heathrow, for example, the number of hourly slots (on average) increased from 
75.9 (1993) to 78.6 (1995) and 80.5 (1998). The following exhibit compares the 
declared hourly capacities at several European airports in 1993, 1995 and 1998. With 
only three exceptions, all the airports declare higher capacities in 1998 than in 1995.  
 
Exhibit 46: Declared hourly runway capacities for summer busy periods 
 1993 1995 1998 
London (Heathrow) 77-79 77-81 75-84 
Paris (CdG) 76 76 76-84 
Copenhagen 74 76 81 
Munich 68 70 80 
Frankfurt 68 70 76 
Paris (Orly) 70 70 70 
Brussels 53 60 64 
Rome 50 56 63 
Milan (Malpensa) 30 30 26 
Stockholm 63 66 70 
Zürich 60 60 66 
Vienna 30 45 54 
Madrid 35 30-50 50 
Barcelona 28 30 47 
Hamburg 40 42 45 
Gatwick 36-45 40-47 42-48 
Manchester 41 42 45-47 
Geneva 30 30 35 
Düsseldorf 30 30 34 
Milan (Linate) 24 22 32 
Athens 30 30 30 
(Source: Civil Aviation Authority 1998, p. 46) 
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Against this background, congestion at some of the EU’s most important airports has 
worsened over the five years after the introduction of the single market in 1992. The 
position is now most stark at Heathrow, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf and, more recently, at 
Gatwick. Already these four airports together affect many of the densest international 
routes: Of the 44 routes with annual traffic volumes of over 400,000 passengers in 
1995, no fewer than 27, including all of the top 10, involved one or more of these four 
airports. Indeed, these 27 capacity-constrained routes accounted for over 70% of 
traffic travelling on the 44 densest routes (p. 47). 
 
As airline incumbents already occupied the majority of such slots at key airports, the 
entrant found hardly enough airport slots for both departure and arrival at these major 
European airports. We can infer that the problem of airport congestion may well be 
intrinsically linked to incumbents’ dominance at the major European hubs. 
 
Exhibit 47: European airports and incumbents’ market share in 1995 
 
Airport/Hub Airline Slots,73 approximate 
market share in % 
Rome Alitalia 70 
Frankfurt Lufthansa 60 
Copenhagen SAS 55 
Amsterdam KLM 53 
Zürich Swissair 50 
Paris Air France 45 
London (Heathrow) British Airways 42 
London (Gatwick) British Airways 28 
(Source: The Economist.) 
 
As already stated, obtaining slots at major European airports has proved to be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for potential entrants.  As a competitive tool, we 
can observe that hub dominance will also lever the incumbent’s possibility to 
influence entry by defending his “grandfathered rights” and not necessarily 
contributing to creating new capacities for entrants. This resulted in some airlines 
(e.g. new entrants like easyJet and Air Nostrum) switching to close, but smaller, 
airports such as Luton for London or Ciampino for Rome. 
 
                                                          
73 Airport slots allocate departure and arrival capacity to airlines. If an airline had a departure slot from 
9 a.m. to, say, 10 a.m., it was allowed to use this time period to have a certain number of planes 
depart from defined gates.  
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If a new entrant wanted to expand his output to already established or new city pairs, 
he could rarely do so for several reasons: First, the maximum number of slots he 
could obtain was 3% per airport, according to the above EC directive. Second, the 
few slots that were eventually sold by the incumbents were off-peak hour slots, 
making increased output more risky, and thus more costly for the entrant. The Civil 
Aviation Authority (1998, p. 49) writes: “…Little more than 10% of slots initially 
allocated to new entrants at Heathrow were during the busier periods of the day 
compared with 80% requested. More than two-thirds were timed either before 7 a.m. 
or after 9 p.m…” The non-availability of airport slots in most cases brought marginal 
cost of opening new flights for new entrants practically to infinity, while incumbents 
maintain their flexibility in managing their pool of capacity. In the rare event that 
incumbents actually were forced to sell underexploited slots, high traffic at airports 
like Heathrow or Charles de Gaulle also meant extremely high prices for such slots.  
 
Moreover, slot allocation even appeared to differentiate between “new entrants”. 
Other European incumbents seemed more likely to obtain new slots than non-
incumbents. The Civil Aviation Authority (1998, p. 50) reports: “In summer 1996 
airlines which had not operated at Heathrow in the previous summer succeeded in 
obtaining only 4% of the peak week slots they requested, and by summer 1997 this 
figure had fallen to 2%. Incumbent ‘new entrants’ fared rather better and in summer 
1996 and summer 1997 they secured about a quarter of the slots they sought…” We 
can deduce from this that marginal costs for opening or expanding flights for non-
dominant incumbents (for example Lufthansa at Heathrow or Air France at Frankfurt) 
were lower than marginal costs of smaller “new entrants” (e.g. Deutsche BA, easyJet 
or Virgin). 
 
V.3.1.3 Grandfathered rights and hub dominance: Commitment or absolute cost 
advantage? 
 
With incumbents holding such a disproportionate high number of airport slots, we are 
tempted to compare this with the dynamics of holding excess capacity. Although such 
slot spaces do not neatly fit the definition of “sunk investment” due to their character 
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as grandfathered rights, they might work in a similarly way.74 In particular, the 
marginal cost curves for incumbents to open flights might be distinctly lower than for 
new entrants. For an incumbent holding the majority of an airport’s available slots, it 
would be relatively inexpensive to increase the number of flights or to change city 
pairs. A dominant player at a given European hub could relatively easily change the 
size of aircraft, modify flight frequencies or change between high- and low-density, 
short- or long-haul flights. For example, if the incumbent were to serve mostly a high 
percentage of European city pairs, by using small aircraft and by maintaining flight 
connections many times per day, the effect on airport slots could be interpreted as 
excess capacity, since the given city pair could also be served less frequently but 
with bigger aircraft. This would mean that a serious asymmetry for marginal costs of 
opening flights in Europe existed between incumbents and true “new entrants”.  
 
Exhibit 48 illustrates this asymmetry: As the incumbent with a dominant share already 
has a fair number of “grandfathered rights” disposable to allocate to any destination 
he chooses, the marginal costs of adding frequency on existing city pairs or adding 
new destinations to his network are small. Only from a certain point on, that is for the 
application of new slots, will it become difficult for the dominant incumbent to obtain 
them. Thus there is a steeply rising marginal cost curve from that point on. 
                                                          
74 The historically costless acquisition of these rights does not withstand their asset character: In 
August 1997, EU and American government officials computed a possible merger between BA and AA 
to be “worth” up to 350 slots at Heathrow. In another case, after British Airways sold its stake in USAir 
in 1996, USAir sought to regain its slots to become once again a direct competitor of BA (USAir had 
given up its slots after its 1993 alliance with BA).  
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Exhibit 48: Comparison of marginal costs for new airport slots 
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We know that former flag carriers already had their own allocation of grandfathered 
rights at foreign airports, which was previously negotiated bilateraly between the 
governments involved. Thus there are low marginal costs on any already existing 
contingent of slots. The EU directive on slot allocation, which was briefly outlined 
above, stipulates that any airline with a share of total airport slots above 3% is not to 
be considered for the allocation of new slots. Therefore, these marginal costs would 
rise steeply once this market share is exceeded. 
 
The worst off, as already described, would be the truly new entrants. They are 
disadvantaged vis-à-vis the grandfathered rights, and, in addition, their chances of 
obtaining a few of the scarce number of the remaining slots are extremely slim. We 
can safely assume there would be significant costs in market studies, political 
lobbying, legal advice and long procedures associated with applying for such slots. 
Thus, taking into consideration the uncertainty of eventual success, the marginal 
costs must be higher than for incumbents.  
 
Our analysis shows that not using available slots is dangerous, even for incumbents: 
They risk losing them. Also, the marginal cost curves shown increase steeply from a 
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certain point on; with excess capacity they would decrease beyond a certain output 
and after entry. Airport congestion makes such decreasing marginal costs beyond a 
certain output unlikely. To stay within Bain’s system of classification, we therefore 
consider the ineffective allocation of slots at dominated hubs in Europe as a case of 
absolute cost advantages to incumbents and, especially, dominant incumbents. In 
accordance with Bain (1956, p. 145), we consider such hub and slot dominance a 
subset of strategic factor supplies, which are…controlled by established firms, so that 
entrant firms might be denied access to essential materials entirely, or be forced to 
use inferior materials involving higher costs or to purchase materials from established 
firms at premium prices.”75
 
V.3.2 High wage rates due to unionization  
 
The view of Williamson (1963) on wage rates as a competitive tool against new 
entrants needs to be discussed. 
 
It is a given that labour-related cost functions for new entrants are largely inferior to 
those of incumbents. New entrants generally have cost advantages of at least 20% 
over incumbents, especially for passenger services, passenger embarkation and 
crew costs, as well as administration. If incumbents could coerce new entrants to 
apply the same high-pay policies as themselves (through joint union memberships, 
for example), then, indeed, the entrants’ cost advantage may disappear. It is difficult 
to give safe estimates about the capital to labour ratio of incumbents and entrants. If 
the capital to labour ratio of incumbents were significantly higher than that of 
entrants, Williamson’s approach would provide an argument for incumbents to 
negotiate higher wages with unions, although increasing their own labour costs by it.  
 
The relationship between union power and market competition was examined for the 
period between 1976 and 1994 (Neven and Röller 1996). Their research found 
significant rent sharing between flag carriers and labour. Combined with government 
subsidies, such excessive wages were found to “...influence the ability of firms to stay 
in business, thereby inducing excessive exit ” (p. 14). If new entrants were to 
continue to face such high-pay competition from former flag carriers in the labour 
                                                          
75 See also the case of Alcoa, which was decided in 1945 (Scherer and Ross 1993, p. 454) 
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market, especially with continued subsidies towards the big carriers, their market 
presence based upon low-cost competition would seriously be endangered. It is 
interesting to note that in contrast with the US rationale, which found potential for 
anti-competitive behaviour in asymmetrical capital-labour ratios between big and 
small firms, the European context before 1994 appeared to favour outright rent 
sharing, regardless of  “hidden efficiencies” due to the employment of capital 
investment. 
 
Another study, by Alamdari and Morell (1997) shows that labour costs per available 
ton-kilometre were reduced by around 23% for European carriers between 1991 and 
1994. Of individual airlines only Iberia and Sabena witnessed rising unit costs during 
this period. It was found that gains in productivity were offset to a degree by some 
increase in real wages. The paper also recognizes that the trend towards outsourcing 
may inflate the productivity improvements. Both studies suggest high wages until 
1994 for incumbent airlines, despite apparent progress in overall productivity. Such 
increased productivity can originate, as Williamson suggests, in a replacement of the 
labour force by capital investment or by increased outsourcing to other suppliers.76
 
Within the scope of this paper, we are particularly interested in the period between 
1993 and 1997. Both studies mentioned overlap only with the beginning of the period 
of interest. Between 1993 and 1997, in particular, important initiatives were launched 
by national carriers to increase productivity as a whole and to decrease labour costs 
in particular: Their success was not evident. Air France’s efforts to cut labour costs 
were hindered by labour unrest. The airline’s proposal to introduce a two-tier pay 
system for cockpit crew in 1997 caused a number of strikes.77 Olympic also had 
problems with labour unrest. Management proposals including a wage freeze, a 45-
hour work week, a cut in the number of cabin crew and route reductions prompted 
staff to stage a three-hour strike in March 1998. The Greek Government said that 
Olympic’s 1994 recovery plan (intended to stretch over five years) had been 
overturned due to union action and mistakes by management.78
                                                          
76 Often such suppliers still remain within the group of the incumbent airline, thus controlling service 
rendered to third parties. 
77 The Air Letter, 20 May 1997. 
78 The Air Letter, 25 March 1998. 
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However, other national carriers used this period to significantly reduce labour costs: 
BA, Lufthansa and KLM are the most prominent carriers that lowered labour costs 
over the period (partly by lowering wages and replacing crew by younger, less 
expensive employees). In 1996, BA unveiled a plan that included eliminating 5,000 
jobs and cutting GBP 1 billion off its annual costs by the year 2000. In general, we 
can infer that for the period after 1993 the overall pressure was to cut jobs and to 
freeze or even lower wages, not to increase them in the way Williamson suggested or 
as incumbents had actually done before 1993. It is also noteworthy that most 
employees of new-entrant airlines were not unionized, and possible union 
membership was still positioned on a national level. As a result, quasi- “collusionary” 
behaviour between incumbents and airline unions aiming to damage new entrants’ 
cost structures on a European scale was not successful. In addition, airline subsidies 
were phased out due to EC directives after 1995, so the excesses of rent sharing had 
to be financed by the carriers themselves. These factors help to explain why the 
major efforts of former flag carriers in the period in question were aimed at increasing 
productivity, especially by cutting down on labour costs. 
 
V.3.3 Cross-subsidies from intercontinental routes 
 
If incumbents were to obtain subsidies from governments, one could interpret them 
as analogous to absolute cost advantages: No matter how high the prices for fuel, or 
how inefficient the organization, etc., the government would guarantee debts and 
would regularly reconstitute the incumbent’s equity if need be. Independently of the 
scale of output, the incumbent might thus use these subsidies as if he had lower 
factor costs or lower interest rates for procured credit than the entrant. But we have 
seen that the European Commission forbade government subsidies after 1995.  
 
The same logic of subsidization on a strictly European scale can be applied to 
intercontinental flights, especially North American routes. The following exhibit shows 
the percentage of such intercontinental flights (as measured in millions of revenue-
passenger-kilometres) for some of the European incumbents: 
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Exhibit 49: Share of intercontinental flights out of total flights sold in 1996 
 
RPK 1996 SAS Iberia KLM Lufthansa BA Air France79
Intercontinental 7,441 13,873 40,061 44,330 77,800 33,440 
Total 19,487 25,931 45,531 58,050 96,163 43,079 
% of total RPKs 38% 53% 88% 76% 81% 78% 
(Source: compilation of the airlines’ various annual reports.) 
 
We know that long-haul routes, especially to North America are very profitable for 
incumbents. Based on bilateral agreements between the various nation states and 
the US, entrants to the European market are usually excluded from such routes (the 
two major exceptions being Virgin to the US and Lauda Air to Asia). We have already 
shown that long-haul, dense routes can optimize the efficiency of wide-bodied 
carriers serving major international hubs, thus lowering average unit costs. This is a 
second source of super-natural profits on intercontinental routes compared with intra-
European traffic. A geographical analysis for the BA group showed that in 1996, 96% 
of operating profit was made outside Europe,80 although 65% of turnover was made 
in the UK and the rest of Europe! 
 
Such protected profit streams may be diverted to subsidize other non-profitable 
operations in Europe, and thus work as absolute cost advantages. Obviously, those 
carriers having the highest exposure to intercontinental flights would benefit the most. 
As with regular absolute cost advantages, the incumbent could lower his ticket price 
to drive out entrants from specific city pairs while cross-subsidizing apparent losses 
with excess profits from intercontinental routes. We would categorize the incumbents 
as: (1) heavily exposed to intercontinental routes (KLM, BA, Lufthansa, Air France 
and Virgin); (2) medium exposed to intercontinental routes (Alitalia, SAS, Iberia and 
Olympic); (3) little or not exposed at all (Sabena, TAP and entrants).  
 
V.3.4 Frequent flyer programmes81
 
Since the early 1990s, FFPs have spread to the EU from the US. All significant 
European airlines now have their own FFP or participate in another airline’s 
                                                          
79 For Air France only 1992 values available 
80 43% the Americas, 30% Southern, 23% Pacific and 4% Europe; BA Fact Book 1996, p. 61 
81 Frequent flyer programmes are a marketing strategy airlines use to encourage customer loyalty. 
Under these plans, passengers qualify for various awards by flying a specified number of miles with 
the sponsoring airline. The awards earned increase in attractiveness as the number of miles flown 
grows.  
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programme. US experience suggests that once FFPs have been established, it would 
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for airlines to abolish them (Civil Aviation 
Authority 1993, p. 9). In the EU, smaller airlines have been just as quick as their 
larger competitors to realize the importance of FFPs. Some have sought to overcome 
their inherent size disadvantage by combining to market joint frequent flyer 
programmes (such as Virgin and British Midland, and previously Dan Air) or 
participating in larger airlines’ programmes (for example Air UK in KLM’s), or both 
(British Midland participates in SAS’s FFP as well as Virgin’s). 
 
Since late 1998, four global alliances have formed, allowing for unified frequent flyer 
programmes within one alliance. These alliances vary significantly in their 
composition, as the following exhibit shows, with varying degrees of involvement of 
European incumbents.82
 
Exhibit 50: Frequent flyer alliances in 1997 
 
Alliance Participating airline 
Star Alliance Lufthansa, United Airlines, Varig, SAS, Thai Airways, Air 
Canada 
One World British Airways, Quantas, American Airlines, Air New Zealand, 
Ansett 
Wings Alitalia, KLM, Northwest Airlines, Continental 
Qualiflyer Group Swissair, Sabena, TAP, Delta, Turkish Hava Yollari, AOM, 
Austrian, Lauda Air, Tyrolean Air, Air Littoral, ANA, Malaysian 
Airlines, Singapore Airlines83
Note: 
Air France announced its intention to develop a separate alliance along with Delta and other 
yet to be identified Asian airlines by the year 200084
 
FFPs have proved popular with passengers, particularly those travelling on business, 
but less so with the companies who pay for business travel. It is claimed that the 
plans encourage unnecessary travel, travel at a higher fare than strictly required or 
travel by a circuitous route so as to use a particular airline. FFPs tend to favour larger 
airlines at the expense of smaller carriers: In the case of a flag carrier dominant in a 
particular city, its more extensive network of routes will encourage passengers 
wanting to collect frequent flyer points to use its services rather than those of a 
                                                          
82 Information source: Romios Voyage, Travel Agent, Geneva. 
83 Due to talks between Air France and Delta (see Le Figaro, 23 June, 1999), Swissair and Sabena 
threatened to withdraw from Qualiflyer and join other partnerships. 
84 See “Le Figaro” of 22 June, 1999: section BI. 
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smaller competitor (Civil Aviation Authority 1993, p. 9). Similarly, the larger airline is 
likely to have more holiday destinations in its route network for programme members 
to use their points to visit.85 Following this rationale, the FFPs of Star Alliance, One 
World and the Qualiflyer Group seem to have both a stronger base with business 
travellers, and an extremely wide network to cover as many city pairs as possible, for 
business and holidays alike. In contrast, airlines such as Air France, Iberia, TAP, 
Olympic and Sabena appear to have had a significant disadvantage as of 1997. 
 
Frequent flyer programmes encourage passenger loyalty through the award 
structure. The General Accounting Office (1990, p. 62) states: “Because the award 
structures encourage passengers to fly regularly on a single airline, a frequent flyer 
plan helps a well-established airline to discourage its passengers from flying on other 
airlines that offer new service to the same destinations. The dominant airline at an 
airport generally offers service to the most destinations and will, therefore, offer 
participants in FFPs the most opportunities to earn and redeem awards” The same 
report found, based on a survey of 520 US travel agents, that business customers 
chose flights to accumulate additional frequent flyer miles more than half the time. It 
also concluded that FFPs were heavily used and that the airline providing the most 
flights from a particular city was likely to attract the most frequent flyer participants.  
  
Indeed, FFPs represent long-term contracts with both customers and other 
incumbents. They aim to prevent entrants from gaining market share by locking in 
customers. The levers for effective FFPs appear to be: (1) an award structure that is 
powerful enough to build customer loyalty (we assume no asymmetries among the 
given FFPs, ceteris paribus); (2) a business class passenger willing to pay above-
normal ticket prices to accumulate bonus miles;86 (3) a wide choice of destinations; 
with direct flights preferred; and, consequently, (4) a strong presence at an airport 
hub. Due to their “global network” approach, however, FFPs may be less effective in 
deterring entrants from specific point-to-point competition on intra-European short- or 
medium-distance routes. 
 
                                                          
85 In the EU smaller carriers tend to concentrate, at least initially, on predominantly business routes.  
86 Critics say that FFPs only exploit the principal-agent problem between employers and their 
employees travelling on business class. 
 131
Exhibit 50: A comparison of marginal revenues between FFP and non-FFP airlines  
 
 
 
 MR(business) 
MR(economy)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The exhibit shows the expected, though schematic, effects of FFPs on marginal 
revenues of incumbents and entrants that are not part of a FFP. It must be noted that 
these effects only play a minor role with economy passengers because: (1) they tend 
to use airlines less frequently than business travellers, so their incentives are 
reduced; (2) they tend to use low-yield flights which are often excluded from the 
bonus schemes; and (3) they tend to be more interested in point-to-point flights, thus 
making the FFPs service more comparable to low-priced point-to-point specialists. 
This analysis, however, neglects one crucial point: business frequent flyers often use 
their awarded bonus miles for economy, not business, flights. This means that one 
client group - the occasional business flyer - does have the choice of taking, say, 
flights for holidays from a hub airport either with a low-cost entrant or practically for 
free with the incumbent. This last scenario may indeed hurt low-cost entrants serving 
holiday destinations from airports where the incumbent has a dominant presence 
(see lowest, lightly gray-shaded curve in the exhibit above). 
 
The question then remains to what extent FFPs aimed at business travellers can 
present an absolute cost advantage vis-à-vis new entrants. Absolute cost 
  No city pair         Small FFP  Medium FFP        Big FFP 
 
MR (entrant) = MR (incumbent), if 
passenger  is not receptive to FFPs 
Incumbents with a strong FFP 
network and hub dominance 
obtain customer loyalty 
Entrants confronted with FFPs 
tend to lose clients 
Economy passengers 
are less influenced by 
FFPs  
p
MR (entrant) if business 
assenger  uses credit for 
rivate leisure trips 
p
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advantages would exist if the incumbent were able to use FFPs to produce a similar 
output as entrants at lower unit costs. This, however, is hard to see: FFPs aim to 
increase output with the incumbent and decrease output with the entrant, instead of 
lowering factor prices per se. But we could try to apply the definition of absolute cost 
advantages as an analogy: What if FFPs were to raise average output of incumbents 
consistently above average output of entrants? If this were the case, the incumbent 
could work with consistently higher load factors than the entrant (for a given aircraft), 
thus lowering average unit costs (provided that there are some economies of scale). 
Or the incumbent’s higher output could be reflected in larger, more efficient aircraft 
than the entrant’s, while maintaining comparable load factors (again reflecting lower 
average costs for the incumbent). The distinction as to whether FFPs lead 
incumbents to increase output or to decrease output with the entrant, or if both 
effects appear simultaneously for given city pairs, is not the point – the point is the 
differential in unit costs between incumbents and entrants for their respective 
common scale of operations.  
 
Even though we may claim that FFPs bring cost advantages by raising demand for 
the incumbent to the detriment of the entrant, this would only account for the benefits 
due to FFPs. A more complete evaluation of FFP effects on factor unit costs needs to 
integrate the costs of the programmes themselves. Only if the benefits of FFPs 
outweigh their costs (on a per unit basis) can we realistically consider that FFPs 
provide net unit cost advantages. What are these costs? 
 
• FFPs imply significant administration costs: FFP programs need to be advertised, 
potential frequent flyer passengers need to be induced to participate in such 
programmes, FFP passengers need to open an account, these accounts need to 
be administered with monthly or quarterly account balances sent to the customer, 
etc.  
• FFPs require, by definition, excess capacity on a broad range of city pairs. This is 
a clear trade-off between unit yields and unit costs. FFP airlines need to choose 
larger aircraft if they want to accommodate additional frequent flyer customers 
who seek to cash in their bonus miles (ergo: marginal unit costs become very 
small, average unit costs per flight drop). Conversely, these frequent flyer 
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passengers will not add to revenues on such flights (ergo: marginal yield will be 
zero, average unit yields will drop).  
 
From the above, we can deduce the following relationship for a 1st flight providing 
bonus miles and a 2nd flight using these miles: 
 
MR(1st flight) + MR(2nd flight) >= MC(1st flight) + MC(2nd flight) + MC(FFP admin.) 
 
With  MR(2nd flight) = 0, we can simplify: 
 
MR(1st flight) >= MC(2 flights) + MC(FFP admin.) 
 
 
This equation, which must hold, in order for FFPs to be profitable, shows that only 
business class tariffs can fulfil these conditions. An economy class ticket could never 
cover marginal costs for two flights plus FFP administration. The underlying rationale 
still holds even if bonus miles were only cashed in after several flights: Given rather 
competitive and low yields in economy class, many such tickets would need to be 
bought before FFPs would become profitable for the incumbent. However, the reward 
structure for the economy client would be much weaker than for the business client. 
 
The fact that business class tickets might provide the necessary yield premium over 
economy class tickets may render FFPs profitable, though not necessarily profit 
maximizing. In order to be profit maximizing, the following equation must hold: 
 
 
MR(1st flight - FFP) – [MC(2 flights) + MC(FFP admin.)] >= 
[MR(1st flight - bus.) + MR(2nd flight - eco.) ] –  MC(2 flights) 
 
After simplification we get: 
 
MR(1st flight - FFP) - MR(1st flight - bus.) >= MR(2nd flight - eco.) + MC(FFP admin.) 
 
This equation can be interpreted as follows: On the left, the difference between all 
marginal revenues linked to FFPs must be greater than the usual or expected 
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marginal revenues with business class tickets. As business clients tend to prefer 
incumbents at hubs, and have always paid significant premiums for this in the past, 
we cannot ad hoc assume such an FFP-premium over regular business class 
revenues.  
 
On the right side of the equation, we have real costs for FFP administration. In order 
for the equation to hold, we must at least assume MR(2nd flight – eco.) to be equal to 
zero. Otherwise, the equation could never realistically be achieved. But by setting 
MR(2nd flight – eco.) equal to zero, the incumbent practically “dumps” excess capacity 
on the market without gaining revenues: a clear deterrence for entrants. 
 
We conclude that with FFPs: 
 
(1) The incumbent increases demand in economy class, while the entrant 
loses ticket sales (especially for holiday city pairs). 
(2) The incumbent’s economy fares remain unaffected by this, whereas the 
entrant is under pressure to lower his prices. 
(3) The incumbent’s business class ticket prices would need to increase in 
order to finance the bonus miles plus FFP administration, ceteris paribus. 
Or, if business class ticket prices remained unchanged, the incumbent’s 
number of business class tickets would need to increase due to FFPs. 
Otherwise the incumbent would maximize his profits by dropping the FFP 
altogether. 
 
 
V.4 Expected post-entry behaviour with absolute cost advantages in the 
airline business 
 
As we have shown above, two kinds of absolute cost advantages were not relevant 
for the airline business between 1993 and 1997: learning effects and unionized 
labour. Thus, we concentrate on the interaction between airport slots, frequent flyer 
programmes and cross-subsidization from intercontinental routes, as well as the most 
probable behaviour incumbents will adopt as a function of these elements.  
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Exhibit 51: Key features of hub dominance, FFPs and intercontinental routes 
 
 Required features Lever against entrants Locus of impact 
Hub 
dominance 
(1) Incumbent already 
advantaged through 
grandfathered rights at 
home airport. 
 
(2) Airport is a major 
platform for national and 
international flights. 
 
(3) Airport gives access to 
close, important customer 
base; i.e. major city must 
be near. 
(1) Entrants only rarely obtain 
significant number of airport 
slots.  
 
(2) Entrant cannot offer as 
many flights to the same 
destination or different 
destinations. 
 
(3) Incumbent offers greater 
frequency to given city pairs 
and/or offers a wider range of 
flights at the dominated 
airport, further benefiting his 
own network. 
(1) Business travellers 
probably most receptive to 
presented structure.  
 
(2) Eventually also 
appeals to fully flexible 
economy passengers. 
 
(3) Advantages of flights 
involving hub dominance 
less relevant for intra-
European routes, 
especially for passengers 
in discounted economy or 
Super Saver.  
 
(4) Alternative would be 
Intra-European point to 
point with average flight 
frequencies from non-
dominated airports. 
 
FFPs (1) Award structure must 
be powerful enough to buy 
passengers’ loyalty. 
 
(2) Number of destinations 
served within the network 
must be important. 
 
(3) Passengers must be 
relatively price insensitive 
on tickets earning bonus 
miles. 
(1) Entrants are usually 
excluded from these 
programmes.  
 
(2) Programmes make 
incumbent’s demand and 
load factors more stable and 
entrant’s less predictable. 
 
(3) Bonus miles may be 
cashed in for holiday trips, 
which otherwise might have 
been made with a low-budget 
airline. 
(1) Especially interesting 
for business travellers, to 
a lesser degree for fully 
flexible economy as well. 
 
(2) No interest for 
passengers looking for the 
best deal on a given city 
pair. 
 
(3) Cashed in bonus miles 
may impact on regular 
economy and low-budget 
demand of entrants, too. 
 
Inter-
continental 
routes 
(1) Profits must be 
maximized on dense, 
long-haul routes with 
stable traffic and load 
factors. 
 
(2) Regular use of wide-
bodied jets between major 
international hubs, 
especially on traffic to 
North America. 
(1) Entrants usually do not 
have access to serve such 
routes. 
 
(2) Excess profits generated 
on these routes act as 
subsidies for otherwise 
unprofitable intra-European 
traffic. 
(1) Cross-subsidies may 
be used to sponsor any 
route or flight class. 
 
(2) Likely to be used to 
drive out low-cost 
competition on particularly 
dense city pairs. 
 
In terms of hub dominance at major European airports, we see that entrants’ access 
to such airports is highly impeded. But for intra-European traffic, alternative point-to-
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point routes involving non-dominated airports87 are feasible and would allow the 
entrant to obtain sufficient slots to build up regular traffic frequencies that might at the 
least suffice for cost-conscious economy and low-budget travellers. It may be that 
business travellers will still prefer much greater flight frequency from dominated hubs, 
but air traffic congestion and resulting delays especially at those hubs may qualify the 
real utility of such high frequencies. We see that hub domination per se remains 
vulnerable as a sole barrier to entry. Its role appears much more to resemble that of a 
strategic asset, on which subsequent strategic initiatives, such as frequent flyer 
programmes, can be built. In the empirical part of this thesis, we shall measure the 
significance of hub dominance in maintaining prices at above normal levels. 
 
FFPs per se appeal most to business travellers and require a huge network of 
possible destinations to remain attractive. Any cost-conscious consumer looking for a 
simple point-to-point connection in Europe will not be deterred from choosing a low-
cost airline simply because the incumbent offers bonus miles. But in the context of 
hub domination, privileged access to business class passengers and an established 
global network, such programmes make sense. Even if low-cost airlines were to 
introduce FFPs, their administrative costs and their own commitment to low prices, as 
well as a somewhat restricted route network, would make such programmes much 
less attractive for these new entrants. The point is that hub domination and FFPs can 
only be seen as complements, which are aimed to mutually reinforce each other. It 
can safely be inferred that their aim is to deter or to drive out entrants on dense intra-
European routes involving hub airports, either by lowering prices in the low-budget 
segment or by giving away free tickets for such routes through frequent flyer plans. In 
the empirical part of this thesis, we will see whether FFPs and hub dominance are in 
fact correlated with each other (see factor analysis under VII.2.2.). Depending on the 
relative weight of FFPs with regard to other potential entry barriers (as measured by 
factor analysis), we may select the variable FFP to measure its impact on maintaining 
high prices. 
 
Cross-subsidies from intercontinental, especially North American, routes can equally 
well be interpreted in the light of what was said about dominated hubs and FFPs: We  
                                                          
87 For example Luton in London, Ciampino in Rome, Düsseldorf for Frankfurt in Germany, etc. 
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know that in order to exploit the economies of wide-bodied long-haul jets, access to 
major international hubs is required. These hubs in Europe are usually dominated by 
an incumbent. Other smaller airports would not provide sufficient demand, in both 
business and economy, to ensure sufficiently high load factors for those carriers. 
FFPs, too, aim to capture the loyalty of passengers for such intercontinental flights, 
and thus to stabilize possible volatility in demand and therefore in load factors on 
those critical routes. It is more difficult to predict the employment of excess profits 
generated in this way. But, in the context of what has just been described, one logical 
way would be to focus these means on the same target as FFPs and hub domination: 
high-density European routes to and/or from major national hubs, especially when 
low-cost carriers are already present on these routes. The empirical part will show 
whether intercontinental routes do significantly “load” with regard to other potential 
entry barriers (see factor analysis). In a second step, the degree to which such 
intercontinental routes influenced ticket prices within the European route network 
would be measured. 
 
Exhibit 52: European incumbent’s position in terms of hub dominance, FFP and 
intercontinental service from 1993 to 1997 
 
Airline Hub dominance FFP Intercontinental 
British Airways Very strong at Heathrow, 
strong at Gatwick 
Very strong to USA 
and Australia 
Very strong at Heathrow 
Lufthansa Very strong at Frankfurt Very strong global 
network 
Very strong at Frankfurt 
Air France Very strong at Charles de 
Gaulle, strong at Orly 
No partner airlines Strong at Charles de 
Gaulle 
Iberia Strong at Barajas No partner airlines Regular at Barajas 
SAS Very strong at Copenhagen Very strong global 
network 
Regular at Copenhagen 
KLM Very strong at Schiphol Strong network to 
USA 
Very strong at Schiphol 
Alitalia Very strong at Rome Strong network to 
USA 
Regular at Rome 
Olympic Strong at Athens No partner airlines Low 
TAP Strong at Lisbon Regular network 
through Qualiflyer 
Regular to Africa, low to 
North America 
Sabena Strong at Brussels Regular network 
through Qualiflyer 
Low  
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VI Perfectly contestable markets 
 
VI.1 Contestability theory as the basis for empirical testing 
 
As Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1988, p. 487) write: “Contestability theory offers an 
analytic framework within which the fundamental features of demands and production 
technology determine the shape of industry structure and many of the characteristics 
of industry prices. The theory accomplishes this via a process of simplification; by 
stripping away through its assumptions all barriers to entry and exit, and the strategic 
behavior that goes along with them both in theory and reality”. 
 
The theory of perfectly contestable markets describes an equilibrium condition within 
an industry structure. This equilibrium condition refers to several parameters used in 
industrial organization and sheds new light on them. Such an equilibrium was defined 
as follows: “…market is perfectly contestable if an equally efficient entrant is unable 
to find a combination of price and outputs that enable it to enter and earn a profit” 
(Bailey, Baumol and Willig 1988, p. 19). In the foreword, Bailey writes:”...the 
announced prices of a monopolist are sustainable (here synonymous with PCM) if 
there exists no output-price vector for any potential entrant that can be expected to 
yield economic profits covering the cost of entry”. Contestability is not the outcome of 
a dynamic game, but rather is defined as a property of equilibrium outcomes. 
 
Although the realism of contestability assumptions has been questioned (Schwartz 
1986; Weitzman 1983), perfectly contestable markets provide convenient 
benchmarks to ascertain the consequences of barriers to competition (Gilbert 1989, 
p. 527). In perfectly contestable markets, under equilibrium conditions, prices will 
equal marginal cost for any product produced in positive amounts by two or more 
firms. If only one firm exists in a perfectly contestable market equilibrium, total 
revenues will exactly equal total production costs. 
 
VI.2 The issue of price sustainability 
 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1988) define a perfectly contestable market with 
reference to the notion of sustainable prices. Implicit in the definition of sustainability 
is the presumption that capital movements can take place instantaneously, while 
prices remain fixed. An entrant can test the market and bring capital into production 
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while prices charged by established firms remain fixed.88 As the entrant’s goal is to 
make a profit, he will only enter, ceteris paribus, if prices exceed costs. In this case, 
the entrant could undercut the incumbent’s price and serve the entire market demand 
at the new, lower price. Once the incumbent reacts and readjusts his price to drive 
down the entrant’s profitability, the entrant could exit from the market, without loss of 
investment. Thus, as long as the incumbent’s price level offers this opportunity for 
entrants to enter profitably, prices are not sustainable. Only when opportunities for 
profitable entry no longer exist can prices be considered sustainable and the market, 
a priori, to be perfectly contestable. 
 
VI.3 Contestable markets and entry barriers 
 
“A perfectly contestable market is an illustration of a market without barriers to entry 
or exit. There is no product differentiation and no cost advantages”89 (Gilbert 1989, p. 
527). It can readily be seen that entry barriers will make it more difficult for an entrant 
to seize profit opportunities by rapidly entering and leaving such markets. Such entry 
barriers may be a cause for otherwise unsustainable prices to last. Baumol, Willig 
and Panzar acknowledge these imperfections as a constraint to market contestability: 
“…This means that in the absence of other entry barriers, natural or artificial, an 
incumbent, even if he can threaten retaliation after entry, dare not offer profit-making 
opportunities to potential entrants because an entering firm can hit and run, gathering 
in the available profits and departing when the going gets rough”.(p. 292). 
 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to enumerate all conceivable entry barriers and 
their theoretic relationship to perfectly contestable markets, since we are evaluating a 
specific industry and the empirical evidence offered within the context of this industry 
alone. Rather, it is important to note that entry barriers in general may be the key 
factor accounting for unsustainably high prices prevailing in an industry. 
 
                                                          
88 This is in contrast to the Bertrand-Nash concept of instantaneous price changes and quantity 
adjustments to clear markets. 
89 Neither are there uncertainty, switching costs or learning economies. 
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VI.3.1 Contestable markets and fixed costs 
 
According to contestability theory, fixed costs may make incumbency sustainable. To 
present the power of fixed costs for sustainable prices, Baumol, Panzar and Willig 
(1988) use an intuitive example based on the idea that the incumbent could choose 
between fixed and variable costs in order to produce a certain output.  
 
Exhibit 53: Price sustainability with fixed costs 
 
 
C+F 
    0         ye         a  b           y* 
F 
C
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The cost curve C consists of variable costs only. It can be seen that there is an 
opportunity for an entrant to produce between points a and b. At point ye, marginal 
costs exceed marginal revenues, but in the region between a and b, marginal costs 
dip below marginal revenues. The incumbent’s prices would not be sustainable 
because under these conditions entry would be profitable.  
 
With an alternative cost function, which duplicates C but also adds into it fixed costs 
F, the situation changes fundamentally. With a new revenue function meeting curve 
C+F at point y*, the new cost function remains above the new revenue function at all 
outputs lower than y*. There is no opportunity for entrants for profitable entry below 
y*. The reason is that an increased fixed cost raises the average cost of smaller 
outputs relative to those of larger outputs. By placing smaller firms at a relative 
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disadvantage, fixed costs make sustainable prices possible for the incumbent (pp. 
286).  
 
However, fixed costs are not necessarily considered entry barriers because they 
need not prevent optimal welfare performance by the industry (p. 289). Employing a 
normative criterion of welfare effects to define entry barriers, Baumol, Willig and 
Panzar follow von Weizsäcker (1980). 
 
VI.3.2 Contestable markets and cross-subsidies 
 
Cross-subsidies within a multi-product firm ocur when one product produces above-
normal profits that are used to compensate for below-normal returns of other 
products. Prices below marginal costs for a certain product/service indicate the 
presence of some form of cross-subsidization. This means that, at current prices, 
users are paying too much for some of the incumbent’s services. Consumers would 
save money on these products/services if a separate firm were to provide only these 
products/services. Contestability theory argues that “…prices cannot be sustainable if 
they involve any cross-subsidies…” (Baumol, Willig and Panzar 1988, p. 351). Any 
product of an incumbent must yield incremental net revenues at least as great as his 
incremental net costs. Otherwise, an entrant may choose to compete for above-
normal-returns by undercutting the incumbent’s prices. The entrant would earn more 
than the incumbent previously did, as it would not be subsidizing other 
products/services. The incumbent would be left with the below-normal-return 
products. Therefore, prices that enable an incumbent to cross-subsidize other 
products/services cannot be sustainable. 
 
 
VI.3.3 Contestable markets and sunk costs 
 
Without sunk costs and with identical technologies, the incumbent firm and a 
potential entrant bear the same cost at each level of output. There is no strategic 
asymmetry between an entrant and an established firm because each faces exactly 
the same cost and revenue function. To illustrate further the concept of perfectly 
contestable markets, we will now touch on their relationship with sunk costs. Caves 
and Porter (1978) see sunk costs as “the difference in incremental cost and 
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incremental risk” between an incumbent and an entrant. The full cost of an 
investment to be sunk, already foregone by the incumbent, would need to be made 
anew by the entrant. The risk of losing this investment is then higher for the potential 
entrant than the incumbent (Baumol, Willig and Panzar 1988, p. 291). From this 
perspective, we can understand that the risk of losing unrecoverable capital needed 
for entry can render markets less contestable. 
 
This asymmetric risk exposure between incumbents and entrants, however, becomes 
relevant only in the case of the entrant exiting the market. If the entrant manages to 
stay in the market sufficiently long, his sunk costs, as the incumbent’s before, will 
eventually become zero (p. 279). This observation is critical to the understanding of 
the role of post-entry behaviour of the incumbent. If the incumbent were to 
accommodate the entrant, and if this were known to the entrant, markets could 
become contestable again because the incumbent’s only way to keep an entrant out 
would be to lower prices to sustainable, that is unprofitable, levels. 
 
Therefore the importance of the incumbent reacting after entry is evident: “…Sunk 
costs are not an entry barrier in itself, but permit a wide variety of other influences to 
affect and to increase the entry barrier.” For example, the autors quote economies of 
scale or “the threat of retaliatory strategic or tactical responses of the incumbent” (p. 
290). 
 
VI.3.4 Contestable markets and strategic behaviour 
 
From the above we infer that the monopolist’s response can produce entry costs. The 
authors write in one proposition: “ Where no other entry barriers and frictions are 
present, either the absence of sunk costs or the prevention of post-entry responses 
by incumbents are sufficient for markets to be contestable” (p. 301).  With different 
models for entry deterrence, the critical role of the incumbent’s countermoves to 
determine post-entry market equilibrium has already been highlighted outside the 
scope of contestability theory in previous chapters.  
 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (p. 296) constructed a model to establish the relationship 
between sunk costs, entry costs and welfare, without imposing restrictions on the 
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incumbent’s post-entry behaviour. In their findings, sunk costs produced entry costs, 
which was intuitively explained by their shorter depreciation period during a finite 
disequilibrium period after entry occurs. Only after such a disequilibrium period was 
the incumbent allowed to react to drive the entrant out of the market. The possibility 
of such a reaction by the incumbent accounted for a shorter depreciation period than 
normally expected (if the capital invested had no salvage value, thus was sunk). But 
this shorter depreciation period was pointless if the incumbent failed to react against 
the entrant, because this would extend the shortened depreciation period and thus 
lower entry costs. 
 
“In the absence of other cost disadvantages to the entrant, entry costs are zero if 
either (a) there are no sunk costs, or (b) the monopolist is never permitted to 
respond” (p. 300). According to this model, both structural (such as entry barriers) 
and behavioural elements (for example, constantly undercutting the entrant’s prices) 
are needed to produce entry costs within otherwise contestable markets. 
 
VI.4 Perfectly contestable markets and the airline business 
 
In the early years of contestability theory, the airline industry in the US was often 
quoted as a particularly typical case (Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1988, p. 279). 
Planes were considered “capital on wings” and as such not sunk. It was reasoned 
that their mobility enabled “hit and run” attitudes of entrants, thus forcing incumbents’ 
prices down to sustainable levels. For example, one study for the period 1979/80 
showed that potential (rather than actual) competition by trunk carriers “had provided 
an effective competitive check on the pricing behavior of local service carriers in long- 
and medium-haul routes during this period” (Bailey, Graham and Kaplan 1991). The 
authors even claimed that the entire process of deregulating the transport sector in 
the US was driven by the expectation that “potential competition could adequately 
protect consumers…” (p. 500). 
 
Within the context of the airline industry, planes all too obviously were considered the 
key capital and technology input. Since such capital was fixed, but not sunk, any new 
entrant could rapidly deploy it on given routes to take the incumbent’s profit margins. 
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Once the incumbent reacted with lower prices, the entrant could take his profits and 
run to new high-margin markets.  
 
The same authors acknowledge other studies of the airline industry, which conclude 
“that the industry is less close to the model of perfect contestability than has 
sometimes been suggested” (p. 498). Call and Keeler (1985) conduct an econometric 
study by testing the correlation between profits and concentration. They also find 
significant reductions in established carrier fares, when entry occurs. Morrison and 
Winston (1987) find that prices are significantly constrained, but only after the 
number of potential entrants is three. Graham, Kaplan and Sibley (1983) also confirm 
that route by route prices depend on various influences that lie outside the 
predictions of contestability theory. 
 
Influences that may explain the deviation from contestability-based outcomes are 
found in (1) airport congestion, (2) new entry from carriers with lower cost curves, 
and (3) at least four carriers operating on the same route (Bailey, Graham and 
Kaplan 1991). Beyond these three possible influences, Baumol, Panzar and Willig. 
also quote delivery lags for new aircraft due to technological change and new 
network structures (p. 501). Without elaborating further on this point, we may assume 
that new network routings and new, better-adapted aircraft may lower the cost curve 
in favour of the first airline that can take advantage of them. 
 
 
VI.5 Predictions of contestability theory concerning the airline sector 
 
o Airline incumbents would opt for sustainable prices 
Without the presence of significant entry costs, incumbents would need to maintain 
prices at sustainable levels to keep entrants out. That is, in the absence of entry 
costs, marginal revenues would need to meet marginal costs. If the industry leaves a 
stable, protected environment, as was the case before deregulation, a disequilibrium 
period would follow with prices going down to sustainable levels.  
 
o Cross-subsidies should be significantly eroded 
For the period following deregulation, as prices move towards sustainable levels, 
cross-subsidies should also diminish. Specifically, prices in lucrative markets (for 
 145
example, long haul and dense city pairs) should be substantially lowered, whereas 
prices in the more costly short-haul and “thin” markets might go up.  
 
o Emergence of new product/service varieties 
Bailey, Graham and Kaplan (1991, pp. 2) write that “..contestability theory also 
predicted the emergence of a variety of products, each of which will yield zero 
economic profit…Products capable of producing zero economic profits, but which 
were formerly excluded, should now appear.” The theoretical basis for this prediction 
may be associated with economies of scope, which we have not discussed. The 
issue of product variety was dealt with in chapter “Product differentiation”. 
 
As explained throughout this paper, the empirical analysis will mostly be concerned 
with the first one of these three predictions that is with price sustainability and the 
associated entry barriers as well as the kinds of strategic behaviour that influence it.90 
Exhibit 54 (which anticipates the cluster analysis of the following chapter) is sobering: 
None of the groups observed showed decreases in ticket prices following 
deregulation in Europe. Pre-deregulation ticket prices at first glance do not seem to 
have become more sustainable (in the sense of perfectly contestable markets) in the 
five years after deregulation. More interestingly, this resistance against lower ticket 
prices is also observable within the lowest fares classes, although to a lesser extent 
than with premium ticket classes.91
 
Exhibit 54: Changes in ticket prices for three flight classes between 1993 and 1997 
 
Cluster Business class Fully flexible economy Lowest fare 
1 Mean 37.30% 24.66% 19.95% 
 Median 31.76% 20.30% 20.20% 
2 Mean 52.35% 27.76% 50.00% 
 Median 52.35% 27.90% 50.00% 
3 Mean 40.65% 18.24% 0.32% 
 Median 24.90% 18.20% 11.39% 
4 Mean 40.45% 19.82% 20.43% 
 Median 36.25% 19.65% 18.60% 
5 Mean -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% 
 Median -100.00% -100.00% -100.00% 
6 Mean 19.90% 4.87% -37.80% 
 Median 19.90% 4.87% -37.80% 
                                                          
90 In this specific context, cross-subsidies were considered absolute cost advantages. As such, they 
may form entry barriers and influence price sustainability. 
91 These nominal figures have not been deflated by any price index. It would have added only little 
insight, and finding a real price deflator common to all European countries might have proved very 
difficult indeed. 
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VII Empirical part and conclusions 
 
The findings in the previous chapter leave us with two possibilities: Either ticket 
prices were already sustainable during the period before deregulation – a possibility 
that seems highly unlikely - or entry barriers existed in the period after deregulation 
that maintained prices above a level which perfectly contestable markets would a 
priori consider as “unsustainable”. The underlying research question may now be 
repeated: Which barriers to entry contributed most to price sustainability92 in the 
years following deregulation (1993 - 1997)? The question, put simply like this, may 
suggest the application of multiple regression analysis, with changes in ticket prices 
the dependent variable and various identified variables of airlines for given city pairs 
the independent ones. However, regression analysis will not tell which entry barriers 
worked for particular city pairs and which applied more to others. Nor will they 
indicate if particular entry barriers required other barriers to become effective to keep 
prices high, as a function of the city pair served. 
 
The other equally important part of the research, is the question of strategic conduct 
induced by these entry barriers among different airlines for given city pairs. Along the 
lines of a firm’s conduct following market structure, we are interested in which cases 
within our sample behaved similarly, and if such similarity may be linked to particular 
entry barriers present within these cases. Factor analysis, for example, may be one 
tool to identify the dominant patterns of airlines reacting to deregulation. Cluster 
analysis, searching for similarities in patterns among different cases, may be another. 
However, such analysis per se will not tell us which one of these grouped behaviours 
kept prices sustainable or not. 
 
Ideally, we seek a methodology to help us to respond to both questions:  
(1) How can we form strategic groups as a function of the presence (or 
absence) of entry barriers within the sample? 
(2) To what extent do these various groups influence price sustainability? 
Which factors within these groups contribute most to such sustained (or 
unsustained) prices? 
                                                          
92 The term sustainability is not without ambiguity: perfectly contestable markets mean low prices; 
whereas entry barriers may make high prices sustainable.  
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VII.1 Research design  
 
VII.1.1 Data and sample selection 
To evaluate the different forms of barriers and their relationship to airlines for given 
European city pairs and to prices, a detailed source of data is needed covering the 
period between 1993 and 1997. The data required was not found in financial 
statements or in industry data aggregated by IATA or other bodies. I was looking for 
operational, relatively detailed data for many important city pairs in Europe. The 
Official Airline Guide (OAG) is a monthly publication, primarily destined for use in 
travel agencies. It contains extensive information on worldwide flight connections of 
all airlines. It lists information related to ticket prices, departure times, type of aircraft 
used, flight classes available and so on. One could say that the OAG remains the 
standard database for flight information worldwide. It is edited by the Reed Travel 
Group in the UK, which is an associate member of IATA.  
 
After having tried unsuccessfully to obtain back copies of the OAG from Reed or from 
travel agencies, I discovered that no university or public institution in Switzerland 
(including IATA in Geneva) had them listed in their catalogues either. By coincidence, 
I discovered the library of the Civil Aviation Authority next to Gatwick airport in 
London. From there, all the raw data required were found and copied. In order to 
select my sample, it was clear that data needed to be ordered along the lines of city 
pairs – this was the first major crucial assumption for ordering and checking for 
completeness of my data. Then, I needed to decide which city pairs should be 
retained within my sample in order to make a valid statement for pan-European 
development after deregulation. This proved relatively tricky because preferences of, 
say, 80% of the passenger traffic in Europe (or 80% of passenger kilometres flown) 
might have biased the results towards high-density routes alone and neglected lower 
density-ones, which might still be very relevant for many European member states.  
 
The question of how many city pairs were needed to form a representative sample 
was not easy to answer. I chose the following compromise. From a doctoral 
dissertation done by Pedro L. Marin at the London School of Economics in 1995, I 
recycled 18 routes that the author had identified as “the largest 18 routes affected”. 
However, these routes contained exclusively northern European city pairs, involving 
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only airports in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. Therefore this 
sample needed to be enriched with 17 other sample city pairs, which included 
France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark and Greece. City pairs were 
chosen as a function of the significance of the cities involved, without considering 
airports that had already been covered by the first sample of 18 city pairs. 
 
VII.1.2  Variable selection and analysis of raw data 
The OAG contained ample data on flight operations and on pricing. we needed to 
filter out variables that were relevant to entry barriers. In order to find detailed data 
from operations (in contrast to aggregated, often financial, data usually employed as 
proxy entry barriers), we elaborated extensively on this issue in earlier chapters. We 
identified variables that might be crucial for different entry barriers at the same time, 
sometimes working in opposite directions with regard to marginal costs (i.e. flight 
frequency). Other variables were assumed to be critical only if they were 
accompanied by other entry barriers (i.e. hub dominance and intercontinental flights 
or FFPs). From the raw data provided in the OAG, we processed data until we 
arrived at the following variables: 
 
For economies of scale, we identified average aircraft size (Aircra) as the most 
relevant variable. Daily flight frequency (Depd) was assumed to be inversely related 
to economies of scale and positively to differentiation. Weekly departures (Depw) 
was considered a control variable to compensate for peaks in daily departures on just 
a few days of the week. In terms of differentiation, we used ticket classes that 
discriminated according to business class (Busine), season (Seas), weekend 
(Week), ticket restrictions (Flexibi) and special discounts (Specia). As we were 
interested in the changes between 1993 and 1997, we only considered the 
differences in these variables, not their absolute values. Hence the prefix d for these 
variables. 
 
In terms of commitment, we used daily departures of 1997 (Frequ) as a continuous 
variable, as well as categorical variables for the association with computer 
reservation systems (CRS). Also, due to the apparent significance of code sharing 
(Codesh), we integrated this as a form of commitment into our analysis, although we 
had shown earlier that this interpretation might be slightly flawed. The code-share 
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variable indicated the number of daily flights that were shared with another airline for 
a given city pair in 1997. 
 
Absolute cost advantages were represented by the variables frequent flyer 
programmes (FFP), Cross-subsidies from intercontinental flights (Interco) and Hub 
dominance (Hubdo). All these variables were categorical in nature: Cross-subsidies 
and frequent flyer programmes were dependent on the airlines serving the particular 
city pair. Hub dominance depended on the airline and the airport it served (either as 
origin or as destination). 
 
Finally, a measure for price sustainability as the dependent variable for the sampled 
routes was required. Again, we were interested in price changes that had occurred 
over the period examined.93 Based upon our research in previous chapters, we 
expected significantly different pricing decisions for business, fully flexible economy 
tickets and lowest fares. Thus, we compared identical ticket classes between 1993 
and 1997 within each of these three categories: business price (PriceBus), high 
season unrestricted economy class (PriceHWPX) and the respective lowest fares 
(Pricelow) available for the given route by the individual airline. 
 
                                                          
93 This focus on changes instead of absolute values had the important advantage of canceling out 
other important independent variables (such as stage length, etc.). 
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Exhibit 55: Summary description of variables 
 
Independent variable Acronym Type Unit of measure Meaning of measure 
Average aircraft size dAircra Interval Passenger seats of 
plane 
Change in size of 
plane from ’93 to ’97 
Daily flight frequency dDepd Interval Number of 
departures per day 
Change in daily 
frequency (’93-’97) 
Weekly departures dDepw Interval Number of 
departures per week 
Change in weekly 
frequency (’93-’97) 
Business ticket dBusine Interval Number of types of 
business tickets 
Ticket differentiation 
within premium class 
(between ’93 and ’97) 
Season ticket dSeas Interval Number of types of 
season tickets 
Ticket differentiation 
due to season (’93-’97)
Weekday ticket dWeek Interval Number of types of 
weekday tickets 
Ticket differentiation 
due to day of the week 
(between ’93 and ’97) 
Restricted ticket dFlexibi Interval Number of types of 
restricted tickets 
Ticket differentiation 
due to new restricted 
tickets (’93-’97) 
Special discount dSpecia Interval Number of types of 
low-fare tickets 
Ticket differentiation 
due to lowest fares 
tickets (’93-’97) 
Daily flight frequency Frequ Interval Number of daily 
departures, if >6 
Committed to high 
frequency in 1997 
Computer reservation  CRS Ordinal {-1;0;1} {no booking via CRS; 
airline uses CRS for 
booking; airline is CRS 
owner} 
Code-sharing Codesh Interval Number of daily 
code-shared flights 
Influence of code-
sharing as of 1997 
Frequent flyer 
programme 
FFP Ordinal {0;1;2} {no FFP; FFP with 
average network size; 
FFP with important 
network and partners} 
Intercontinental flights Interco Ordinal {-1;0;1} {solely intra-European 
traffic; average 
presence of 
intercontinental routes 
in network; strong 
presence of 
intercontinental routes}
Hub dominance Hubdo Ordinal {0;1;2} {secondary airport; 
presence at dominated 
airport; dominance at 
airport}  
Dependent variable     
Price Business class dPriceBus Interval Local currency Change in fare 
between ’93 and ‘97 
Price Economy class dPriceHW
PX 
Interval Local currency Change in fare 
between ’93 and ‘97 
Price cheapest ticket dPricelow Interval Local currency Change in fare 
between ’93 and ‘97 
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VII.1.3  Estimation 
 
The relationship between price sustainability and selected independent variables 
representing entry barriers will be analysed with regression analysis. However, 
instead of applying one equation to the entire sample of city pairs, we prefer to derive 
distinct equations for meaningful subsets of the sample.  
 
Pricej (Bus, Eco, Low) =  
= αj+βj1Aircraj+βj2Depdj+βj3Depwj+βj4Businej+βj5Seasj+βj6Weekj+βj7Flexibij+ 
βj8Speciaj + βj9Frequj + βj10Codeshj + δj1CRSj + δj2FFPj + δj3InterCoj + δj4Hubdoj + εj 
 
with j = 1,…, m (where m is the number of strategic groups), β indicates coefficients 
of continuous covariates and δ of categorical covariates. We see that such a 
regression equation would be rather unwieldy, with a true risk of obscuring rather 
than highlighting drivers for sustainable prices. In addition, the equation’s outlined 
general structure would fail to account for interaction between the categorical 
variables, a possibility that cannot necessarily be excluded following our assumptions 
made in the theory part before. We have to look for alternative formulations, even at 
the risk of increasing the sum of squared errors of a somewhat reduced regression 
equation. Factor analysis appears to be the proper tool for reducing our set of multi-
variates. Then the (reduced) regression equation is: 
 
Pricej (Bus, Eco, Low) =  
= αj +βj1Factorj1 + βj2Factorj2 + …… βjnFactorjn + δj1Factorj1 +…… δjpFactorjp + εj 
 
with j = 1,…, m (where m is the number of strategic groups), n and p represent the 
number of factors94 that were found to be relevant in the particular sample or subset 
of samples, β indicates coefficients of continuous covariates and δ of categorical 
covariates. Also, factor analysis will allow us to check for possible interaction among 
the factors and variables, with the possibility of integrating ex-post interaction 
variables into the regression analysis. 
 
                                                          
94 We distinguished between the number of factors retained for continuous variables and for 
categorical/ordinal variables. 
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VII.2 Cluster, factor and regression analysis 
 
VII.2.1 Cluster analysis versus factor analysis 
Cluster analysis seeks to classify data into relatively homogeneous groups according 
to their similarities. These classes of distinct cases can be visually represented, 
usually as clusters in two-dimensional space, or as branches of a tree. In this study, 
we based our similarity measure on distance.95 although it could also be based on 
correlation coefficients. With factor analysis, components of variance are the central 
concept (Karni and Levin 1972). The correlation coefficient is a measure of the 
variance component common to two variables. Factor analysis can be used to 
examine the underlying patterns or relationships among a large number of variables 
and to determine whether or not the information can be summarized into a smaller 
set of constructs. Factor analysis identifies underlying linear variates that draw out as 
much sample variance as possible, and usually considers only those variables with 
“high” loadings. With cluster analysis, all of the variables are considered when 
measuring similarities and classifying them. Cluster analysis ignores the variance (or 
distances) of variables with “low” loadings. However, cluster analysis will not interpret 
how these variables relate to each other. 
 
As we expect valuable insight from applying both procedures (and later from 
regression analysis to measure sustainability), we shall first of all form groups (or 
cases) that describe the various behavioural patterns of airlines serving different city 
pairs in Europe in the 5 years after deregulation. 
 
VII.2.1.1 Clustering: Preliminaries 
The variables listed above were exported from an Excel formatted spreadsheet into a 
program specialized for cluster analysis (CLUSTAN). The variable values were not 
transformed or standardized, a deliberate choice: As Everitt (1980) notes, 
standardization to unit variance and mean of zero can reduce the differences 
between groups on those variables that may well be the best discriminators of group 
differences. Therefore, it is more practical to process the data together and then to 
perform a single cluster analysis. In this case, we are treating all variables as if they 
were interval scaled, including the ordinal variables as well. This approach is 
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considered appropriate in the literature (Kaufman 1990, p. 34). It would be far more 
appropriate to standardize variables within groups (i.e. within clusters), but obviously 
this cannot be done until the cases have been placed into groups (Aldenderfer and 
Blashfield 1984, p. 20). 
 
Then proximities were computed among these variables employing the method of 
squared Euclidean distance to produce homogeneous clusters with respect to all 
variables. This Euclidean distance is defined as: 
      p 
dij  =  √ ∑ (xik – xjk)2       k=1 
 
where dij is the distance between cases i and j, and xik is the value of the kth variable 
for the ith case. Despite their importance, Euclidean and other distance metrics suffer 
from serious problems, among the most critical of which is that the estimation of the 
similarity between cases is strongly affected by elevation differences. Variables with 
both large size differences and standard deviations can swamp the effects of other 
variables with smaller absolute sizes and standard deviations. Moreover, distance 
measures are also affected by transformations of the scale of measurement of the 
variables, in that Euclidean distance will not preserve distance rankings (Everitt 
1980). In order to reduce the effect of the relative size of the variables, researchers 
routinely standardize the variables to unit variance and means of zero before the 
calculation of distance. As indicated before, we have not chosen to follow this path of 
standardization for a simple reason: We consider the classification in groups as only 
an intermediary step; our clusters are not the end result of our research, but provide 
a first and simple depiction of existing groups. Cluster analysis is mostly used as a 
descriptive or exploratory tool, in contrast with statistical tests which are carried out 
for inferential or confirmatory purposes. That is, we do not wish to prove a 
preconceived hypothesis; we just want to see what the data are trying to tell us 
(Kaufman 1990, p. 37). Although we acknowlegde possible biases due to non-
standardized Euclidean distances, we expect to compensate for them in our 
succeeding steps of factor analysis, when even relatively “small” variables may 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
95 After some exploratory clustering, we decided to use distance measures in favour of correlation 
coefficents: This produced 7 classes instead of 37 at a 5% significance level. 
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become highly loaded, and thus significant for sustainable prices.96 The result of this 
proximity computation was then clustered according to “average linkage”. Proposed 
by Sokal and Michener (1958), average linkage was developed as an antidote to the 
extremes of both single and complete linkage. It essentially computes an average of 
the similarity of a case under consideration to all cases in the existing cluster and, 
subsequently, joins the case to that cluster if a given level of similarity is achieved 
using this average value (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984, p. 40).  
 
The software’s integrated “Best cut” function recommended a grouping of all 178 
cases into 7 clusters to be significant at the 95% level.  
 
Exhibit 56: “Best cut” proposed clustering 
 
 
After re-examining the underlying data, we first found that the t-statistic would hardly 
change if we were to reduce the number of clusters to 6 (the realized deviates would 
increase from 0.47 to 0.54 and the t-statistic would only slightly worsen from 6.27 to 
7.17). Then we examined the six listed exemplar cases; exemplar cases are those 
                                                          
96 We would also like to point out that standardized variables would have yielded 41 cases (on a 5% 
significance level). Moreover, variables that were privileged happen to be those representing output, 
something highly interesting when comparing price/output combinations within regression analysis. 
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cases that represent most typically the individual cluster (underlined in Exhibit 55 
above).  
 
Exhibit 57: Means of the six clusters for each of the independent variables 
 
Variable Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Cluster5  Cluster6 
dDepw   2.86    -5.40  18.10   19.61   -13.89   26.00 
dDepd   0.24    -1.20    4.10     3.83     -2.31     4.00 
dAircra   6.76  -51.60  66.60  119.11  -130.49  225.00 
Hubdo   1.19    0.60    0.80      0.36       0.14     2.00 
Frequ   4.60    2.00    4.70      3.83       0.03     4.00 
CRS   0.35    0.20    0.10     -0.22       0.80     1.00 
Codesh  0.51    0.00    0.00      1.97       0.00     0.00 
InterCo   0.02   -0.40    0.00     -0.67       0.31     1.00 
FFP   0.60    0.20    0.70      0.25       0.71     1.00 
dBusine -0.42   -0.40    0.80     -0.14      -0.09     0.00 
dSeas   0.16   -1.60    2.80     -0.75      -0.11   14.00 
dWeek   1.18   -0.80    2.80     -0.44       0.00   12.00 
dFlexibi -0.05   -1.60    2.60     -0.75      -0.17   10.00 
dSpecia  0.32   -0.20    0.90     -0.08      -0.03     4.00 
 
One single case cluster attracted our interest: The city pair Manchester-Frankfurt/BA 
(Cluster 6) appeared somewhat as an outlier, and we thought about combining it with 
the next closest97 cluster (which would have been cluster 4), thus reducing the 
number of our clusters to five. After closer inspection, however, we found that the 
level of new ticket classes and the use of aircraft well above regular capacity and hub 
dominance indeed deserved a separate cluster, even if it contained only one single 
case. We accepted these groups as an important intermediate result for further 
empirical analysis later on.  
 
VII.2.1.2 Clustering: Resulting clusters 
 
Cluster 1 (Exemplar case Paris - Lisbon/AF) contains more than half of all cases in 
our sample. It depicts city pairs that usually involve airport hubs with a strong 
presence of the particular airline; often, the respective hub is even dominated by this 
airline. The airline chooses to maintain capacity, that is, leave both flight frequency 
and aircraft size essentially unchanged. Daily departures remain on a high overall 
level, indicating dense routes. Ticket differentiation for the particular airline shows 
only moderately in terms of discriminating more between weekdays/weekends and 
introducing new Super saver fares. 
                                                          
97 Closest in terms of Euclidean distance 
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Cluster 2 (Exemplar case Brussels - Hamburg/HX) is a small cluster, containing only 
five cases. It is the only cluster where capacity is reduced (in terms of frequency and 
aircraft size) without leaving the city pair market. These cases usually involve airports 
where the airlines’ share is only moderate. The airlines align their ticket classes with 
the “official” IATA coordinated tariffs, thus there is no differentiation in that respect. 
 
Cluster 3 (Exemplar London - Cologne/BA), another small cluster, contains 10 
cases. New service with small, efficient jets was started, providing on average four to 
five daily connections for a given city pair. Most often, these city pairs involved an 
airport hub, where the airline already held a relatively strong position. The airlines 
chose to differentiate their ticket classes from “Official” fares. 
 
Cluster 4 (Exemplar London - Frankfurt/LH) represents 36 cases and is an important 
cluster. This cluster describes airlines that opened new service. In contrast to cluster 
3, airlines use larger aircraft and lower daily frequencies to provide the output 
required. More than half of the daily connections involve code sharing with other 
airlines. These city pairs involve airports where each airline’s presence, in general, is 
not very strong, and airlines do not serve many intercontinental routes within their 
network.98 There is no emphasis on differentiation. This cluster probably best 
represents operational choices made by new entrants. 
 
Cluster 5 (Exemplar Manchester - Brussels/KL) contains 35 cases. It describes 
those city pairs that were abandoned by airlines. The airlines’ presence at the 
airports served was very weak. This cluster essentially represents incumbents that 
unsuccessfully tried to compete outside of airport hubs where their presence was 
already established.  
 
Cluster 6 (Exemplar case Manchester - Frankfurt/BA) is a single case cluster. New 
service was started with high frequency and large aircraft size. BA’s particular 
                                                          
98 It is somewhat unfortunate that the clustering procedure chose this particular exemplar case to best 
represent Cluster 4. This is mainly due to the strong weighting attributed to capacity measures: The 
exemplar case shows a new city pair originating in London City Airport, not Heathrow, being served by 
Lufthansa with a Boeing 737. In this sense, the exemplar case stands for an incumbent who tries to 
copy entrants. 
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attention to discriminating between ticket classes is reflected in high scores for ticket 
differentiation. 
 
The resulting clusters are shown below, with the exemplar cases representing the 
most typical case within each distinct cluster. The number in brackets indicates the 
number of cases in each cluster. 
 
Exhibit 58: Resulting clusters 
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 2.2  Factor analysis of measures associated with entry barriers 
r distinct types of entry barriers were of particular interest: economies of scale, 
rentiation, sunk costs and absolute cost advantages. As shown before, we 
umed these barriers to be partially multidimensional, not unidimensional, and that 
e entry barriers (especially sunk costs and absolute cost advantages) could not 
measured with uni-dimensional parameters. Since I had multiple measures for 
h construct, we wanted to determine whether the multiple measures were more 
ely associated to one another than they were to other measures which were 
nded to measure a different type of entry barrier. The appropriate analysis 
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procedure was to do a principal component factor analysis of all the measures, with 
varimax rotation, and to allow the analysis procedure to determine which measures 
loaded together (Kim and Mueller 1978).  
 
A principal component analysis explains as much of the total variation in the data as 
possible with as few factors as possible. The analytical goals of parsimony and 
independence are achieved through this method. However, the first component often 
represents an overall measure of the information contained in all the variables, and it 
is difficult to interpret whether the factor is more related to one subset of variables 
than another. Rotation methods alter the initial factors so that we can more easily 
interpret the factors, and the varimax rotation method rotates the axes orthogonally. 
The variables which load highly (near +/- 1) on a factor do not necessarily describe 
an underlying concept: this task is left to the individual researcher (Kleinbaum, 
Kupper and Muller 1988). 
 
If all our measures for each construct loaded together, then the measurement model 
was well specified and reflected each specific domain of content; but if they did not 
load together, then we would learn where the discrepancies were and which data 
were less trustworthy. A scree test, with the minimum eigenvalue set at 1.00, clearly 
suggested three factors.99 From the following factor analysis it appeared that some of 
my measures reflected the constructs as we had anticipated, but other measures did 
not seem to differentiate between types of entry barriers. 
 
Whereas Factor 1 clearly reflected differentiation, based on ticket classes, the 
remaining two factors lumped together different measures from different kinds of 
entry barriers. However, this aggregation into the two remaining factors is not 
inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions outlined before: Factor 2 essentially 
loads highest on capacity-related choices, such as flight frequency and aircraft size. 
Interestingly, Factor 2 also loads as well on code sharing, an indicator that is likely to 
be positively correlated with flight frequency. These measures are associated with 
economies of scale (although frequency and aircraft size would go in opposite 
directions) and sunk costs (for flight frequency in absolute terms and code sharing). 
Factor 3 loads high especially on absolute cost advantages (such as hub 
                                                          
99 These three factors explain cumulatively 69.85% of the total variance observed. 
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dominance, intercontinental flights and FFPs). It also shows a high loading on CRS 
(sunk costs), possibly due to leverage effects that CRS can exercise when combining 
the three identified absolute cost advantages. 
 
Exhibit 59: Components matrix after rotation a 
 
1.019E-02 0.935 -9.00E-02 
2.886E-02 0.904 -8.78E-02 
0.119 0.790 -0.187
9.292E-02 0.249 0.699
-3.59E-02 0.756 0.103
7.195E-03 -0.193 0.809
-0.179 0.578 -6.63E-02
0.160 -0.194 0.895
9.671E-02 -0.109 0.647
0.633 1.061E-03 -4.26E-02
0.955 -4.85E-02 9.566E-02 
0.907 1.501E-04 0.168
0.963 -5.99E-02 9.686E-02
0.863 5.402E-03 0.160
dDepw 
dDepd
dAircra
Hubdo 
Freq
CRS
Codesh
InterCo
FFP 
dBusine
dSeas 
dWeek 
dFlexibi
dSpecia 
1 2 3
Components
Method of extraction: Principal components analysis 
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalisation 
The rotation converged after 4 itérations. a.  
 
The next step in the empirical evaluation was to assess the relationships between the 
independent variables and the dependent variables. Given the results of factor 
analysis, we had a better understanding of which measures were more likely to serve 
as “good” predictors of the dependent variables. In the next section we will discuss 
the regression method and the process of predictive validity. 
 
VII.2.3   Regression analysis and entry barrier measures  
Multiple regression analysis is by far the most widely used multivariate technique in 
strategy management research, since it can be used to examine the relationship 
between a single dependent variable (in this case, sustainability of prices) and a set 
of independent variables such as the ones discussed above. Its popularity often 
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results in simple ordinary least square estimations with little regard to testing the 
assumptions underlying regression analysis or alternative specifications to determine 
a better fit with the data.  
 
General specifications 
We applied the regression to selected clusters of city pairs. However, when 
examined separately, different clusters are likely to have significantly different 
intercepts and slopes for their respective independent variables. We defined prices 
as a linear function of a constant Y-intercept and seven regressors, which were 
selected from our factor analysis due to their heavy loading on a particular factor and 
due to their relevance for identifying the dominant types of entry barriers: 
 
Pricejt (Bus, Eco, Low)    =  αj + βj1Depwjt+ βj2Aircrajt+ βj3Codeshjt + βj4Hubdojt+  
+ βj5CRSjt + βj6InterCojt + βj7Flexibijt + εjt 
 
with j = 1,…, m (where m is the number of strategic groups or clusters), α the 
intercept on the Y-axis, β indicates the coefficient of the independent variable and ε 
our independent error term; t Є {1993;1997}, representing either of both years. 
 
We were primarily interested in price sustainability, thus in price changes over time. 
Therefore, we deduced the following regression specification by subtracting the linear 
regression equation of 1993 from the one that described 1997: 
 
dPricej = Pricej1997 – Pricej1993 =  βj1dDepwj+ βj2dAircraj+ βj3dCodeshj + βj4dHubdoj+  
+ βj5dCRSj + βj6dInterCoj + βj7dFlexibij + ε´j 
 
with the prefix d describing the differences between 1997 and 1993 in the 
independent interval variables. For meaningful interpretation of the impact of each 
independent variable on price sustainability, an intercept term ≠ 0 was not 
necessarily helpful: A positive Y-intercept already would have included at least some 
of the price increases that had occurred. In other words, a positive intercept on the Y-
axis alone already suggests increases in prices, thus a priori unsustainable prices. As 
our research question concentrates on entry barriers alone and their respective 
contribution to price changes, any potential Y-intercept would conveniently cancel out 
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due to our subtraction of two linear equations, which had used an identical term of αj 
for both in 1993 and 1997.  
 
Choice of clusters 
Going back to our clusters, we first of all eliminated clusters 5 and 6 for obvious 
reasons: Cluster 5 described city pairs where airlines had decided to quit service 
between 1993 and 1997. Again, per definitionem, there was no point in examining 
price sustainability (variable for price changes equals –1). Cluster 6 was also 
eliminated, since it contained only one case. This left us with clusters 1 through 4. 
More clusters then were withdrawn: Cluster 2 initially contained five observations, but 
needed to be corrected “manually” due to imperfect clustering. After this 
reassignment of cases, only three cases remained within this cluster. Cluster 3 only 
contained ten cases, and it was not considered fruitful to run a regression analysis 
with 7 explicative variables on only 10 cases. An alternative would have been to lump 
cluster 3 with cluster 4, since both clusters showed city pairs expanding on capacity. 
However, there were excellent reasons to cluster these two groups apart: By 
consolidation, mutually opposite signs in ticket differentiation and CRS would have 
further watered down our difficult analysis to identify the driving barriers in each 
cluster. 
 
Testing the assumptions 
Multiple regression analysis rests on a set of assumptions about the error terms: zero 
expected value (E(εi) = 0), constant variance (E(εi) = σ2), independence (E(εiεj) = 0; 
i≠j), and drawn from a normal distribution. In cross-sectional analysis, a typical 
problem that emerges is that of heteroscedasticity (i.e. changing variance). For two of 
the selected clusters, an exploratory regression analysis was run, using ordinary 
least squares with a constant intercept on the Y-axis. These first equations were run 
for 91+36 cases, with HWPX (fully flexible economy class) price changes the 
dependent variable, and seven regressors chosen among the most loaded variables 
of the three factors. Upon examining the plot of the predicted dependent variable 
(changes in price) and the residuals for the examined clusters No.1 and 4, we 
identified unequal variances. 
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After some empirical testing, we came to the conclusion that the error term ε´j was 
heteroscedastic with regard to a weighting by exp(Hubdo * CRS * InterCo). This 
weight was to be applied to all subsequent regression analyses. 
 
 
VII.3 Regression results of incumbent and new entry routes 
 
Finally, we retain only clusters 1 and 4 for further examination: Both cluster 1 and 
cluster 4 are the most relevant ones for this research: On one side, there were 
incumbent routes that presented the typical established operations of former flag 
carriers. They are represented in cluster 1. Cluster 1 airlines needed to react to the 
threat of entry100. On the other hand, there were routes where new service was 
started. Both entrants and industry incumbents would serve such markets for the first 
time and could therefore be considered entrants. Cluster 4 describes these newly 
served routes.  
 
VII.3.1 Results for incumbent routes (Cluster 1) 
 
The sample of city pairs within cluster 1 involved those routes where the carrier 
already had a strong presence at either the origin or destination airport. These routes 
were frequently served and indicated high traffic densities. One could describe these 
routes as dominated by former flag carriers. 
 
Exhibit 60: Model summary for cluster 1 
 
R R-two R-two 
adjusted 
Standard 
error of 
estimation 
Changes in 
the statistics
    
CLUSTER = 1 
(selected) 
   Variation of 
R-two 
ddl 1 ddl 2 
0.880 0.774 0.754 7.17485 0.774 7 78 
0.867 0.752 0.730 4.44081 0.752 7 82 
0.900 0.810 0.791 4.26189 0.810 7 70 
a  For a regression through the origin (model without a constant for intercept), R two measures the 
proportional variance of the dependent variable relative to the intercept as determined by regression.  
This type of R two cannot be compared with models that include a constant for intercept. 
b  Independent variables: dFlexibi, Hubdo, dAircra, Codesh, dDepw, CRS, InterCo 
c  All statistics are based upon observations, for which CLUSTER = 1. 
d  Dependent variable: PriceBus, PriceHWPX, Pricelow 
e  Linear regression through the origin 
f  Regression by least squares estimate – Weighting by WEIGHT2 
                                                          
100 Compare with Karnani & Wernerfelt, where incumbents choose either to: 1) do nothing, 2) defend 
its market, 3) counterattack, or 4) total attack. 
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The regression was run on three ticket classes: business class, fully flexible economy 
and the lowest available fares. Exhibit 64 summarizes the outcome for each ticket 
class in a particular line. R2 is in a range between 75% and 80%, but cannot be 
compared with R2 which would include a constant factor.101  
 
The following three exhibits present the coeffcients for price changes in three 
different ticket classes: business, economy and lowest available fares. 
 
Exhibit 61: Regression results for business, economy and lowest fares in cluster 1 
 
 Non 
standardised 
coefficients
 Standardised 
coefficients 
t Significance 
level 
Confidence interval at 
95% of B 
 
 B Standard 
error 
Bêta   Lower limit Upper limit
dDepw 4.043E-03 0.005 0.067 0.873 0.385 -0.005 0.013 
dAircra 1.360E-03 0.002 0.055 0.839 0.404 -0.002 0.005 
Hubdo 4.957E-02 0.159 0.299 0.313 0.755 -0.266 0.365 
CRS 7.251E-02 0.070 0.334 1.029 0.307 -0.068 0.213 
Codesh -7.836E-06 0.022 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.044 0.044 
InterCo 2.581E-02 0.145 0.155 0.178 0.859 -0.263 0.315 
dFlexibi -3.032E-02 0.008 -0.241 -3.795 0.000 -0.046 -0.014 
a  Dependent variable : PRICEBUS 
 
 B Standard 
error 
Bêta   Lower limit Upper limit
dDepw -6.231E-03 0.003 -0.171 -2.184 0.032 -0.012 -0.001 
dAircra 8.328E-05 0.001 0.006 0.083 0.934 -0.002 0.002 
Hubdo 0.186 0.094 1.855 1.980 0.051 -0.001 0.372 
CRS 3.695E-02 0.043 0.283 0.849 0.398 -0.050 0.123 
Codesh 3.296E-02 0.014 0.161 2.386 0.019 0.005 0.060 
InterCo -0.129 0.085 -1.278 -1.521 0.132 -0.297 0.040 
dFlexibi -7.854E-03 0.005 -0.103 -1.588 0.116 -0.018 0.002 
a  Dependent variable : PriceHWPX 
 
 B Standard 
error 
Bêta   Lower limit Upper limit
dDepw 1.184E-02 0.003 0.315 4.249 0.000 0.006 0.017 
dAircra -2.142E-03 0.001 -0.139 -2.129 0.037 -0.004 0.000 
Hubdo 2.945E-02 0.111 0.276 0.266 0.791 -0.192 0.250 
CRS 1.278E-02 0.047 0.092 0.275 0.784 -0.080 0.106 
Codesh -2.746E-02 0.017 -0.110 -1.572 0.120 -0.062 0.007 
InterCo 2.347E-02 0.105 0.219 0.224 0.823 -0.185 0.232 
dFlexibi -3.576E-02 0.005 -0.456 -7.265 0.000 -0.046 -0.026 
a  Dependent variable : PRICELOW 
b  Linear regression through the origin 
c  Regression of weighted least squares – Weighting by WEIGHT2 
d  Exclusive selection of observations for which CLUSTER =  1 
 
 
                                                          
101 For comparison, we also ran the same regressions with a model involving a constant term. The 
model summary there yielded an R2 in a range between 20% and 25%, which we considered 
satisfactory. 
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VII.3.2  Interpretation of results (Cluster 1) 
 
Business Class 
 
                                                          
For business class, a single variable representing differentiation has a significant 
impact on price changes. Unlike our theoretical predictions suggested, the 
introduction of new ticket classes (here represented by fully flexible tickets) had 
negative impacts on business class fares. It is not difficult to find a reason for such 
negative correlations: Fully flexible tickets, even in economy class, provide direct 
competition for business class, especially on short-haul European routes. These 
newly introduced and lower priced ticket classes threatened to cannibalize the 
business segment. However, as shown in the previous chapter, on average, business 
fares had increased by 37,3%. This means that other factors must have more than 
compensated for the negative impact of ticket differentiation. Indeed, all remaining six 
regressors show positive signs, with CRS and Hubdo the most important ones. 
However, none of these variables is significant on a 90% confidence interval, at least 
not on a univariate level.102
 
Fully flexible economy 
 
Increases in weekly flight frequency show significantly negative impacts on ticket 
prices, and the extent of code sharing in 1997 shows a significantly positive 
correlation on the dependent variable. These results must be interpreted in the light 
of our theoretical predictions: Increasing flight frequency led to higher average costs. 
Especially on high-density routes as in cluster 1, larger aircraft could have been used 
instead of increasing flight frequencies. Code sharing was expected to reduce excess 
capacity and thus to provide lower average costs, which would allow for lower prices. 
These findings suggest considerable market power: Increasing frequency and 
lowering prices could deter entrants along the lines of the Dixit model (see IV.4.1). 
Sharing codes with other airlines and increasing prices indicated market power of 
both incumbent airlines over such routes. 
 
By far the most influential independent variable is hub dominance, which is also 
significant on a 95% confidence interval. Its positive impact on prices had been 
102 We suggest further research in this field, with a possible lead: CRS are particularly apt to leverage 
on multiple factors at the same time and to combine them differently in order to maximize revenues.  
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predicted by theory. The impact of hub dominance on higher ticket prices outweighs 
the negative impact of more frequent flights by around 10 times (compare the 
respective β coefficients). Both intercontinental exposure and increases in fully 
flexible tickets, our proxy for differentiation, contributed to explaining variances from 
the mean towards lower ticket prices, but failed to be significant on a 90% confidence 
interval. The negative coefficient for airlines also serving intercontinental routes 
indicates that for economy class prices may be lowered, possibly to induce 
passengers to transfer at the incumbents’ hubs onto intercontinental routes. This 
would suggest cross-subsidization on European routes, a clear contradiction to the 
theory of perfectly contestable markets. This effect is shown to be significant on a 
85% confidence interval only. 
 
The effect of lower prices with economy class tickets through newly introduced ticket 
classes was shown to be significant on a 85% confidence interval only. Its impact to 
reduce fares was much smaller than with business class. 
 
Lowest available fares 
 
Our third price class that we had examined in cluster 1 contained the lowest available 
fares for the given city pairs. Most importantly, we note that the independent 
variables related to size, which we assumed to be relevant for keeping premium fares 
expensive, no longer played a significant role. Hub dominance, intercontinental 
exposure and CRS not only did not show any significance, but their coefficients were 
much smaller compared with other classes, i.e. economy class. It is also noteworthy 
that intercontinental routes did not appear to cross-subsidize lowest available fares 
on dominated routes of cluster 1. The absence of such a relationship would 
correspond to the theory of perfectly contestable markets. In this context of low 
margin fares, frequency and capacity related variables behaved very much along the 
lines that had been suggested in the theory part: Increasing aircraft size tends to 
lower average costs, which may manifest itself in lower prices. More weekly 
departures do not lower costs: Prices tend to increase. Code sharing, although not 
significant on a 90% confidence interval, shows a clear tendency to lead to lower 
prices, probably through lowering average costs. The significantly negative coefficient 
of differentiation through new ticket classes suggests that new ticket classes had 
been introduced which allowed a further reduction of lowest fares. 
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VII.3.3  Results for new entry routes (Cluster 4) 
 
Cluster 4 describes the situation where new routes were started after deregulation, 
either by industry incumbents or by new entrants. These city pairs did only 
exceptionally involve airports where the airline held a strong position. In most of the 
cases, traffic was started from secondary airports, such as Luton or City airport for 
London. New service typically was started with around four daily flights for the given 
city pair (each way). This cluster described an environment that was expected to be 
more competitive than cluster 1, as the industry incumbent held no city pair-specific 
advantage compared to any other entrant. 
 
  
Exhibit 62: Model summary for cluster 4 
 
R R-two R-two 
adjusted 
Standard 
error of 
estimation 
Changes in 
the statistics
    
CLUSTER = 4 
(selected) 
 Variation of 
R-two 
ddl 1 ddl 2 
0.997 0.995 0.993 0.34499 0.995 7 27 
0.998 0.997 0.996 0.18836 0.997 7 29 
0.998 0.997 0.996 0.22371 0.997 
a  For a regression through the origin (model without a constant for intercept), R two measures the 
proportional variance of the dependent variable relative to the intercept as determined by regression.  
This type of R two cannot be compared with models that include a constant for intercept. 
d  Dependent variable: PriceBus, PriceHWPX, Pricelow 
e  Linear regression through the origin 
7 27 
b  Independent variables: dFlexibi, Hubdo, dAircra, Codesh, dDepw, CRS, InterCo 
c  All statistics are based upon observations, for which CLUSTER = 4. 
f  Regression by least squares estimate – Weighting by WEIGHT2 
 
 
As indicated before, a value for R2 as high as the one shown in our model summary 
should be interpreted with caution. It is mainly due to the fact that we had defined our 
Y-intercept as passing through the origin of the Y-axis. A control run of our regression 
equation, where we introduced a constant term into the equation, yielded a value for 
R2 of around 35%. The following exhibit presents the coeffcients for price changes in 
three different ticket classes: business, economy and lowest available fares. 
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Exhibit 63: Regression results for business, economy and lowest fares in cluster 4 
 
 Non 
standardised 
coefficients 
 Standardised 
coefficients 
t Significance 
level 
Confidence interval at 
95% of B 
 
 B Standard 
error 
Bêta   Lower limit Upper limit
dDepw 2.239E-03 0.003 0.289 0.760 0.454 -0.004 0.008 
dAircra 6.064E-03 0.001 
0.000 
Bêta 
3.044 6.297 0.000 0.004 0.008 
Hubdo -0.342 0.041 -4.367 -8.360 -0.425 -0.258 
CRS 4.452E-02 0.106 0.525 0.420 0.677 -0.173 0.262 
Codesh 4.482E-03 0.013 0.118 0.355 0.725 -0.021 0.030 
InterCo 3.918E-02 0.089 0.502 0.441 0.663 -0.143 0.222 
dFlexibi -4.908E-02 0.016 -1.069 -3.010 0.006 -0.083 -0.016 
a  Dependent variable : PRICEBUS 
 
 B Standard 
error 
  Lower limit Upper limit
dDepw -3.824E-03 0.002 -0.662 -2.463 0.020 -0.007 -0.001 
dAircra 2.902E-03 0.001 1.953 5.687 0.000 0.002 0.004 
Hubdo -0.131 0.022 -2.252 -6.015 0.000 -0.176 
0.008 
dFlexibi 
 
0.010 
-0.087 
CRS 2.791E-02 0.054 0.441 0.515 0.611 -0.083 0.139 
Codesh 2.177E-02 0.007 0.771 3.225 0.003 0.036 
InterCo 2.455E-02 0.045 0.422 0.549 0.587 -0.067 0.116 
-1.584E-02 0.009 -0.463 -1.793 0.083 -0.034 0.002 
a  Dependent variable : PriceHWPX 
 B Standard 
error 
Bêta   Lower limit Upper limit
dDepw 5.838E-03 0.002 0.903 3.058 0.005 0.002 
dAircra 4.974E-03 0.001 2.992 7.965 
-0.174 -0.120 
0.069 
0.058 -0.410 
dFlexibi -8.579E-02 0.011 
 
 
0.000 0.004 0.006 
Hubdo 0.026 -2.663 -6.562 0.000 -0.228 
CRS 0.151 2.136 2.204 0.036 0.010 0.292 
Codesh -1.221E-02 0.008 -0.387 -1.492 0.147 -0.029 0.005 
InterCo -0.292 -4.487 -5.070 0.000 -0.174 
-2.239 -8.113 0.000 -0.107 -0.064 
a  Dependent variable : PRICELOW 
b  Linear regression through the origin 
c  Regression of weighted least squares – Weighting by WEIGHT2 
d  Exclusive selection of observations for which CLUSTER =  4 
VII.3.4   Interpretation of results (Cluster 4) 
 
Business class 
 
Three variables showed significant impact on price changes: Aircraft size (positive), 
hub dominance (negative) and ticket differentiation (negative). As for aircraft size, we 
found that the use of bigger aircraft (such as a Boeing 737-400 compared with a 
Fokker 50) was significantly linked, on a 95% confidence interval, to higher ticket 
prices. This empircal finding supports the theory of higher average unit costs for 
larger aircraft, if no trade-off is made with flight frequency for given city pairs.  
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Hub dominance had a very strong negative impact on prices, being significant also 
for economy class and lowest fares as well. This result runs against our theoretical 
predictions, which suggest absolute cost advantages that are inherent in the 
operation of airport hubs. Keeping in mind that cluster 4 mainly consisted of airlines 
that opened routes from secondary airports, with other airlines competing for the 
same routes from their established hubs in exceptional cases only, it showed that the 
hub advantage disappeared once alternative airports were made available to 
entrants. The hub advantage known from cluster 1 was even likely to turn into a 
disadvantage, with airport hubs often congested (more time for turnarounds required) 
and regularly being more expensive (landing fees, etc.). 
 
Differentiation by introducing new tickets tended to lower prices. In business class, 
fully flexible tickets offered virtually the same service for less money, something to 
which business travellers appeared sensitive. Contrary to the theory, which 
suggested price premiums through differentiation, lower priced tickets seemed to 
cannibalize this premium segment. 
 
Economy class 
 
As with business class, aircraft size increased, hubdominance and ticket 
differentiation both decreased fares in economy class. These relationships were all 
significant at a 95% confidence interval for both aircraft size and hub dominance, and 
at a 90% confidence interval with ticket differentiation.  
Weekly flight frequency is shown to lower prices significantly (95% confidence 
interval), while code sharing increased prices (95% confidence interval). As with 
cluster 1, this is not what theory would have predicted: More frequent flights should 
increase prices (through higher unit costs) and code sharing should decrease fares 
(through lower unit costs). Unlike with cluster 1, the explanation of price coordination 
and market power is not convincing in the context of cluster 4: Both entrants and 
incumbents were starting new service, mostly from secondary airports. The 
contenders struggle for dominance on new routes and expand their capacity rapidly 
in order to advance vis-à-vis other contenders. The importance of hub dominance 
serving as a barrier to entry is not contradicted by this observation: The contenders 
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do not yet dominate these secondary airports, but they are trying to get there by 
increasing flight frequencies and decreasing fares. 
 
The impact on lowering fares due to newly introduced ticket classes was less 
pronounced in economy class, but still significantly negative (90% confidence 
interval).  
 
Lowest fares 
 
 
As with business and economy class, aircraft size increased, hub dominance and 
ticket differentiation both decreased the price category of lowest available fares (99% 
confidence interval). Three variables are significant and idiosyncratic in their effect on 
lowest prices: changes in weekly flight frequency are positively correlated with prices. 
This corresponds with what we would expect from higher costs being reflected in 
ticket prices. CRS are significant (95% confidence interval) in raising prices. Only 
within lowest fares on newly served city pairs were CRS significant for higher ticket 
fares. Unlike the theory (see IV.3.3 and IV.4.2) suggested, did we not find any 
transfer of profits derived from booking fees towards CRS stakeholding airlines. CRS 
appear to contribute to higher ticket fares for airlines that hold important ownership 
stakes in CRS.103 The most obvious explanation would be a possible control over 
distribution channels by incumbents that happen to be the owners of such CRS.  
  
The single most important factor leading to lower ticket fares is dependent on the 
airline’s intercontinental exposure (99% confidence interval). This finding suggests 
that airlines that also served intercontinental routes in their network, which by 
definition had to be industry incumbents, used profits generated on such routes to 
subsidize lower prices against industry entrants on new routes. This contradicts the 
theory of perfectly contestable markets. 
VII.3.5 Synthesis and comparison of the results 
 
Exhibit 68 synthesizes our empirical findings. It shows all significant correlations 
between changes in ticket prices and the respective independent variables that 
represented potential entry barriers. Positive coefficients mean that a higher value of 
                                                          
103 To be more precise: airlines, whose stake in CRS were important relative to the size of their own 
route network, were the most advantaged. 
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the independent variable increased ticket prices, negative coefficients stand for 
decreases.  
 
Exhibit 64: Summary of findings 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 4  
Business Economy Lowest Business Economy Lowest 
Ticket 
differentiation - - - - - - 
Weekly  
frequency  - +  - + 
 + Code share  + -  - 
 
Hub dominance  -  + - - 
 
Intercontinental  -    - 
 
Aircraft size   - + + + 
 
CRS      + 
 
We shall now review the impact of the various selected independent variables across 
all three ticket fare classes within the two clusters and highlight their conformity or 
non-conformity with the predictions made by perfectly contestable markets.  
 
Ticket differentiation 
In cluster 1 and cluster 4 the introduction of new ticket classes led to lower ticket 
prices. This applied across all price segments that were examined, so one can 
therefore not suggest a price premium that may have been expressed through new 
ticket classes. If such new ticket classes had better segmented the market and added 
value to the flight service, differentiation would have allowed for such price premiums. 
Our empirical data show that differentiation was not a significant barrier to entry. In 
this sense, pefectly contestable markets are not violated. 
 
Weekly frequency 
Increases in weekly flight frequency were empirically significant for economy fares 
and lowest available fares. For lowest fares (in both clusters 1 and 4) the higher costs 
of operating more frequent flights were reflected in higher prices. This is not 
surprising, as determining lowest fares is often based upon marginal cost pricing.  
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For economy class, increases in weekly frequency would lower prices. This empirical 
finding confirms the hypothesis made earlier (see IV.3.1.3 and IV.4.1): Increased 
flight frequencies on certain routes with lower fares would deter entrants. The 
characteristics of excess capacity and Cournot competition along the lines of Dixit 
can be confirmed for economy class. With regard to changes in weekly frequency, 
perfectly contestable markets were not impeded for the segment of lowest available 
fares. In economy class (for both clusters 1 and 4) markets were not perfectly 
contestable due to entry barriers and strategic behaviour linked to flight frequency. 
 
Code share 
As with flight frequency, the cost effects of code sharing were directly reflected in the 
lowest available prices. Code sharing consolidated operations between two airlines 
and reduced average unit costs. These lower costs were empirically shown to 
decrease ticket fares for the lowest available fares. In this respect, we cannot 
observe any impediment to perfectly contestable markets. 
 
Within the economy segment, code sharing tended to increase prices. Unlike flight 
frequency or aircraft size, code sharing could not create excess capacity and would 
not allow for strategic behaviour along the lines of Dixit. Instead, the argument of 
market power may provide a valid explanation. In economy class (both clusters 1 and 
4), code sharing impeded conditions of perfectly contestable markets. 
 
Hub dominance 
Dominance at airport hubs presented barriers to entry in the sense of absolute cost 
advantages. The empirical analysis showed that in cluster 1, hub dominance induced 
significantly higher prices only for economy class. We may rationalize this 
observation by considering that margins for business travel are already high, and 
incumbents have little interest in raising lowest available fares to above-normal profits 
(signalling low profits to entrants, etc.). Due to the hub dominance of incumbents, 
perfectly contestable markets did not exist in economy class for cluster 1. 
 
For city pairs (Cluster 4) newly entered, hub dominance showed significantly and had 
a strong negative impact on prices. This was explained by the fact that most of these 
newly served city pairs originated from secondary airports in the city where 
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incumbents held dominant hub positions; thus, hub specific advantages could not be 
exercised by the incumbent. On the contrary, these secondary airports proved less 
congested, had less expensive landing fees and, especially, were more accessible 
for new entrants. This shows that once incumbents had to compete with entrants on 
the same level, their competitive advantage due to grandfathered rights disappeared 
and prices had to drop. In this respect, hub dominance of incumbents did not 
preclude perfectly contestable markets. 
 
Intercontinental  
As cross-subsidization would be generated within the airline, the principle of profit-
maximization suggested subsidizing only the most strategic and competitive routes: 
In cluster 1, intercontinental exposure served to lower prices in economy class. It is 
interesting to note that no subsidies were allocated to lowest available fares in cluster 
1. For economy class in cluster 1, conditions of perfectly contestable markets were 
impeded. 
 
For newly entered markets (cluster 4), competition between industry incumbents and 
new entrants was more intense and concentrated on the lowest available fares: 
Cross-subsidies were directed only at the lowest fares segment. Industry incumbents’ 
lowest available fares were not expected to cover costs compared with new entrants 
who offered a favourable cost structure. Therefore, subsidies were significant if the 
industry incumbent wanted to stay in business on such city pairs against no-frills 
competitors. Again, cross-subsidization derived from intercontinental routes 
prevented perfectly contestable markets. 
 
As with subsidizing economy class - and not lowest available fares – in Cluster 1, one 
could expect this price segment, at least partially, to feed traffic into the incumbent’s 
intercontinental routes. Lowest available fares were not structured to provide a feeder 
service for such intercontinental routes. Therefore, subsidizing such intercontinental 
feeder services could eventually increase the airline’s total margin (compared with 
using other airlines and then transferring onto the intercontinental route at the hub).  
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Aircraft size 
Theoretically, larger aircraft should provide lower average costs than smaller aircraft 
given a sufficiently high load factor. This reasoning links aircraft size to economies of 
scale and the expected relationship was empirically confirmed for lowest available 
fares in cluster 1. In such a low-margin setting, prices would closely follow the actual 
costs of operations. This relationship accorded with perfectly contestable markets. 
 
 
                                                          
Our empirical findings are the opposite for newly started routes (cluster 4) across all 
price segments: Here, the use of bigger aircraft increased prices significantly in all 
price classes. As both entrants and incumbents increased daily frequency in order to 
pursue dominance on these new routes, many aircraft were operated - often smaller 
ones. The principle of economies of scale applies hardly in such a setting, where 
demand is new and preference is given to frequency over aircraft size in order to gain 
market share quickly. If larger aircraft were used, they would be unlikely to obtain a 
sufficiently high seat factor if frequency increased as well. This would mean higher 
unit costs for both incumbents and entrants than would be necessary if excess 
capacity could be avoided.104 This behaviour was contradictory to the principles of 
perfectly contestable markets, but was linked to flight frequency and not aircraft size: 
If entrants obtained slots, they could cause substantial losses to industry incumbents 
by operating fewer flights and filling up larger aircraft. 
CRS 
Computer reservation systems were the only barrier to entry we identified that 
presented technology-driven sunk costs. They had a significantly positive impact on 
prices only for the lowest fares in cluster 4. Despite careful regulation of the 
standards of such equipment, CRS owner airlines could still benefit from a “preferred 
client” status when bookings were made. Although competing offers from some 
entrants might also be offered through the CRS, the system might still privilege 
incumbents over entrants. Also, once potential passengers had enquired about flights 
through CRS, direct offers from entrants (i.e. by telephone or through the Internet) 
could not easily be made anymore. We observed that control over the distribution 
104 The airlines most often chose smaller aircraft for frequent flights, such as Lufthansa using Canadair 
and AvroJets instead of Boeing 737s. This was in line with our finding that the type of plane has an 
impact on prices.  
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channel in the form of CRS precluded perfectly contestable markets for the segment 
of lowest fares on newly started routes.  
 
Exhibit 69 summarizes the factors that were empirically shown to have impeded 
perfectly contestable markets in the European airline industry after deregulation. 
 
Exhibit 65: Entry barriers that impede perfectly contestable markets 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 4  
Business Economy Lowest Business Economy Lowest 
Ticket 
differentiation 
      
Weekly  
frequency 
 No PCM   No PCM  
Code share  No PCM   No PCM  
Hub dominance   No PCM    
Intercontinental  No PCM    No PCM 
Aircraft size       
CRS No PCM      
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VIII Implications for strategy and public policy 
VIII.1 Strategic implications for incumbents 
The following section reviews those barriers to entry that were empirically shown to 
reduce a market’s contestability. Incumbents may reap supra-normal profits by 
exploiting this lack of contestability in the way they conduct business. However, we 
distinguish between conduct that exploits existing barriers to entry (Point VIII.1.1) and 
strategies that are aimed at creating new barriers to entry (Point VIII.1.2).  
 
For routes on which the incumbent increases flight frequency, code sharing among 
incumbents may serve as a complement: Instead of an incumbent operating new 
flights by himself in order to better control certain routes, other incumbents serve the 
same route in a coordinated manner. The notion of market power allows both 
partners to raise prices in economy class. For less dense city pairs and for lowest 
available fares, code sharing often leads to gains in efficiency and thus to lower 
prices. 
VIII.1.1 Exploiting existing barriers to entry through strategic behaviour 
Flight frequency 
On routes with medium to high density, the incumbent will prefer more frequent traffic 
with smaller planes, rather than fewer flights using bigger aircraft. As increasing flight 
frequency makes markets less contestable on both hub dominated routes and routes 
that involve secondary airports, the incumbent can pursue this strategy universally. If 
his cost structure renders the incumbent too expensive, he can leave these routes to 
franchising partners. The strategic impact is leveraged by lowering prices in economy 
class in order to deter entrants. 
 
Code sharing 
 
Hub dominance 
Market power at airport hubs is the most important impediment to contestable 
markets on established routes. Incumbents will be interested in maintaining control of 
as many available slots as possible at the given airport. If any extension of such 
airports were planned, it would be in the incumbent’s interests to occupy these newly 
created slots as well, instead of providing an opening to entrants. As suggested 
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above, the physical constraints of airport hubs can effectively be exploited by 
increasing flight frequency and by extending control over airport slots through code 
sharing agreements with other incumbent airlines.  
 
The other crucial element for dominating a hub-and-spoke network was 
intercontinental flights and the excess profits they generated due to near monopolies 
on such routes. On the one hand, hub and spokes allowed airlines to funnel enough 
passengers on to high-capacity, long-distance carriers, contributing to high profit 
margins on such routes. On the other hand, part of these excess profits was used to 
subsidize economy class on certain spokes. The incumbent was interested in 
subsidizing those routes where traffic was high and entrants threatened to open 
service. As slot openings for volume traffic were difficult for entrants to obtain, the 
scarcity of no-frills fares was not really a threat to incumbents at these hubs. Cross- 
subsidies could therefore be minimized by concentrating only on economy class. 
 
 
Intercontinental 
 
Outside of dominated hubs, airport slots were more easily available for entrants. In 
order to sell capacity (and to gain market share through increasing flight frequency), 
incumbents had to react to the entrant’s no-frills fares. Therefore, cross-subsidies 
were directed at lowest available fares and not at economy class.
 
CRS 
Incumbents were concerned about controlling distribution channels. Computer 
reservation systems allowed them to leverage on passengers’ habits of booking 
through travel agents. Incumbents should further use this tool and try to persuade no-
frills airlines that took only direct bookings (by telephone or through the Internet). 
CRS were likely to remain a powerful tool, especially if customers wished to transfer 
to other flights, for example long-distance ones. If no-frills airlines subscribed to CRS, 
this might give the incumbent the opportunity to further optimize his own network, and 
might also influence the entrant’s price policies (by adding commission fees for the 
CRS). 
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VIII.1.2 Creating new barriers to entry 
Beyond the mere exploitation of entry barriers, the incumbent may also attempt to 
create new barriers to his advantage. We see the potential for the following new 
barriers: 
 
Slot allocation 
Because the way the incumbent conducts business is largely enabled by hub 
dominance, a change in the regime that allocates airport slots is not in the interests of 
the incumbent. As different studies have suggested, the incumbent will defend this 
barrier to entry against changes in regulation such as auctioning off all available slots 
to the highest bidder. Instead of allowing the market mechanism to efficiently allocate 
the scarce resource of airport slots, it is in the incumbent’s best interests to defend 
the status quo of grandfathered rights. Only if airport capacity were expanded might 
the incumbent be interested in bidding for newly created airport slots, in order to 
maintain his market power. 
 
Bilateral agreements 
The incumbent has a strong interest in maintaining bilateral agreements on air traffic 
for as long as possible. Such bilateral agreements are the source of the supra-normal 
profits that can be earned on many intercontinental routes. Bilateral agreements 
often facilitate code sharing between incumbents since they de facto tend to split up 
markets between partners.  
 
If bilateral agreements are dissolved, due to liberalization of air traffic, the incumbent 
will look for new barriers to create. As long as such agreements persist (as on 
intercontinental routes), the incumbent can maintain collusive arrangements with his 
partner airline flying into his hub. 
 
Additional hubs 
In order to expand their route network and to relieve the dominated hub from 
congestion effects, many incumbents form additional hub airports, which they 
dominate. For British Airways this would be Gatwick, for Lufthansa it would be 
Munich, for Air France Orly or Lyon Satolas. Knowing that sufficiently dense traffic 
existed for these airports, incumbents might also preempt entrants from developing a 
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home base there by dominating such hubs. In such cities, it may become impossible 
for entrants to find alternative airports, which would render the advantages due to 
hub dominance all the more effective for the incumbent. 
 
Control over secondary airports 
Secondary airports in major cities present ideal airports for new entrants: They are 
not dominated by incumbents, airport slots are available, landing fees tend to be 
much lower and airport congestion is less acute. With the customer base as close as 
for dominated hubs, entrants can better exploit their operational efficiency and cost 
advantages at such airports. It is in the incumbent’s interests to gain influence over 
secondary airports in order to neutralize these advantages: The local incumbent may, 
for instance, enter the same secondary airports (as BA did with City airport in 
London), either with its own equipment or through franchisees. The operator of the 
dominated hub may be the same as the operator of the secondary airport (for 
example BAA for both Heathrow and Luton). Pressure from the dominant client or 
conflict of interest may lead the operator to increase landing fees at the secondary 
airport as well. Finally, European-wide air traffic control may privilege dominated 
hubs over secondary airports with regard to navigation.  
 
Air traffic control 
Air traffic control is a critical bottleneck in air traffic and provides the parties that 
control it with the opportunity to exploit the limitations of air space. The inefficiencies 
that result from airport congestion may be either alleviated or exacerbated by air 
traffic control. If incumbent airlines, or a consortium of incumbents, were to operate 
air traffic control in Europe, conflicts of interest may appear. Incumbents may tend to 
privilege their own airlines by making them fly fewer loops before landing or by letting 
them take off before other airlines’ planes on the runway. For no-frills entrants, where 
operational efficiency and quick turnaround of planes are so critical, having to wait 
longer on the ground or having to fly an extra waiting loop may become a critical 
disadvantage. Incumbents, therefore, will have a strong interest in controlling air 
traffic. 
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VIII.2 Strategic implications for entrants 
We suggest that entrants will not be able to create entry barriers by themselves. 
Their main competitive advantage will lie in superior efficiency in operating their 
planes. Key drivers in the industry that enable superior efficiency include: no-frills 
service, short-distance routes, highly standardized procedures, choice of only one 
aircraft type, point-to-point connections, lower labour costs and fees and direct sales 
channels. However, such superior efficiency can only take effect under market 
conditions that are not impeded by the identified entry barriers. 
 
Flight frequency 
 
Hub dominance 
In the light of the incumbent’s increased flight frequency and use of smaller aircraft, 
the successful entrant should be concerned about choosing the most economic 
aircraft (probably a bigger aircraft, such as a Boeing 737) and setting frequency 
accordingly to obtain high seat factors. For less dense routes, two daily connections 
may be sufficient, while higher demand may require three or four daily connections. 
The entrant’s pricing policies should fully reflect these cost advantages. 
Code sharing 
The entrant will have made a choice about the right combination between aircraft size 
and daily frequency. If the route provides sufficient traffic, there is no need to enter 
code sharing agreements in order to gain market power. If demand proves to be 
insufficient, entering a code-sharing agreement may be incompatible with the 
entrant’s pricing policy, quality standards, booking procedures, etc. Low-cost entrants 
risk compromising their competitive advantages if they share codes with other 
airlines. 
 
Entrants should avoid dominated airport hubs, where there is only scarce availability 
of airport slots and expansion is difficult. If secondary airports are available, and if its 
customer base provides sufficient demand, the entrant should develop his routes at 
such airports. 
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Intercontinental 
Its choice of short-haul planes, no-frills service and legal constraints prevent the 
entrant from serving intercontinental routes. If airport slots are available at the 
incumbent’s hub, the entrant might explore the possibility of feeding traffic into the 
hub’s intercontinental network. Although not the traditional point-to-point service, this 
market niche may be interesting for the entrant, especially if incumbents were to 
decide that cross-subsidies for their own feeder operations were too costly. However, 
the entrant’s direct distribution channel is unlikely to provide information on transfer 
flights and intercontinental connections to passengers. Also, the entrant’s no-frills 
approach will require passengers to check luggage in a second time at the hub 
airport. 
 
CRS 
 
In order to minimize booking fees, avoid any conflict of interest with incumbents 
owning a CRS, and shield the entrant’s network operations from incumbents’ 
monitoring via the CRS, an entrant should not join a CRS. Direct booking with the 
entrant should be part of the marketing campaign (see easyJet’s telephone number 
painted on the fuselage of its planes). The CRS as a distribution channel is still 
strongly based on the intervention of travel agents. It should be part of an entrant’s 
strategy to disintermediate that costly layer. 
 
 
VIII.3 Implications for public policy 
VIII.3.1 Liberalization of European air traffic has failed 
As we have tried to show throughout this thesis, the liberalization of European air 
traffic did not yield the benefits that were put forward by advocates of liberalization: 
The entry of new competitors was neither pervasive nor lasting; the quality of service 
did not improve significantly, ticket prices did not come down; and convenient point-
to-point connections with larger, comfortable and modern aircraft remained elusive. In 
addition, bottlenecks in air traffic worsened, with passengers spending record times 
in the air circling around airports or on the ground waiting for ever scarcer take-off 
slots to become available.  
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The post-deregulation period in the US after 1978 had experienced quite the 
opposite effects. At the least in the short run, massive entry from new airlines 
occurred, creating real and serious competition for the major carriers. More than that, 
the industry incumbents competed against each other in a cut-throat manner, with 
pricing policies regularly based on marginal costs. Although the industry 
progressively consolidated, the profound impact of deregulation in the US of lowering 
ticket prices and enabling true competition on high-density routes cannot be denied.  
 
It can be argued that gradual deregulation may have its advantages over a total, one-
off procedure. However, the objective goal of any liberalization effort must ultimately 
be to make markets at least contestable, no matter how gradual the approach chosen 
for deregulation. One may also stress that market contestability is already very much 
towards the laissez faire end of the regulatory spectrum, when compared with the 
equilibrium ideal of perfect competition. With perfect competition requiring at least 
two, obviously non-colluding firms, contestability would tolerate it if only one was 
presently operating in the market. However, as long as markets do not become 
contestable, incumbents can act as if entry would not occur, and competition (or 
contestability in this case) will not deploy its forces to increase public welfare. It is 
noteworthy that these conclusions, which appear modern and derived from a very 
topical market inefficiency, have already been formulated by Bain (1956, p. 206): 
“What is suggested here is that a somewhat more general and comprehensive 
attention might be given under the law to the preservation of a socially desirable 
condition of entry to our industries – the preservation of an effective degree of 
potential competition.” 
 
VIII.3.2 Economic barriers to entry replace regulatory barriers 
 
As we have tried to show in this thesis, entry barriers were at the origin of market 
imperfections that rendered the different routes less contestable. Before 
deregulation, new airlines were prevented from entering city pairs, because they 
were governed by bilateral agreements. Thus regulatory barriers to entry were 
replaced by new “economic” barriers, created by the more able among the industry 
incumbents. The strategic behaviour of these incumbents leveraged on existing 
barriers, which were not subject to explicit deregulation. These barriers were 
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solidified and extended, notably by organizing operations around dominated airports 
and creating tremendous scales of operation in such a setting. Such strategic 
behaviour and the economic barriers that it created caused industry structure to 
change with it.  
 
With regard to public policy, the new market structure that emerged was neither 
foreseen nor intended by the responsible policy makers. As was shown in numerous 
examples, and empirically proven, these economic barriers thrived on welfare losses 
to keep entrants out and to reap benefits as a private entity. For example, the welfare 
loss linked to airport congestion was instrumentalized for strategic behaviour by 
increasing flight frequency, funnelling in traffic for high-density and long-haul routes 
and maintaining high demand on such routes via CRS and sophisticated price 
discrimination. Public welfare was not served with regard to airport congestion, but 
the benefits of such welfare losses were appropriated exclusively by the dominant 
incumbent, especially in the form of higher ticket prices. 
 
We believe such mechanisms to be robust over time, that is, they are likely to be 
repeated by “successful” incumbents, if they are allowed to do so. Today, in 2001, 
Europe’s biggest incumbents are bidding for majority stakes in air traffic control. Air 
traffic within Europe is, like airport congestion, one of the key bottlenecks in this 
industry. The airline that can control such traffic, or potentially influence it, will again 
thrive on welfare losses, instead of reducing them. The possibility of privileging the 
owner airline or alliance partners for quick take-offs and landings is tempting, indeed. 
As with computer reservation systems, which initially had owner airlines show up first 
on screens for available flights, air traffic control systems, too, may conveniently 
adapt to owner airline’s systems or customs. For low-cost airlines, whose competitive 
advantage lies in superior operating performance, quick turnaround of aircraft, etc., 
traffic control by competitors may seriously impact on their lower unit costs. 
 
VIII.3.3 Why privatization will not resolve these market imperfections 
 
With these market inefficiencies becoming worse in the years after 1998, 
stakeholders in air traffic, including advocates of liberalization, could not continue to 
ignore them. Along the lines of what has been said above, it would be surprising to 
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see such stakeholders proposing the elimination of economic barriers to entry to 
produce contestability in the European market. They may, probably rightly, argue that 
new entrants at the most important European hubs would probably not reduce 
welfare losses in the form of airport congestion. In the light of a profoundly changed 
market structure, it is almost impossible to reverse hub-and-spoke networks now, 
both practically and economically. Nevertheless, with welfare losses so obvious, 
these advocates are pressed to propose solutions. They are proposing the same sort 
of remedy that was the cause of the current situation: further liberalization, especially 
with regard to air traffic control (Fixing America’s airlines 2001).  
 
With this thesis, we have tried to stress the point that further liberalization will 
provoke further strategic behaviour aimed at creating new economic barriers, 
especially to the benefit of  already dominant incumbents and making entry ever- 
more difficult. Such behaviour, as shown, is unlikely to benefit public welfare. Again, 
a new market structure would evolve from such behaviour, with some incumbents 
unilaterally benefiting from it.    
 
The only solution to this dilemma that we can identify would be specific regulation of 
critical points of market structure. Entry barriers, be they regulatory or economic, 
would be an example. From an industrial organization point of view, the question may 
be asked: If the elimination of regulatory barriers to entry may rightfully be considered 
as “liberalization”, why then must the elimination of  economic barriers necessarily be 
called “re-regulation”? Only if a public authority without the vested interests of airline 
management were to impose rules could such barriers be eliminated. Obviously, 
such regulation would need to be a dynamic process and could be presented as a 
form of counterbalance to the firm’s power to determine market structure. 
 
Just as amateurs or mediocre managers will not be able to define coherent strategic 
behaviour that will yield economic barriers to entry, regulation of market structure 
cannot be left to amateurs or politicians either. The need for industry experts who 
understand the highly detailed operational characteristics of particular industries is 
essential for successful regulation in the interests of public welfare. These experts 
may come from academia, or possibly from within the industry itself and be converted 
to serve public interests. Competence and understanding of critical features of an 
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industry will not only improve regulation in its material sense but may also impact on 
the procedures for regulation: Instead of regulating any detail of air traffic, experts will 
concentrate only on key barriers, and thus pass regulation more quickly into practical 
application. The lags between new entry barriers and corrective regulation may thus 
be shortened. Moreover, competent regulators may even anticipate the effects on 
market structure that such strategic behaviour is likely to have, enabling the public 
interest to shape market structure effectively with proportionate degrees of regulation. 
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Annex: 
 
Empirical analysis was based on the following 35 city pairs 
 
 
City pair Departure Destination 
1 Amsterdam Brussels 
2 Amsterdam Düsseldorf 
3 Amsterdam Hamburg 
4 Barcelona Rome 
5 Birmingham Dublin 
6 Brussels Düsseldorf 
7 Brussels Hamburg 
8 Brussels Frankfurt 
9 London Amsterdam 
10 London Brussels 
11 London Cologne 
12 London Cork 
13 London Copenhagen
14 London Dublin 
15 London Düsseldorf 
16 London Frankfurt 
17 London Hamburg 
18 Madrid Athens 
19 Madrid Copenhagen
20 Madrid Lisbon 
21 Madrid Milan 
22 Madrid Rome 
23 Manchester Amsterdam 
24 Manchester Brussels 
25 Manchester Dublin 
26 Manchester Frankfurt 
27 Paris Athens 
28 Paris Barcelona 
29 Paris Copenhagen
30 Paris Lisbon 
31 Paris Madrid 
32 Paris Milan 
33 Paris Rome 
34 Paris Stockholm 
35 Rome Athens 
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